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ABSTRACT 
This research studies the implementation process of Integrated Resettlement Policy (IRP) 
in Three Gorges Project (TGP). In post-Mao China, the society has diversified greatly 
and caused changes to the govemmentality of the State. The prevailing understanding on 
Chinese policy implementation as policy outcome determined from above is now no 
longer informative. Therefore, the actor-network approach is adopted to improve our 
understanding. This approach is further elaborated both under the sociology of 
translation and in its spatial dimension. The former informs that IRP implementation is 
achieved by the interplay of heterogeneous actors. The outcome of IRP implementation 
is explained by the State's translation. The State is the translator which draws on local 
resources and employs localized strategies to link up heterogeneous actors. For the latter, 
it is argued that IRP implementation is also affected by spatial contingency and local 
causal mechanisms. As resources and strategies are mobilized in the local context, they 
are not directly determined by the State. Li this way, the implementation of IRP in a 
locale is spatially contingent. Moreover, local factors, such as the TGP and the high 
demand for economic development, are peculiar to Three Gorges Region (TGR) only. 
They are also considered as favourable conditions for the IRP implementation. 
The implementation process of IRP is illustrated in the context of Zigui 
County. One of the village in the county, Tongshuwan Village, is further selected to 
illustrate the subtleties of the process. Several implications have been found in this case. 
Local cooperation is important for the implementation of IRP in a locaie. To'a certain 
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extent, the role of local actors is imperative to the whole implementation process. 
Moreover, it is evident that if the policy considers the benefits of the local residents, local 
cooperation will be guaranteed. The findings of this research illustrates the fact that to 
respect the value of local right, local participation and local knowledge are also pre-
requisites for the undertaking of resettlement project. Lastly, it is illustrated that the 
power of the State is not something possessed but generated by the association of 
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1.1 The Research Problem 
This paper is about population resettlement caused by the construction of 
the Three Gorges Dam (TGD). TGD will be the largest dam in the world which requires 
tremendous investment, long construction period, and involuntary population resettlement 
of 1.13 million people. Meanwhile, there will inundate nearly 30,000 hectares of 
farmland and orange groves. Besides, 13 cities, 140 towns, 1352 villages, 657 factories 
and other facilities as well as 8,000 historical relics will be inundated (Li, Ping 1992b; 
Sullivan 1995). The scale ofthis resettlement project is "equivalent to relocating the total 
population o f a small country" (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 11). Upon completion, an addition of 
over 18,000 megawatts of electric energy will be provided to central and southern China, 
and the navigation along Chanjiang will be further improved (Sullivan 1995). There is a 
high expectation that the completion of this mega-project will further boost the entire 
national economy of China. However, this project is also slated by local and overseas' 
voices for its negative impacts on the environment (Fearnside 1988; Huus 1994; Sullivan 
1995).' 
Among various types of development-related population displacement, 
based on the World Bank's report, those caused by the building of large dams and 
i 
1 For the recent debates of the Three Gorges Project (TGP), see Dai & Xue (1996). 
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reservoirs are the most common (Cernea & Guggenheim 1993). Accordingly, it is 
estimated that there will be "an average of some 300 new hydropower and irrigation high 
dams entering the construction stage" annually, therefore, a total number of 4 million 
people needed to be resettled (Cernea 1995: 92). In addition, the size of "development-
related population displacement" will tend to increase in the next decades because of the 
speeding up of the infrastmctural development (Cernea 1994; Cernea 1995). 
Resettlement^ becomes a recent public concern not only because of the negative 
environmental and social impacts of the mega-projects, but also due to the "widely 
publicized and increasingly well organized resistance to resettlement in many parts of the 
world" (Cernea & Guggenheim 1993: 1). Therefore, in the impression of most of people, 
resettlement is regarded as "a hard nut to crack all over the world", especially in 
developing societies (Li, Ping 1992b). Recent investigation of resettlement in developing 
countries shows that "the displacement caused by development projects is the direct 
outcome of a planned political decision to take land away from its current users" (Cernea 
& Guggenheim 1993: 4). Furthermore, in these projects, it is rationalized that "beliefs 
such as ‘the greatest good for the greatest number � � such sc emes reflect basic political 
choices concerning who should gain and suffer from development" (Cernea & 
Guggenheim 1993: 4). Hence, many scholars suggest that in order to implement the 
resettlement work effectively, the benefits of the local people (such as the compensation 
of houses and the allocation of land) should be a top priority especially for involuntary 
2 In the following chapters, 'resettlement', 'population displacement' and 'population relocation ,�are used 
to stand for the same thing. 
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resettlement (Cernea & Guggenheim 1993; Hall 1994; Li, Jiongguang 1996; Thoahlane 
1991). 
In the 1988 international river system symposium, the TGD was listed as 
"the first of the world's 20 most terrifying giant dams under consideration" (Yao 1989a: 
15). It is not only because this dam will bring adverse environmental effects and losses of 
thousands of items of cultural heritage, but also has to resettle over a million of people. 
The Head of the Three Gorges Project Development Corporation {Sanxia Kaifa 
Zonggongshi), Lu Youmei, comments that population resettlement was one of the "big 
difficulties" of the whole project (Sullivan 1995). With such a huge number of population 
resettlement, will the Chinese authority be able to undertake this task successfully? 
Since 1949, over 80,000 reservoirs have been built, about 30 million mu of 
farmland have been inundated and 10 million people have been resettled in China. 
However, it is discovered that only one-third of the resettlement project is considered 
satisfactory (Li, Boning 1992; Li, Ping 1992b; Liu, Junde 1990). In the past, the authority 
only made a single lump sum payment as ‘once and for all’ compensation for the people 
and made use of political campaign to force them to leave their homelands. There was a 
total lack of legal framework for resettlement. Therefore, it caused tragic result in 
resettlement. For example, the 319,000 people resettled due to the construction of 
Guanting and Sanmenxia reservoirs in the 1970s and the 383,000 people resettled 
because of Danjiangkou reservoir in the 1980s are still as poor and backward as before, 
and frequently seek return to their homelands (although the reservoirs have been 
completed). Thus, social and economic problems are prevalent in the reservoir areas 
/ 
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(Cernea 1994; Fang & Wang 1988; Shi 1992). Summing up the previous experience, the 
Chinese authority has recognized that the old practices on resettlement should be 
amended and it is necessary to establish laws and regulations in tackling resettlement. 
Meanwhile, in order to help the relocated population to develop long term attachments to 
the new site, the new resettlement arrangement should ensure the relocated people with 
better living standard, or at least maintain it at the same level as before. There should be 
"social connections with host communities, and symbolic identifications with the new 
environment" (Cernea & Guggenheim 1993: 4). With this in mind, the Chinese authority 
has established the 'resettlement with development approach' and tailored a specific 
regulation, the Integrated Resettlement Policy (IRP) {Kaifaxing Yimin Zhengce), to tackle 
the TGP resettlement. The IRP is a policy which changes the traditional way of simple 
relocation and compensation. Rather, investment funds are provided to the local 
authority "to help resettled people develop the local rich natural resources and create 
stable conditions for their livelihood" (Li, Ping 1992b: 25). In other words, the 
resettlement task and economic development are now combined together. Since the 
Chinese authority has no experience in this new resettlement approach, questions arise, 
such as, what exactly does it entail? How is it implemented? Who implements it? To 
what extent will it be implemented? These are some of the questions that must be 




1.2 Research Objectives 
There are three objectives in this research. First, it documents the 
empirical reality of how IRP is implemented in the Three Gorges Region (TGR). The 
TGP has attracted the world's limelight, however, most studies are interested in 
scrutinizing the decision-making process of the project (see Lampton 1987a; Lieberthal & 
Oksenburg; Ma 1990). Little has been written on the details of IRP in westem literature. 
It is, therefore, necessary to supplement the literature with a more detailed account of 
IRP. Second, it attempts to provide a better understanding of policy implementation in 
China nowadays. Since the Chinese society has undergone rapid changes during the 
reform era, it is necessary to understand policy implementation from a new perspective. 
This research will draw on an analytical framework to understand the implementation of 
IRP. Third, since space plays an important role in shaping the implementation of national 
policy in local areas, this research attempts to document how the spatial contingency of 
Zigui County and the particular local forces in TGR have affected the outcome of 
implementation. 
Zigui County was chosen as the study area. Geographically, Zigui County 
is located right ‘above the dam and at the head of the reservoir' {bashang kushou). It is 
the earliest counties undertaking population resettlement in the TGR? According to the 
principle of "first-grade development, completion of the dam at one stroke, retaining 
water by stages, and gradual resettlement of population", Changjiang will be dammed in 
late 1997 (Yao 1989a: 21).^ Therefore, Zigui County will have to fmish the first phase of 
3 , 
For the 19 inundated counties in TGR, see Fig. 4.1. 
"First-grade development" means that no dam will be built between the TGD site, SandoujMng，and 
Chongqing. "Completion of the dam at one stroke" stands for that the 185 metres' dam will be built at one 
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resettlement before late 1997.5 According to the estimation of the Changjiang Basin 
Planning Office (CBPO), in Zigui County, there will be 9 towns or townships, with 134 
villages and a total affected population of 67 thousands which accounts for 16% of the 
County's total population (The actual relocated population will finally reach 100 
thousand, taking into consideration the natural increase in population).^ Moreover, 2,000 
hectares of farmland, hundreds of factories, 15 power stations, 200 km highways, 50 piers 
and 200 km broadcast network line will also be sunk (Interview with the Head of Zigui 
Resettlement Bureau, Zhou Min, 4/8/1996). The pilot study of relocation in the county 
commenced in 1985 and finished in 1993. Zigui County is now in the stage of actual 
resettlement. The progress of Zigui County's resettlement project is as follows: first, the 
new county seat in Maoping has completed the basic infrastructural construction (roads, 
electricity, as well as water supply has been installed, and the foundation of the site has 
been flattened) {santongyiping). Second, relocation work is implementing in every 
inundated towns (townships) which mainly deals with population relocation and 
infrastructural reconstruction (‘backward�resettlement [houkao yimin] in Quyuan, 
Shachenxi, Guojiaba and Xiangxi is going to complete in near future). Third, till the mid 
of 1996, there has been one to two thousands people resettled to the suburb of Yichang 
time. "Retaining water by stages" refers that the water level does not rise to 175 metres at once but in 
ascending order, from 95 metres, 135 metres, 156 metres and finally 175 metres. By doing this, it can 
reduce the adverse effects to the harbour at Chongqing. "Gradual resettlement of population", as water 
rises by stages, so the people are relocated phase by phase and this process is undertaken continually till the 
completion of the TGP (Chen, Jingqui 1992: 32-33, my translation). 
5 Since the water level will rise up to 95 metres in late 1997, the County Resettlement Bureau must relocate 
those people who live under 95 metres (Interview with the Head of Zigui Resettlement Bureau, Zhou Min 
4/8/96). ’ 
6 The 9 towns (townships) are: Guizhou (the seat of Zigui County), Maoping, Guojiaba, Xiangxi, 
Shachenxi, Xietan (these five are towns), Zhouping, Quyuan and Shuitianba (these three are townships) (see 
Fig. 4.4). 
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City and Dangyang County (Interview with the Head of Zigui Resettlement Bureau, Zhou 
Min, 4/8/96). With a decade of resettlement experience, Zigui County offers the best case 
to investigate the implementation of IRP. Additionally, the Department of Geography at 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong has set up experimental field plots and established 
a collaborative relationship with the Zigui County government which will facilitate field 
research for my study. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
The research methodology includes mainly literature review and field 
research. The reviewed literature covers, first, theories and arguments of population 
resettlement and policy implementation in both China and developing countries in 
general. It aims at finding out a better conceptual framework to understand IRP 
implementation. Out of the literature review, a particularly useful framework - the actor-
network approach -- is suggested. This approach treats the outcome of IRP 
implementation as "effects generated in patterned networks of diverse (not simply 
human) materials" (Law 1992: 380). 
Information on Zigui County is collected from library research, talks and 
seminars held in both Zigui and Hong Kong and field trips to Zigui County. The basic 
socio-economic data were collected from two sources: first, the statistical figures were 
taken from Hubei Yearbooks, Yichang Yearbooks and Zigui Local Gazetteer and, 
second, the unpublished materials were copied from Zigui local government. Based on 
the information passed by the informants in the Department of Geography at Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, I carried out my preliminary visit to Zigui County between 
t 
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22nd and 30th of August, 1995. It gave me some basic information about the 
resettlement work in Zigui and established a relationship with the local government. 
Between 1st and 15th of August, 1996, I went to Zigui County again to undertake my 
field research. During 29th of August and 5th of September of the same year, the 
officials of Zigui County (involving the Head of Zigui County, Head of Agricultural 
Bureau, Head of Financial Bureau, as well as Head of Resettlement Bureau) visited the 
Department of Geography at the Chinese University of Hong Kong- and had a seminar 
with us. It provided a chance for me to clarify the data taken from the field earlier and 
further exchange opinions with them. 
The methodology of case study is used so as. to give an in-depth 
illustration of the sequence of IRP implementation process. "Although case studies are 
invariably ' u n i q u e � � i f carefully chosen they allow theoretical concerns to be grounded in 
observation. They are adopted in the belief that close examination of the 'concrete, leads 
to an understanding of more general processes" (Murdoch & Marsden 1995: 373). It is 
necessary to all that the purpose of this research is not to generalize the case study 
experience. 
Among the relocated villages in Zigui County, Tongshuwan village is 
selected as the case study since it is one of the earliest resettlement villages. According to 
the local official estimation in 1991, about three quarters of its population needed to be 
displaced (see Fig. 4.4)7 The local authority started to plan the resettlement work and 
mn the pilot programme in late 1991. In 1993, after the completion of pilot programme, 
7 In 1991, there is a total population of 1,437 (402 households) in the village, ofwhich 1,100 ofthem (287 
households) needed to be relocated (Uwublished materials copied in the house of Villaee Partv Secretarv 
11/8/1996). ^' 
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and the actual resettlement began. In 1995, two-thirds of the relocated population have 
been resettled.^ It is planned that all the resettlement projects would have been completed 
by late 1997 (Personal note, 29/8/1995). Thus, the experience at Tongshuwan is 
sufficiently long enough to scrutinize the process of IRP implementation. Moreover, as 
compared with other resettlement villages, Tongshuwan Village is considered as an easily 
accessible village. This plays a major role in the choice of field site. 
During the field work, research techniques of in-depth interviews and 
i n f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n w e r e used . T w o c a t e g o r i e s o f p e o p l e w h o are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the 
implementation o f lRP in Zigui were interviewed: first, the cadres at the county, town and 
village level who are responsible to implement IRP; second, the relocated peasants in 
Tongshuwan village. In the latter category, two to three households from each relocated 
group of the village were chosen for interview (Tongshuwan village was divided into 
eight groups where six of them were targeted for relocation). A total of twelve 
households were interviewed. 
1.4 Significance of the Research 
This research will make a contribution to the understanding of IRP 
implementation. It will also supplement the literature on TGP resettlement project. The 
literature on the TGP resettlement project is mainly concentrated on the propagation of 
IRP's pilot study, problems found in pilot study IRP, and investigation of people's 
8 • 
732 people (185 households) has been resettled locally {houkou) and 7 people (2 households) has been 
resettled in other regions {waiqian) (Unpublished materials copied in the house ofVi l lage Party Secretary, 
11/8/1996). 
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attitude towards IRP implementation. An understanding of the actual implementation of 
IRP is found wanting. By focusing on this dimension, it is hoped that this research will 
provide a new research direction for TGP resettlement project. By understanding the 
mechanism of the IRP at work, it is possible to know why some projects are much more 
successful in some locales than others. This research also has practical implications. 
Since the Chinese society is undergoing rapid changes in the reform era, the framework 
used in this research may provide illustration for the whole country. Finally, it is hoped 
that the Zigui resettlement experience may help to provide insights and directions for 
further resettlement projects in TGR or other parts of China, and other infrastmctural 
projects. 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
The organization of the thesis will be arranged as follow. Chapter 2 gives 
a review of both the English and Chinese literature on resettlement project. In this 
review, it examines the resettlement projects in different countries. Moreover, it also 
exposes the problems found in the existing literature on resettlement project. It helps to 
lay down the foundation for a more appropriate study framework in the following 
chapters. Chapter 3 deals with the conceptual framework. Basically it follows the actor-
network approach, which also considers the spatial dimension. The use ofthis conceptual 
framework aims at providing a better understanding of the implementation of IRP. 
Chapter 4 draws on the background of TGP resettlement project. It outlines the basic 
characteristics of TGP, historical background of TGR, as well as the basic socio-
i 
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economic features of Zigui County. The former two are important locally generated 
mechanisms which create favourable conditions for the implementation ofIRP. The later 
one is regarded as the spatial context which affects the IRP implementation. This helps 
us to understand why the implementation ofIRP in Zigui is different from other locales in 
the TGR. Chapter 5 attempts to delineate the IRP implementation by the actor-network 
approach. In order to have a clearer picture of the whole process, one of the villages in 
Zigui County ~ Tongshuwan Village ~ is chosen as a case study. Chapter 6 summarizes 




RESETTLEMENT PROJECT: A REVIEW 
OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at highlighting the deficiencies of existing literature, on 
resettlement projects both in English and Chinese. It starts with a review of the English 
literature on resettlement. It is expected to find out the extent to which this issue has 
been approached successfully in the literature. Then it reviews the literature on 
resettlement projects in China. This section is divided into two parts. First, it reviews the 
literature on IRP. Second, it focuses on the literature of policy implementation in China. 
This review should shed light on an appropriate framework in addressing the IRP 
implementation. 
2.2 The Resettlement Experience in the Developing Countries: A 
Review of the English Literature 
Most of the English literature on resettlement project focuses on the 
impact of resettlement. In the past several decades, under the wave of modernization, the 
developing nations had undertaken a large number of massive development projects. 
Concomitantly, they had forced a huge number of people to resettle in other areas. 
Unfortunately, the decision makers and the project planners either considered 
resettlement as "a by-product of development and modernization" or "a necessary 
i 
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liability", instead of a major concern in the projects (De Wet 1991; Hamilton 1990; 
Shami 1991). Accordingly, one can imagine that: 
“Many jobs, much valuable land, and other income generating assets are lost. 
Health care tends to deteriorate. Kinship groups and informal social networks for 
mutual help are scattered. Links between producers and their customers often are 
severed and local labor markets are disrupted. Ancestral shrines and graves must 
sometimes be abandoned, breaking links with the past and with people's cultural 
identity. And not only the affected people are worse off: when displacement is 
massive, it weakens also the local and regional economy" (Cemea 1994: 47). 
In this way, these outcomes of resettlement make "a mockery of stated intentions to use 
relocation as a development strategy" (Hansen & Oliver-Smith 1982: 270). 
It is Scudder and Colson (1982 cited in Hansen & Oliver-Smith 1982) who 
attempt to conceptualize the impact of resettlement. They define the impact of 
resettlement as "multi-dimensional stress" which can be mainly classified in terms of 
physiological, psychological and sociocultural. The physiological stress refers to the 
huge morbidity and mortality rate after resettlement, whereas psychological stress is the 
feeling of guilt, anxiety and uncertainty and related behaviour like "nostalgia" and 
"helplessness" following resettlement. Last, sociocultural stress is the political, 
economic, social and cultural impact of resettlement which Hansen & Oliver-Smith 
(1982) who address. Shami (1991) points out that the first two kinds of stresses are 
mainly found in refugee displacement whereas the latter one is found in development-
caused resettlement. 
It is difficult to deny the contribution of Scudder and Colson in the study 
of the impact of resettlement. However, their works are still unsatisfactory. By focusing 
on the impact of resettlement, it implies that resettlement is regarded as a single event and 
i 
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the fact that resettlement is being undertaken within a period of time and probably 
implemented by stages is neglected. The implementation process of resettlement has 
seldom been addressed. 
Besides, mitigation of resettlement impact is another major concem of the 
English literature. As reviewed above, the affected population is totally neglected from 
the project design as well as its institutional and financial arrangements. Therefore, the 
resettlement projects are characterized as insufficient social planning and shortage of 
financial and technical inputs (Cernea 1988，De Wet 1991). Colson (1971) exposes that 
the scant attention to the lack of social planning in resettlement is due to the mistake of 
"engineering bias" or "sectorial bias". It means that specific sector in a development 
project "is an essential policy domain between the macro national level and the micro 
project level. De Wet adds that at the sectoral level that the hard economic calculations 
take place, and where priorities, and hence the budget and the policy relating to 
resettlement, are often avoided" ( 1991: 105). In the 1980s, owing to increasing concern 
of affected communities in resettlement, the World Bank endeavoured to find out 
solutions to alleviate the impact produced by resettlement (Cernea 1988; Cernea 1993; 
Cernea 1994; Cernea 1995; Gibson 1993; Hamilton 1990). Therefore, research on 
resettlement mitigation changed the emphasis from a "welfare approach" to "people-
centre approach"(Hamilton 1990). 
As resettlement will inevitably dismantle the past production system of the 
affected population, it is suggested that resettlement project should also be development 
project (Hamilton 1990). In other words, the benefits of the displaced people should be 
/ 
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first considered in the implementation of resettlement project (such as securing the land 
tenure of the relocatees, translating compensation into production means and recovering 
the local economic system, etc.) (Cernea 1993; Cemea & Guggenheim 1993; De Wet 
1991; Plater 1995). Moreover, in order to reduce the impact of imposition of non-local 
resettlement policy, Enakshi (1992) argues that the authority should respect the 
relocatees' opinion and hamess the local knowledge in resettlement.planning.‘ More 
information should be distributed to the affected population so as to reduce their feeling 
of insecurity and anxiety when facing changes.^ In addition, Cernea (1988, 1994) points 
out that, by gathering previous experience, participation of the affected population in the 
formulation of resettlement plans is critical for the success of resettlement.^ Hall (1994: 
1794) argues that under the influence of traditional theories like modernization, neo-
Marxist and institutional incorporation, projects planners and the authorities all have 
doubts about "the potential for constructive change arising from internal social interaction 
within project situations". Therefore, local groups only have "little room for manoeuver 
to set their own agenda for action" (Hall 1994: 1793). 
To sum up, perhaps the approach of Cernea and Guggenheim (1993) 
represents a rather comprehensive picture on the mitigation ofresettlement impact. They 
adopt the "anthropological approach" to summarize pointers for resettlement mitigation 
studies. The anthropological approach fosters an "understanding from the native's point 
‘For the study of impacts bring by non-local resettlement policy, see Grimm (1992). 
2 In the study ofBaliraja dam, "it is possible to construct a dam for irrigation with the ftill participation of 
the people and resulting in no displacement" (Enakshi 1992: 20). , 
3 In the case of Finland Karelians, De Wet (1991: 105) points out that the relocatees could "make their 
voices heard as they were able to mobilize public support and to have their case represented at high official 
levels�� . Whereas in the Yacyrata project of Argentina, the authorities imposed restrictions on such kinds of 
participation, thus caused failure in resettlement. 
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of view" (Cernea & Guggenheim 1993:6). Cemea and Guggenheim (1993: 6) argue that 
resettlement impact will be avoided "only when the traditional tools of development 
planning are complemented by ethnographic research and the active involvement of the 
people affected by resettlement in project decision making". 
The literature on resettlement mitigation is not without problem. Similar 
to the literature on resettlement impact, it fails to consider resettlement as a process. 
Meanwhile, as the majority of these studies are projects supported by the World Bank, 
their focuses are mainly on policy evaluation as well as the role of the World Bank. 
These works have gathered valuable experience for formulating appropriate resettlement 
policy and significantly improved the livelihood of the relocated population. However, 
they have failed to evaluate the role of the State in implementing resettlement project. 
Indeed, resettlement involves million of people, as in the case of TGP, it cannot be left to 
individual families. Instead, the State should play a dominant role. Therefore, more 
extensive studies are required to capture the role of the State in resettlement mitigation. 
Moreover, the literature has paid insufficient attention not only on the role 
of the State but also on the host communities. According to the World Bank, the victims 
of resettlement can be divided into three categories. They are the displaced people, the 
host community and the surrounding environment (Cemea & Guggenheim 1993). 
However, it is found that the literature on resettlement mitigation has concentrated on the 
relocated people but not on the host communities. (Except Cristensen and Scudder 
(1991，cited in Shami 1991) who attempts to study the impact on host communities. 
t 
However, there is limited attention on the mitigation measures in their work). ‘ 
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It is Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982) who present the most comprehensive 
attempt to examine resettlement as a process. They conceptualize resettlement as a kind 
of "social process". The study of "social process" refers to the investigation of how the 
decision-making of the people help them to solve problems caused by resettlement. 
Therefore, under this conceptualization, relocated people are regarded as "actors rather 
than targets or clients". Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982: 5) consider the relocated people 
as actors because they show "rational, goal-oriented behaviour and attempt to develop 
effective (consistent with their own perceptions of well-being) coping mechanisms to deal 
with varied stresses". Hall (1994) further operates on this actor-oriented concept by 
specifying “the internal social interaction within the project situation" in the Brazilian 
hydropower project. He concludes that by considering resettlement as a social process, it 
allows for the rescue of the mistakes produced by deterministic development models.^ 
Therefore, local interests can also have sufficient considerations in resettlement planning. 
Derived from the study of Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982), Scudder and 
Colson (1982 cited in Hansen & Oliver-Smith 1982) further develop a framework which 
considers resettlement as a process of adaptation. They call this framework a four-stage 
model of resettlement. According to this model, resettlement can be divided into four 
stages. They are, in sequence, the recruitment, transition, potential development and 
handing over or incorporation. The recruitment stage is the decision-making stage of 
resettlement which determines the site and the responses of relocatees upon the issue. 
The transition stage is the period which the relocatees start to face with stresses. The 
< 
4 The deterministic development models, such as modernization, neo-Marxist and institutional 
incorporation, all consider resettlement planning should be determined by extemal forces like the State or 
international development agencies (Hall 1994). 
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responses of them in this period tend to be conservative in order to minimize further 
stresses. The potential development stage is "characterized by increased initiative and 
risk taking and the emergence of a dynamic and increasingly open-ended society". Since 
this stage will occur only if the relocatees have been better off or recovered from the 
transition stage, it may not be found in some cases. The handing over or incorporate 
stage is the one in which the resettlement society “is a long-term success as an entity 
when management of local production systems and the running of the local community 
are handed over to a second generation that identifies with the community" (Hansen & 
Oliver-Smith 1982: 274-5). 
This conceptualization has provided two important implications for 
resettlement studies. First, relocated people are not passive agent in the course of 
resettlement; rather they can be actively involved in shaping the outcome of resettlement. 
Second, the outcome of resettlement should not only be seen as determined by external 
centres (such as the State and the World Bank) but also shaped by the interplay of 
different actors involved. 
However, there are also shortcomings in this model. It is found that the 
model has not differentiated between involuntary and voluntary resettlement. Perhaps 
Cernea (1993, cited in Cemea & Guggenheim 1993) provides a far more comprehensive 
distinction between these two types of resettlement. He identifies three major differences 
between them. First, there are both push and pull factors in voluntary resettlement but 
there is only push factor in involuntary resettlement. Second, in terms of the degree of 
anxiety and insecurity of relocated people, it is much higher in involuntary resettlement 
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than its counterpart. Third, they are different in the composition of resettlers. As the 
process of voluntary resettlement is slow and gradual, the settlers can still have linkage 
with their homeland. Therefore, they can "give them a cushion should they fail as well as 
extra resources from home to help them adjust to their new habitat" (Cemea & 
Guggenheim 1993: 3). In involuntary resettlement, the whole population is thrown "into 
the same quandary at the same time". Such a movement represents the cutting of social 
linkage and resource supply from homeland (Cernea & Guggenheim 1993).^ 
This model, however, is too general "to account for the details of specific 
cases, or for differences in responses of people across schemes, or within the same 
scheme" (De Wet 1991: 107). In other words, spatial variation has not been considered in 
this model.6 Furthermore, this model is based on "limited ethnographic validity, as it had 
drawn largely on rural African and Asian examples, and did not necessarily fit more 
stratified, structurally closed Latin American societies, or urban communities" (De Wet 
1991: 107). Thus, this explains why some scholars have turned their concerns to 
resettlement in urban area (Bartolome 1984; Cernea 1993) and other developing nations 
like India and the Arab world in recent years (Enakshi 1992; Shami 1991; Shami & 
McCann 1991). 
5 Three main agents of involuntary resettlement are further identified. It involves development projects 
(such as dams and railway), wars and political disturbances as well as natural disasters like flooding and 
earthquake (Cernea & Guggenheim 1993; Enakshi 1992; Shami 1991). Cemea (1993，cited in Cemea & 
Guggenheim) suggests that there are three major differences among development-caused resettlement and 
those caused by wars and natural disasters. First, the former one is "planned political decision" whereas the 
latter two are not. Second, the authority, in former case, should has higher commitment to take care of the 
affected people than the latter two. Third, the displacement caused by wars and natural disasters are 
temporary in nature whereas the development-related resettlement is permanent. 
De Wet and McAllister (1991, cited in De Wet 1991) also argue that to understand local variation is 
critical for the planning and implementation of the resettlement policy. 
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Meanwhile, Shami (1991: 9) also criticizes that although the suggestion of 
resettlement as process has balanced the past account, it still considers resettlement as 
"two steady states with a middle transition stage". He suggests that resettlement "must be 
seen as twin facets, rather than as distinct successive phases, of the process". 
In the E n g l i s h r e s e t t l e m e n t l iterature, s t u d i e s o n r e s e t t l e m e n t in A s i a n 
countries are only a recent focus. The speeding up of infrastructure construction? and 
ever increasing population densities has rapidly increased development-caused 
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resettlement growing rapidly in Asia (Table 2.1). Based on the recent investigations of 
the World Bank, it is found that there are at least 10 million people affected annually in 
developing countries (Cernea 1994; Economist 1994). Perhaps Enakshi (1992) represents 
the most comprehensive and systematic investigation of involuntary resettlement in India. 
He argues that the prime factor of failure in rehabilitation work is that the government has 
“failed to perceive the issue of displacement in its totality and looked at it merely from an 
economic point of view" (Enakshi 1992: 51). The absence of consultation and 
participation of affected residents, inadequate compensation, lack of an integrated 
rehabilitation approach and the inefficient and corruptive nature of the implementation 
authorities are also reasons of failure. Besides, Shami (1991) also attempts to provide a 
general overview and formulate a better understanding of the resettlement in the Arab 
World. He concludes that the resettlement in the Arab World still has received 
7 Infrastructure construction costs an annual investment o f $ 2 0 0 billion in developing countries. As a result, 
"the share ofhouseholds with access to clean drinking water has risen by 50 percent in the last 15 years; per 
capita access to electric power and telephones has doubled; and over half of the increase in food production 
has come from investments in irrigation" (Cemea 1994: 46). 
Among the Bank-financed projects in developing countries, 60 percent of the projects and 82 percent of 
displaced people are undertaken in South and East Asia (Cemea 1994). 
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insufficient attention from scholars. Therefore, the dominant view on resettlement in the 
Arab World is still under the influence of the modernization theory such as the 
sedentarization projects^ of Bedouins and other nomadic people and the focus of 
resettlement studies are still limited on war refugees (Shami 1991; Shami & McCann 
1991). 
There is also a problem in the literature on Asian resettlement projects, 
too. Although 20 million people were displaced in China over the last few decades, there 
has been no attempt, similar to that ofEnakshi (1992) for India, to study the resettlement 
experience of China. It is expected that the Chinese experience should enrich the regional 
theoretical and comparative framework of resettlement study. 
Time Period Number ofPeople 
China 1950-90 20,000,000 
India 1950-90 18,500,000 
Thailand 1963-77 130,000 
Brazil 1980-90 400,000 
Turkey 1980-90 300,000 
Table 2.1 Estimates ofNational Resettlement caused by Development Projects 
(Source: Cernea & Guggenheim 1993: 2) 
In sum, the English literature on resettlement projects has been found 
wanting. It does not give significant emphasis to resettlement as a process. Nor has it 
succeeded in addressing the spatial differentiation among countries. Particularly, while 
9 Sedentarization is "viewed as a positive force for modernization which should be implemented ai]d even 
imposed upon the people, with no ftirther delay for reasons ofsocio-economic and political integration but 
also to 'eliminate' the nomads' ‘mythical, and ‘superstitious’ traditions" (Ministry of Local Government 
1963,cited in Shami 1991: 16). 
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China will have to relocate one million of people in the TGP, little attention has been paid 
to the Chinese resettlement experience. Therefore, it is worthwhile to review how this 
issue has been dealt with in the Chinese literature. 
2.3 The Resettlement Projects in China 
The literature reviewed in this section mainly focuses on the involuntary 
resettlement caused by dam projects in China. The discussion will be divided into three 
parts. First, it will examine the literature on resettlement in general. Then, it reviews the 
literature on the IRP, which is implemented in TGP resettlement. Finally, at a broader 
scale, it reviews the literature on policy implementation in China. 
2.3.1 Little Concern for the Affected People 
In the literature on Chinese resettlement projects, resettlement is usually 
regarded as the by-product of dam projects. In fact, the majority of them concentrate on 
dam construction rather than resettlement. Colson (1971) called this "engineering bias". 
Moreover, Shui (1996) argues that resettlement projects in China have long been 
implemented as a kind of political campaign. Therefore, relocated people are required to 
sacrifice totally so as to complete the construction of dam. Mou and Cai (1996) further 
argue that the process and outcome of resettlement vary depending on the political 
climate of the day. They point out that during a relatively stable period of 1956- 57, the 
result ofXinanjiang Reservoir resettlement was remarkable -- with detail planning by the 
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authority, sufficient funding for compensation,'^ adequate understanding of people's own 
rights and benefits of the reservoir, and comprehensive arrangement for residents after 
resettlement. In order to increase the people's confidence on relocation and gain their 
support, the local cadres did several things. Firstly, they clearly introduced the meaning 
of reservoir construction. Secondly, tours were arranged for the relocatees to visit the 
relocation site. Thirdly, the relocatees accepting area was fully consulted before 
relocation. Lastly, the information about accommodation and production arrangement as 
well as the means of relocation were made known to the relocatees (Mou & Cai 1996). 
However, in resettlement during the Great Leap Forward (GLF), many problems have 
been found in resettlement, like persistent poverty of the relocated families, as well as 
their repeated attempts to return to their homeland, which delayed the construction of 
dam project. During the GLF, the strategy of mass campaign was introduced to the 
implementation of resettlement work. Under the slogan of ‘pay effort to send satellite 
and carry out resettlement work in full speed’ {guganjin fangweixing kuaimajiabian 
gaoyimin), the relocatees' revolutionary passion was mobilized. By emphasizing on 
'scarify for State construction' {geijinshe zou gongxian), no compensation was given to 
the relocatees. In order to enhance the speed of resettlement, the relocated people were 
mobilized to help to break down their old houses. In some extreme case, resettlement and 
innudation were carried out at the same time (Mou & Cai 1996). Furthermore, Yi (1996) 
points out that resettlement in China is directed by the 'administrator's will，{zhangguan 
yizhi) rather than experts' opinion. 
{ 
'° At that time, the State gave 508 yuan for each affected person (Mou & Cai 1996: 170). 
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In s u m , it is d i s c o v e r e d that the l iterature o n C h i n e s e r e s e t t l e m e n t is m o r e 
focused on dam project rather than the affected people. Therefore, there is no attempt to 
study the resettlement planning and arrangement of relocated communities. Moreover, 
there is also no hint on the most fruitful ways to investigate the implementation of 
resettlement policy until the emergence ofIRP. It is imperative to review the literature on 
IRP so as to enrich the existing literature on Chinese resettlement project. 
2.3.2 Deficiencies of IRP Studies 
The TGP is a mega-project which will involve relocating a million people. 
Therefore, a special regulation has to be tailored to resettle the huge number of people. 
As IRP is a new attempt in China, the Chinese State has implemented pilot resettlement 
since 1985. Hence, the literature on IRP is recent. Majority of the studies is concerned 
with the implementation of pilot IRP. Feasibility study on the pilot IRP is the most 
common type of study (Dai 1989; Fang & Wang 1988; Tian & Lin 1988; Xin 1987). 
Moreover, there is also much work on policy suggestion and evaluation of pilot IRP. Xu 
et al. (1993) argue that limited environmental capacity is the prime constraint of the 
implementation of IRP. They suggest that, hilly slopes should also be exploited and local 
agriculture should rely more on cash crops, such as orange and tea. Chen, Guojie (1992, 
1994，1995) further argues that the basic strategy of the IRP should be industrial 
development rather than agriculture in order to solve the problem of limited 
environmental capacity and help to improve the backwardness of the TGR. 
/ 
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It is Li, Boning (1992) who attempts to conclude and systematize the pilot 
experience. Although his work has the function of policy propagation, it really provides a 
principal direction for pilot IRP. He finds out that there is a major problem in arranging 
relocatees to settle in secondary and tertiary industries during pilot study. He explains 
that there are three major shortcomings. First, the education level of the relocatees is too 
low. Therefore, it is necessary for them to have a long period of training. Second, it is 
difficult to resettle the whole family into a factory because only the youth would like to 
work in the factory while the elderly would prefer to stay on the farm. Third, in order to 
ensure the return of invested capital for future uses, it is important to choose enterprises 
which are profitable. However, in the eight years' pilot, it is found that half of the chosen 
enterprises reported losses (Li, Boning 1992). Therefore, he corrects his previous idea 
that IRP should be based on the development of secondary and tertiary industries. On the 
contrary, he suggests that the development strategy of IRP should rely on cash crop 
planting. In contrast to Li, Boning (1992), Chen, Guojie (1995) suggests that for the long 
term development of the TGR, secondary and tertiary industries should be developed for 
IRP. He supplements that it is necessary to look at the IRP implementation from a long 
term development perspective. Besides, Chen, Guojie (1992) also criticizes that although 
the authority has stated clearly the principal direction of IRP, it is necessary to establish 
some yardsticks to measure the success ofIRP. 
Furthermore, the literature on IRP also includes the investigation of the 
responses of affected population (mainly the relocated communities) on pilot IRP (Li, 
Jiongguang 1996; Lu, Qi 1996). In his investigation, Li, Jionguang (1996) argues that the 
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attitude of the relocatees towards resettlement has a significant effect on their cooperation 
in the IRP implementation. Meanwhile, Lu, Qi (1996) suggests that resettlement is a kind 
of 'integrated behaviour' {yinghe xingwei). Therefore, IRP should not only be concerned 
with the economic development of the local area, but also pay attention to the effect of 
changed socio-cultural environment on the relocatees (Lu, Qi 1996). 
As reviewed above, most of the literature on IRP concentrate on pilot 
study. There is still not enough attention paid to the actual implementation of IRP 
(except that of Zhang, Hongxiang 1995). Moreover, it is discovered that a majority of the 
IRP studies is written for practical purpose. Thus, they all focus on policy evaluation, 
policy suggestion, problem encountered, as well as future direction of IRP. Seldom is 
there any contribution to the theoretical understanding of IRP. In other words, the 
literature consists of more superficial descriptions than in-depth theoretical attempts. 
Furthermore, the literature on IRP is written for propagating the successful experience or 
advantages of pilot IRP. Little independent and in-depth analysis is conducted. Also, 
scant attention has been paid to the opinions of the relocated people (except that of Li, 
Jiongguang 1996 and Lu, Qi 1996). Finally, it is found that there is insufficient concerns 
for the IRP implementation process in the existing literature on IRP. 
In sum, it should be clear by now that the literature on IRP is not only 
limited, but also unsatisfactory. Most of the studies on IRP are focused on superficial 
delineation of the policy but pay little attention to the implementation process. Hence, it 
is worthwhile to review the literature of Chinese policy implementation so as to cast light 
on the appropriate framework of this study. 
/ 
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2.3.3 Policy Implementation in China 
In the past several decades, during the period of the Cold War, it was 
difficult for the westem scholars to know exactly the state of policy implementation in 
China. In the eyes of these scholars, owing to the divergence in ideology, China is an 
authoritarian state. In other words, China is similar to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries in that the whole country is dominated by a communist party based on 
Marxist-Leninist principles and with a socialist economic system (Lieberthal & 
Oksenberg 1988). Under the influence of this prevalent view on China, two conceptual 
models are found in the literature on Chinese policy implementation. They are the 
rationality model and the power model. The former one posits that policy outcomes are 
reasonable calculation and responses of the top leaders to practical problems derived from 
ideological principles. The latter suggests that policy outcomes are the consequences of 
power struggle among top leaders. In other words, "policy is the aggregate response of 
leaders or factions to problems they perceive and this response reflects the relative power 
of the participants, their strategies for advancing their beliefs and political interests, and 
their differentiated understanding of the problem at hand" (Lieberthal & Oksenberg 1988: 
15). 
However, there is a major drawback in these two models. Both models 
assume the relations between policy makers and policy outcome is a mechanical one. 
Therefore, it is supposed that the top political leaders "can exercise enormous leverage 
over the political system as a whole and that these same leaders make decisions by 
identifying problems and then adopting responses to those issues that derive logically 
t 
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from their own value preferences -- or power needs in intraelite struggles" (Lieberthal & 
Lampton 1992: 10). Therefore, the policy outcome can be explained in terms of the 
leaders' preferences and perceptions (Lieberthal & Oksenberg 1988, Lieberthal & 
Lampton 1992). Neither of them is concerned with the process of policy implementation. 
On the contrary, a "bottom-up" perspective has been adopted to explain 
policy implementation in China. It is assumed that within the cellular structure of 
Chinese society, the decentralized authority allowed the local leaders acting as ‘local 
emperor'{tiiwangdi) in their 'independent kingdom' {duliwangguo) (Shue 1988). 
Therefore, they are able to choke the upward information flow and so as to alter top-level 
decision making (Lieberthal & Lampton 1992). Same as the above models, this kind of 
conceptualization has also neglected the process of policy implementation. 
Since the reform in the late 1970s, the Chinese bureaucratic structure has 
become increasingly growing towards fragmented and disjointed." As a result, the 
implementation of a national policy is increasingly needed “to achieve agreement among 
an array of bodies [various bureaucracies and locales], where no single body has authority 
over the others" (Lieberthal & Lampton 1992: 8).'^ Coupled with the changes of the 
Chinese State as it progresses through the gradual reform, the literature starts to develop a 
new conceptualization on policy implementation in China -- the interplay of different 
” I t may be explained by two reasons. First, the decentralization of budgetary authority has allowed many 
locales and bureaucratic units to obtain funds from their own sources instead of central allocation 
(Furthermore, the local governments can acquire local revenue after the tax reform of 1994). As a 
consequence, these locales and bureaucratic units can have more autonomy to "pursue their own policy 
preferences" and "less sensitive to the policy demands from higher levels" (Lieberthal & Lampton 1992: 8). 
Second, the reduction of coercion (purges, labeling and demotions) and the loosening in ideological control 
in the reform era also pave the way for fragmented bureaucratic structure. 
12 Lieberthal (1992, cited in Lieberthal & Lampton 1992) called this kind of polity as "fragtnented 
authoritarianism". 
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bureaucratic units and locales. This has become an important ingredient in understanding 
policy outcomes. 
It is Lampton (1987a: 3) who suggests that policy outcome should not be 
necessarily understood from the perspective of either "top-down" or "bottom-up". 
Rather , it i s s h a p e d b y "the in terre la t ionsh ips a m o n g the c o n t e n t o f p o l i c y , the 
institutional structures in which policy is implemented, and the wider sociopolitical 
context in which these structures and processes operate". Lieberthal and Lampton (1992) 
indicate that policy implementation in China, in fact, is the study of fragmented 
bureaucratic structure and its internal dynamics, such as prevalence of bargaining and 
negotiations among bureaucracies or even central and local governments. 
There have been studies attempting to scrutinize the Chinese water policy 
implementation such as Lampton (1987b), Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) and Ma 
(1990). Lampton (1987b) tempts to outline the characteristics of policy implementation 
in China through water policy. He exposes that the delay of decision making in Chinese 
water policy is mainly due to the overloading of Chinese political system, peculiar 
Chinese political culture as well as distinctive unitism and protectionism in China. 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) attempt to illustrate the interrelationships among 
bureaucratic interests, politics, and processes in shaping the decision making process of 
the TGP. They argue that the rationality model is inadequate to explain such process. 
Rather, more attention should be paid to the dynamics between different interest entities. 
For our purposes, there are three major drawbacks o f the existing literature 
on policy implementation in China. First of all, the existing literature is biased towards 
i 
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the economic aspect. Less attention has been given to the understanding of the social 
dimension such as resettlement. The literature on policy implementation in China has 
been dominated by the focus on economic reform. Therefore, the majority of the studies 
has concentrated on fiscal policy (Bachman and Naughton, cited in Lampton 1987a), 
resource and energy policy (Fingar, Lampton and Ross, cited in Lampton 1987a; 
Lieberthal & Oksenberg 1988) as well as industrial policy (Walder, in Lieberthal & 
Lampton 1992). Although there are some attempts to implement research on the non-
economic sphere such as personnel (Manion 1991), science and education (Paine, cited in 
Lieberthal & Lampton 1992; Rosen and Simon, cited in Lampton 1987a) and coercion 
(Pollack, cited in Lieberthal & Lampton 1992), the range is comparatively small. There is 
still no systematic research on the implementation of resettlement policy in China today. 
Second, the role of space is totally underestimated in the existing literature 
on policy implementation in China. Most of the studies on policy implementation are 
understood from the perspective of either political science, sociology or economics. In 
comparison, there is no attempt from the geographical perspective. Duncan (1989b) 
argues that space cannot be reduced to the constituent of social phenomena and change. 
On the contrary, it exists as secondary and contingent causal effect which affects the 
general social mechanism. Although national policies are formulated for the whole 
country, it needs to admit that policies are not equally implemented spatially. Therefore, 
different policy outcomes will be exhibited under different spatial circumstances. 
Third, the majority of the existing studies is carried out in more open and 
developed regions, such as the coastal region. Scant attention has been paid to the 
/ 
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relatively poor and less open regions like TGR. Besides, the literature is biased towards 
the urban area, and much less attention has been given to rural area (except that of White, 
cited in Lampton 1987a and Zweig, cited in Lieberthal & Lampton 1992). 
2.4 Summary and Conclusion 
In this review of the English literature, it is discovered that most of the 
studies are focusing on the effects of the affected population. Little attempt has been 
made to study the host communities. Besides, while increasing academic interests are 
now shifting to study the resettlement of developing countries, it is a big surprise to learn 
that there has been no systematic and comprehensive study on today's China. 
In reviewing the Chinese literature on resettlement projects, it is 
discovered that resettlement is always regarded as a by-product of dam construction. 
There is no specific attention to the affected communities. This deficiency has been made 
up to a smaller extent by the studies on IRP. However, the literature on IRP has suffered 
from several drawbacks. Most of the studies emphasize too much on the pilot study and 
are problem-solving oriented. Meanwhile, the literature is also criticized for its strong 
sense of policy propagation and its lack of consideration of the opinions of the affected 
population. Furthermore, there is little attempt to provide a theoretical understanding of 
IRP. The literature on IRP has failed to address the underlying mechanism of IRP 
implementation. 
This chapter has not only reviewed the literature on resettlement projects 
but also touched on the literature on policy implementation in China. However, this 
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l i terature h a s b e e n f o u n d w a n t i n g . T h e r e i s a shor tage o f s tudy o n s o c i a l and w e l f a r e 
policy. In addition, the majority of the studies are concerned with developed regions, 
with meagre attempt being made to understand the poorer and inland regions. 
C o n c o m i t a n t l y , s t u d i e s o n urban areas are d o m i n a n t in the l iterature. Litt le o f t h e m h a v e 
focused on rural areas. Finally, despite the importance of space as a factor in the regional 
variation in the process of policy implementation, the spatial dimension is totally 
neglected in the literature. In conclusion, if we are to unravel the process of IRP 
implementation, it is necessary to construct a better-informed framework for analysis, a 





THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter has reviewed the literature 6n Chinese policy 
implementation and revealed its serious limitations. The purpose of this chapter is to 
construct a better framework to capture the process of IRP implementation in China. 
Such a construction starts with an outline of the recent transformation of the socio-
economic structure and govemmentaiity in China. It is hoped that such an outline of the 
significant changes in post-Mao China will specify the choice of a relevant theory for the 
purpose of understanding IRP implementation. The concept of actor-network approach 
will be introduced in section three. Different from previous accounts of Chinese policy 
implementation, this approach propounds that much more attention should be paid to the 
interplay of local actors in policy implementation. This section also addresses the role of 
space in the implementation process. This is necessary given the literature's negligence 
as well as the importance that the actor-network approach has assigned to contingency 
and local. Section four deals with the implications of the actor-network approach on IRP 
implementation in Zigui County. Finally, section five will summarize all the arguments 
in this chapter. 
{ 
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3.2 The Political-economic Reality of Post-Mao China: A Call for a 
Relevant Framework 
The reform undertaken since the late 1970s has led to significant changes 
in China. These changes can be scrutinized in four different aspects: first, the social 
structure, second, the state-society relation, third, the central-local relation and fourth, the 
rural society. 
3.2.1 The Collapse ofa Total Society and the Emergence of an Ungovernable 
Differentiated Society 
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949，the Chinese society can be 
regarded as a "total society" (Li et al. 1994: 70). A total society is characterized by its 
low degree and speed of societal differentiation and its relative homogeneous nature 
within the society. In other words, a total society is a monopolistic society and plays the 
role as political, economic and ideological centre. The most significant feature of a total 
society is that the State monopolizes almost all major kinds of resources, including 
tangible and intangible ones. The direct consequence of resource monopolization is the 
total state control of the whole society and the entire social life. Therefore, the State's 
ability in societal penetration, mass organization and mobilization is very strong. The 
resources are allocated through various administrative hierarchies and measures, 
including the status system {shenfen zidu), household registration system {hukou zidu) 
and unit system {danwei zidu), etc. These kinds of resource allocation mechanism are 
known as the 'sub-institutional structure' {cike zhidu jiegou) of a total society (Wang, 
Fenyu 1993: 73). The amount of resources that a unit or an individual receives is J^ased 
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on their corresponding bureaucratic ranking and political alignment (Xie 1993). In 
addition, the social groups or organizations in the society are also highly dependent on the 
State as they need the provision of resources from the State. Walder (1983, 1986 cited in 
Li et al. 1994: 78) dubs this situation as "organized dependency". Furthermore, the 
individual status and welfare are closely linked with their own units {danwei). The units, 
in fact, are the extension of the State's authority in society. It integrated all kinds of 
functions including production, consumption and social welfare, etc. Therefore, a unit is 
not only a production organization but also a "centre for collective consumption" (Li et 
a l 1994: 7). The critical factor affecting the individual status and welfare in units is the 
amount of resources that the units receive from the State. It implies that maintaining a 
good vertical relationship with the State is very important for the welfare of the units. It 
can explain why the Chinese State could completely control over the whole of the society. 
Under such kind of "redistributive socialism", no wonder Shue (1988) depicts that the 
past Chinese society as a "cellular" or "honeycomb" one (Li et al. 1994: 13). In sum, 
before the reform era, the Chinese society can be delineated as a low degree of 
differentiation and highly identical society (Sun et al. 1994). The State has controlled 
tightly over the whole society by means of units. Thus, it shapes the society as a nearly 
classless society which left only two major classes -- the State and the masses (Li et al 
1994).i 
On the contrary, the economic reform has significantly altered the Chinese 
social structure in late 1970s. The previous Chinese resource allocation pattern, the 
i 
‘Tang (1990, 1993, 1994) has applied this concept of total society -- though framed in the Fouckuldian 
concept of a police state and governmental rationality -- to understand the development of urbanization, 
urban land development and the intemaI structure of city in China during the Maoist period. 
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monopolistic resource endowment and allocation pattern, have become diversified. After 
a decade of economic liberalization (in terms of fiscal and local resources exploitation), 
the resources are now transferred to different locales and bureaucratic units. The direct 
consequence of resource transfer leads to the change of "total society" to "differentiated 
society". The previous Chinese social stratification is now under redefinition. The 
emergence of "free floating resource" {ziyou liudong ziyuan) and "free action space" 
{ziyou xingdong kongjian) allow the society, now parallel with the State, as an 
independent source of resources and opportunities. Therefore, the individual social 
status, welfare and "life chances" are no longer bounded by their own units. Economic 
liberalization together with the decreasing individual dependency on the State have led to 
the rise of the new social classes and groups like the industrialists {gongyejia), 
entrepreneur {qiyejia), merchants {shangren), ultra-rich households {baofahu) and self-
employed households {getihu). These new classes becomes the reference groups in the 
society. Therefore, individuals who are still affiliated with units will gradually feel 
"relatively deprived" and are more inclined to seek 'exit' for themselves (Li et al. 1994: 
19). As there are more opportunities when society becomes more abundant, people will 
now try their best to improve their "life chance" by working ‘second occupation' or 
developing their own business {xiahai). As a result, the original "communal solidarity" 
within units breaks up and is now replaced by "instrumental solidarity" and 
"individualistic instrumentalism" (Li et al. 1994: 20). Furthermore the role of the unit 
has now shifted from "a community of unlimited liability" to “a community of limited 
liability��(Janowitz 1952, cited in Li et al. 1994: 20). In other words, the loyalty of 
i 
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individuals towards units is not viewed as necessary and, thus, they can be totally free 
from the control of unit system. 
In short, after decades of reform, the traditional resource allocation pattern 
has broken down and the social structure is transformed. A new social stratification is 
formed and new classes emerge. The appearance of free floating resource and action 
space in Chinese society and the bankruptcy of the "redistributive politics" has inserted 
significant impact on the society. On one hand, it has loosened the individual bondage 
from the units and allowed the economics to grow under its own logic. On the other 
hand, it turns the Chinese society towards "increasingly ungovernable" (Li et al. 1994: 
21).2 . 
3.2.2 A Shift from Direct to Indirect State Management 
The state-society relation also experiences changes in the decade of 
reform. The change of state-society relation is exhibited in the continuous weakening of 
state control over the society. Therefore, the previous governmental rationality has been 
proved ineffective in the reform era, i.e. the use of administrative and ideological 
measures is no longer able to integrate the whole society. It implies that the state-society 
relation in China needs to be renewed. 
The drastic change of Chinese socio-economic context has created a 
number of different 'independent interest entities' {duU liyi zuti) in the society, hence, the 
state control and management over the society becomes more difficult than before. This 
t 
2 Tang (1995) has noted such change, again in a Foucaudian approach, in China and then unravelled similar 
changes in urban-rural relation. 
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can be seen from three aspects. First, the scope of state control has been diminished. 
This is explicitly reflected in the enrichment of people's daily life, the blossomed 
development of art works, literature and scientific researches. Second, the magnitude of 
State control has gradually weakened. The measures of State control are gradually shifted 
from direct administrative control to indirect and contractual management (cooperation). 
This process is regarded as ‘being hollowed，{xuhua) (Sun, Liping 1992: 72). It is 
evident in the rapid growing of the different mediating civil associations {minjian tuanti) 
such as economic co-operatives {jingji hezoushe), leisure groups {xingquban) and 
scientific research organizations {keyan zuzhi) (Sun, Bingyiu 1994a, 1994b; Sun, Liping 
1992; Sun et al. 1994). Third, the control measures are becoming more 'normative' 
{guifanxing) (Sun, Liping 1992: 72). The State is now inclined to use indirect 
management and macro-control methods such as jurisdiction, legislation and economic 
incentives rather than coercion and administrative commands in order to govern the 
society (Sun, Liping 1992; Xie 1993). As a result, the strength of state control over the 
society is greatly limited and becomes "more selective and more efficacious than before" 
(Shue 1995: 111). Liu, Zaifli (1996) comments that the governmental rationality of 
Chinese society in the reform era is shifted from 'ideological age�(yishixingtai shidai) to 
'numerical age, {suzi shidai). It implies that the ideological bounding of the society is 
being loosened and economics is allowed to grow under its own development path now. 
In sum, it is discovered that the previous concept of ‘emphasis on the 
State rather society' {zhong guojia qing shehui) has been changed (Sun et al. 1994). As a 
i 
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consequence, it has made the social integration more difficult than before, and the 
boundary of Chinese State and society needs to be reshaped. 
3.2.3 The Requirement to Take Note of Local Interests in a Changing Central-local 
Relation 
The major impact of the reform in the late 1970s is the collapse of the 
traditional resource allocation pattern. It does not only alter the state-society relation but 
also leads to the change of the central-local relation. With the increasing autonomy over 
local fiscal resources {difang caizheng baogan), the local dependency on the central 
government is greatly reduced. Therefore, the concept of 'the whole country as a single 
chessboard' {chuanguo yipanqi) (at the expense of the regional interest in order to 
promote the benefit of the whole country) is no longer applicable. Since the provinces are 
now different independent interest entities, it is commonly found that their interests and 
that of the central governments are more divergent than before. This is clearly reflected 
in the implementation of national policy in local areas. Since the authority of central 
government over the local has been weakened, the measures of administrative command 
and political mobilization are no longer effective in enforcing the implementation of a 
national policy in local areas. In addition to the lack of institutionalized channels to 
conciliate different interests among central and local, so bargaining between central and 




3 Schroeder (1992, cited in Lieberthal & Lampton 1992: 283) points out that bargaining behaviour can also 
be found among locales such as Wuhan City and Hubei Province. 
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It can be concluded that, in today's China, as interests become divergent 
between central and local, different locales will have different interpretations and 
responses towards the state policy. Thus, the policy outcome is affected. Coupled with 
the lack of institutionalized central-local relation in China, the ‘smoothness，ofthe policy 
implementation is greatly depending on the co-ordination among different local interest 
parties in post-Mao China.^ 
3.2,4 The Emergence of Rural Society with More Diverse Interests and Decision-
making Mechanisms 
The Chinese rural society has also undergone drastic changes during the 
reform era. Before the reform era, rural China was organized by the State through the 
commune system {gongshe zidu). Under this system, the rural community was organized 
based on geographical boundary and merges into the administrative hierarchy which put 
the household under different teams or brigades. The benefits and welfare of the peasants 
were closely linked with the team they belonged to, and the betterment of the team was 
highly depending on the relationship with the upper hierarchy. Therefore, the People's 
Commune {Renmin Gongshe) was the centre of economics, politics and ideology in rural 
China in which the peasants were totally depending on the State. In this way, rural China 
was a simplified community with only two classes - the peasants and the rural cadres 
(notably the team leaders, bridge leaders and the commune leaders) (Wang, Fenyu 1993; 
Li etal. 1994). 
I 
“ ‘ ~ t 
Wu & Zheng (1995) concludes that it is necessary to establish an institutional framework to stabilize the 
central-local relation in China. It is because the existing measures ofauthority re-centralization by the State 
are only further deepening the conflict among central and local. 
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However, the reform has led to the collapse of the commune system. In 
order to restore the political order in rural China, the former production brigades are 
reformed as town or township government, whereas the villages are granted autonomy 
{zizhi). The household responsibility system {hukou baogan zidu) together with rapid 
rural industrialization (xiangchen gongyehua) have not only raised the rural productivity, 
but also altered the rural social stratification. Since new resources and opportunities are 
emerging in rural society, a new rural elite class (the industrialists), worker class and 
merchant class have now appeared. Therefore, the previous dualistic rural social 
structure has been modified. Now, the social bonding in rural China is no longer 
communal but growing more towards economical and occupational. Besides, it is 
discovered that the governmental rationality of rural society has been changed from 
administrative to a mixture of traditional (blood and territorial), administrative and 
contractual (Wang, Xiaoyi 1993). Coupled with this tendency, many different 
associations, such as economic organizations and leisure groups, and underground 
religions are found to flourish in contemporary rural China (Sun, Bingyiu 1994a, 1994b). 
It is estimated that there are 30-70 million believers in rural China who participate in 
Protestant "house churches" and underground Catholic churches now (Wehrfritz 1995). 
Most people would probably expect that the decentralization and transfer 
of resources would lead to the liberalization of rural society. Most o f the recent research 
argues that the decentralization of fiscal and decision-making authority has made the 
central government lose most of its control over the local society. However, it does not 
I 
mean that the rural society is now liberalized. It is simply a case o f the original power of 
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the State being transferred to the local governments. Therefore, instead of the central 
state control, the rural society is still under the tight control of the local government 
(Blecher 1991; Gold 1989; Oi 1986，1989a，1989b，1990, 1995; Rozelle 1994; Shue 
1 9 8 8 , 1 9 9 0，1 9 9 5 ; W h i t e 1 9 9 0 ; W o n g 1 9 8 7 ; Z w e i g 1 9 8 9 ) . 5 j^ -^ s u g g e s t e d that the d e g r e e 
of rural collectivization is directly related to the degree of rural industrialization in rural 
China (Oi 1989a�1990). Under the wave of economic reform, the local government is 
now acting more like a 'corporate' entity which actively involves in local economic 
development (Oi 1995; Wang, Xiaoqiang 1996). On the one hand, the central state's 
control over the rural society has been weakened. On the other hand, the local 
governments are now more concentrated on local economic development. As a 
consequence, scant attention has been paid to the development of social services in rural 
China. 
Concomitant with increasing the local government's control on rural 
society, the role of local cadres has also become more influential than before. In the 
investigation of Wenzhou, Parris (1993: 242) recognizes that "local cadres played a 
pivotal role often colluding with local citizens to thwart central policy". Since the social 
integrative power o f t he central government is decreasing, the implementation of national 
policy in local areas is greatly depending on the cooperation of local cadres. Therefore, in 
today's China, it is necessary to build up consensus with local cadres when implementing 
national policy in local areas. By investigating the mechanism of how local leaders 
affecting national politics, most of the westem scholars argue that the local leaders affect 
t 
5 See Chung & Tang (1996，1997) for a conceptual and empirical understanding o f t h e control of rural 
communities by an urban government. 
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the national politics by constructing a complex set of associations (Lidstrom 1995; 
Murdoch and Marsden 1995). 
Oi (1989b) finds that the role and identity of village cadre are quite 
ambiguous in today's rural China. On the one hand, they represent the State, implement 
state policy, interpret the State's will to the peasants and control upward information 
flow. On the other hand, their interest cannot be assumed to be the same as the State. In 
a strict sense, the village cadres are not the state cadres {guojia ganbu) but rather the state 
agent in village only. Therefore, they cannot get the salary and benefits like old age 
pension from the State. In this way, the village cadres are caught quite an embarrassing 
situation: they come originally from the peasants and have to defend the village's interest, 
however, they have to complete the task ordered from above (see also Zhang, Yulin 
1992). 
Together with the change of the traditional resource allocation pattem is 
the corresponding change of the political structure in rural society (Wang, Shaoguang 
1996). The diminishing state control over the rural society allows the peasants to have 
more 'institutional space, {zhidu kongjian) to succeed their autonomy (Zheng 1996: 26). 
Villages in China have been granted autonomous status since 1982. However, there is no 
real progress in rural China. The decision making authority is still in the hand of a few 
rural cadres, and villagers have little chance to participate in deciding village affairs. In 
order to ftirther achieve the village autonomy, the Chinese authority announced the 
Organic Law ofVillager,s Committees in 1987. According to this law, under the village 
charter (also called "small constitution"), it allows the villagers to have their own 
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committee {cunmin weiyuanhui) and representative assembly {cunmin daibiao huiyi). 
For the committee, it is the "highest executive body of a village" whereas the assembly is 
like a "lilliputian parliament" (Jiang, Wandi 1996: 11).^ Both of them are directly elected 
from the peasants by secret ballot. In the past, all the important decisions, such as grain 
distribution to the State, the setting up of family planning quotas and tax collection, etc., 
were decided by a few village "arbitrators". Therefore, "local fury and unfulfilled 
quotas" are always resulted (Jiang, Wandi 1996: 12). In contrast, as the villagers' 
committees and representative assemblies are directly elected by peasants, they have to be 
responsible to the peasants. Hence, all the important decisions are first discussed openly 
in the meetings of villagers' committees and representative assemblies. Meanwhile, all 
final decisions "are publicly presented after meetings in notices posted on bulletin boards 
maintained where everyone has access" (Jiang, Wandi 1996: 12). According to Lawrence 
(1994), it is found that most of the affairs decided by villagers' committees and 
representative assemblies are only confined to economic and financial aspects, seldom do 
they touch on political aspects. It is clear to show that they are definitely effective village 
management mechanisms which allow peasants to voice their opinion and decide their 
own affairs. More importantly, they help to maintain social stability in rural China.^ 
6 The villagers' representative assembly has power to make decisions on important issues like the village 
budget, supervise the villagers' committee, veto wrong decision by the villagers' committee, remove 
members of the villagers' committee and write the codes of conduct for the village (Lawrence 1994; Wang, 
Shaoguang 1996). 
7 It is clearly reflected in the case of Pengshan County in Sichuan Province. In early 1993, the county was 
informed that a state highway would be constructed which would cause destruction on the people's farms. 
The villagers' committee held representative assemblies to discuss this issue with the villagers an(l finally 
reached an agreement that the village would "experience short term losses and long term gains", therefore, 
supported the construction. On the contrary, the neighbouring county of Pengshan fully consulted the 
people's opinion, which resulted in serious local resistance to the construction (Jiang, Wandi 1996). 
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In summary, the Chinese State is undergoing rapid changes in the reform 
era. The emancipation of individuals from the state system caused social mobility and 
triggered off the formation of new social classes. Hence, the society is more diverse than 
it used to be. Besides, the state-society relation has also been modified. While the State 
is still interested in controlling the society, the past governmental rationality is no longer 
applicable. It has to rely more on indirect mechanisms for management. Furthermore, 
with the increasing divergent interests among central and local governments in post-Mao 
China, the central-local relations have already undergone enormous changes. 
Implementation of national policies nowadays cannot ignore the local context. Finally, 
the Chinese rural society has become much more complicated with diverging interests. If 
these changes are to be observed and taken care of, it would require a framework of 
policy implementation in China paying more attention to the cooperation of various 
locales and bureaucratic units. In other words, to have a better understanding of the IRP 
implementation in China, we need a framework that addresses the interplay of 
heterogeneous actors. 
3.3 The Actor-Network Approach 
3.3.1 General Background 
The actor-network approach is a recent European network theory 
advocated by several sociologists of science and technology like Callon, Latour and Law 
(Clarke 1991). It represents an improvement over the existing sociological theories in 
three ways. First, it attempts to approach sociology from the ‘how，perspective ^rather 
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than the ‘why’ perspective. Under this approach, it is suggested that nothing should be 
privileged before investigation. Rather, everything should be "analyzed in the same 
terms. So it erodes distinctions that are said to be given in the nature of things, and 
instead asks how it is that they got to be that way" (Law 1994: 12). Therefore, agent, 
power, and society should not be treated as given by nature. Rather, they should be 
treated as constituted by a series of micro-processes. Second, the approach suggests that 
all things or phenomena are considered as "a product or effect of a network of 
heterogeneous materials" (Law 1992: 381). In this approach, network, indeed, is 
describing the interaction among actors and intermediaries. Nevertheless, network is not 
determinate in advance, rather, it is formed contingently. It is important to note that 
although social relations are generated by heterogeneous materials, it does not mean that 
the former can be reduced to the latter, i.e. "one drives the other". In contrast, social 
relations and material relations are inter-shaping in the course of interaction (Law 1992). 
Third, it is suggested that society and social structure are recursively generated and 
reproduced by itself. Therefore, the actor-network approach is trying to tum "a sociology 
of nouns" into "a sociology of verbs". Instead of seeing society as "a lot of social 
products moving round in structural pipes and containers that were put in place 
beforehand", the actor-network approach considers the social world as "in its processes it 
shapes its own flow" (Law 1994: 15). Society, in Gidden's word, is "both a medium and 
an outcome" (Law 1994: 15). Therefore, under the actor-network approach, the task of 
sociology is "to characterize these networks in their heterogeneity, and explore how it is 
i 
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that they come to be patterned to generate effects like organizations, inequality, and 
power" (Lawl992:381). 
To summarize, actor-network approach is a recursive sociology of process. 
To a certain extent, it is similar to symbolic interaction. However, it is, in addition, with 
an added dash of Machiavellian political theory, a portion of (suitably diluted) 
discourse analysis, and a commitment to the project ofunderstanding the material 
character of the networks of the social (Law 1994: 100, italic represents my 
emphasis). 
3.3.2 Its arguments 
Let us start summarizing its arguments by clarifying the definitions of 
actor and network: 
All groups, actors, and intermediaries describe a network: they identify and 
define other groups, actors, and intermediaries, together with the relationships that 
bring these together (Callon 1991: 142, italic represents my emphasis). 
Therefore, a network is built by the mutual definition of actors and intermediaries as well 
as the circulation of heterogeneous materials. However, the above definition of actor is 
just partly correct. As the actor-network approach conceives of a society as an effect of 
network which is generated and reproduced recursively by itself, this will be the case for 
the concept of actor too. Law (1992: 384) points out that an actor “is a patterned network 
of heterogeneous relations, or an effect produced by such a network". In this way, it can 
be said that actor is not only an actor but also a network. In order to distinguish between 
the concepts of an actor and a network, it is necessary to conceive of the former as a 
micro network whereas the latter as a macro one. Therefore, an actor is converted from a 
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network to a single point or node in another larger network through the process of 
punctualization or simplification (Callon 1986a, 1991). It can be clearly illustrated in the 
case of the electric vehicle of France (see Fig. 3.1). 
For example, towns consist of more than public, the wish to preserve town centres 
and the town councils that constitute their spokesmen. They differ from one 
another with respect to population, history and geographical location. They 
conceal a hidden life whose anonymous destinies interact. However, so far as the 
EDF is concerned, they may be reduced to a transport system that must avoid 
adding to the level of pollution and a town council that seeks to advance towards 
this goal (Callon 1986a: 29, italic represents my emphasis). 
simplificatio^ 产 - ^ 
^ " - " - ^ ^ ( ^ ^ T o w n ^ ^ 
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components researchers 
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Fig. 3.1 The Anatomy of the EDF Actor-world (Source: Callon 1986a: 29) 
The mechanisms which link actors together require clarification too. 
Network is, indeed, social relations by the mutual definition of actors. However, in the 
absence of a medium, it is impossible for the actors to establish relations. Thus, Callon 
(1991) suggests that it is important to pay attention to the role of materials. They are 
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things circulating among actors which help to define their relationship. Those materials 
which link actors together are notjust simply the social ones, they should also include the 
non-social ones like technical and natural (Callon 1986a, 1991; Latour 1986; Murdoch & 
Mardsen 1995). By taking the example from a clan's structure, Latour (1986: 275) 
illustrates that "when a society is made of social elements alone it does not have a stable 
structure". Meanwhile, under the conceptualization of the sociology of science and 
technology, the role of materials or intermediaries is not just a passive one. Rather, they 
are synonymous with actors (Callon 1991, Murdoch 1995). In other words, "an actor is 
an intermediary that puts other intermediaries into circulation ~ that an actor is an author" 
(Callon 1991: 140-1). However, is there any difference between actor and intermediary? 
In general then, actors are those who conceive, elaborate, circulate, emit, or 
pension off intermediaries, and division between actors and intermediaries is a 
purely practical matter (Callon 1991: 141). 
Besides, it is also necessary to note that the shapes, sizes, and relations among actors are 
all effects generated from within. Therefore, there is "no theory or model of the actor or 
the network that can be specified a priori" (Murdoch 1995: 753). 
In actor-network approach, before the achievement of alliances between 
actors, the actor-world should be established first (see Fig. 3.2).® In other words, the 
actor-world is the foundation for the actor-network approach. Through the mechanisms of 
simplification and juxtaposition, the actor-world is formulated. The concept of 
simplification is "used to account for the reduction of an infinitely complex world by 
8 Although it is suggested that the actor-world should be established first, it does not imply any sequential 
order with the process of translation, i.e. it does not mean that after passing through the procedure of actor-
world first, and then to translation. On the contrary, it should be the actor-world built first and still function 
in the process of translation. 
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means of translation" (Callon 1986a: 28-9). Therefore, an actor-world is "limited to a 
series of discrete entities whose characteristics or attributes are well defined" (Callon 
1986a: 28). Juxtaposition defines "the conditions of operation for the actor-world. In 
fact, it is from these juxtapositions that the actor-world draws its coherence, its 
consistency, and the structure of relationships that exists between the components that go 
to make it up" (Callon 1986a: 30). Callon (1986a: 30) comments that simplification and 
juxtaposition belong to "a double process", i.e. they are interdependent. 
In the case of the electric vehicle in France, Callon (1986a: 22) delineates that 
"[t]he EDF (the initiate actor -- TKF) has defined the roles, and then attempts to 
enroll other entities into them. It binds the functions of these roles together by 
building a world where everyone has his own place". 
Within the actor-world, the entities' identity, the roles, their nature of bondage and their 
size are being defined. In other words, it is the context that "gives each entity its 
significance and defines its limitations" (Callon 1986a: 30). 
Actor-world 
^^^^^ Sociology of translation ^"""^^^ 
/ 4 phases of translation \ 
‘ 1. Problematization- Obligatory Passage Point \ 
1 2. Interessement y 
\ 3. Enrolment / 
^Vs4. Mobilization > / 
‘ Fig. 3.2 A Conceptual Diagram of Actor-Network Approach 
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After the establishment of an actor-world, however, how can the actors be 
linked together to form a network? Or specifically, how does the initiate actor draw 
potential allies by meeting their needs and "then enrol them as allies in the network 
through a funneling process" (Clarke 1991: 127-8)? As mentioned above, it is the 
intermediary which ties actors together and eventually forms the network. However, how 
can the "heterogeneous set of bits and pieces each with its own inclinations" be 
transformed into a network? It is imperative to employ some strategies to stick the actors 
together. This is what translation is meant to do. 
In linguistic sense, translation means 
one version translates every other, acquiring a sort of hegemony: whatever you 
want, you want this as well (Latour 1987: 120-1). 
Besides this linguistic meaning, Latour (1987: 117) suggests that translation also has a 
geometric meaning: 
translating interests means at once offering new interpretations of these interests 
and channeling people in different directions (italic represents my emphasis). 
In the operation of translation, it involves the translator, entities being translated, as well 
as intermediaries (Callon 1991). Translator is the initiate actor which fixes the identity of 
other actors and regulates their behaviours in the beginning of translation. Therefore, in 
order to achieve hegemony over other actors, there are two tasks that the translator needs 
to complete: first, to enrol the enlisted actors, and second, to control and stabilize their 
behaviours in a channeled direction. In achieving these two steps, intermediaries will be 
circulated to bind the actors together (Callon 1991; Murdoch 1995). Meanwhile, it is 
important to note that strategies of translation should not be regarded as prcrgiven. 
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Instead, they are dependent on empirical investigation (Callon 1986a; Law 1992). In 
other words, the strategies of translation are "contingent, local, and variable" (Law 1992: 
387). As stated above, actors are conscious beings with their own wills and inclinations, 
therefore, there is a possibility that actors have the freedom to reject translation. Hence, 
the critical factor for a successful translation relies on the capacity of the translator to 
overcome the resistance of actors and eventually impose definitions and enrolments on 
actors. The result of a successful translation is that the prime translator will control the 
Other actors who are linked together. In addition, "it also permits an explanation ofhow a 
few obtain the right to express and to represent the many silent actors of the social and 
natural worlds they have mobilized" (Callon 1986b: 224). Therefore, “to translate is to 
speak for, to be indispensable and to displace" (Callon 1986a: 28). Finally, it should be 
borne in mind that translation is also an uncertain and recursive process which does not 
succeed once and for all (Law 1991). Thus, as it is the case of the concept of society, 
translation should not be viewed as transforming verbs into nouns. Rather, it is to 
"achieve relative durability, to make verbs behave as if they were nouns" (Law 1991: 
103). 
As mentioned above, strategies of translation are dependent on specific 
situation, thus, it should be investigated empirically. It is, therefore, appropriate to 
discuss certain phases and strategies of translation using the illustration of St. Brieuc Bay 
documented by Callon (1986b). 
According to Callon (1986b), translation can be divided into four phases 
of translation: problematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilization (see fig 3.2). 
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In order to tie the actors into the alliance, the translator has to make them recognize that 
this alliance can benefit them in the starting of translation. Thus, the first phase of 
translation is problematization. According to Parkin (1994), problematization is 
a process whereby a powerful key actor (organization or individual) seeks to 
define a problem in terms of their own portfolio of possible solutions, thus 
making the resolution of the problematic situation dependent on their node of 
network (or 'obligatory passage point').' Thus, they seek to achieve hegemony by 
defining other actor's places in the network in relation to theirs. This, in effect, 
defines the problem in terms of one possible set of solutions" (Parkin 1994: 206). 
By establishing oneself (the translator) as an obligatory passage point in the network of 
relationships, the translator can determine "a set of actors and defined their identities" 
(Callon 1986b: 204). 
In the phase of problematization, the identities and relations between 
actors are tentatively established. Therefore, the actors still have the possibility to reject 
or detour from the assigned direction. In order to maintain the actors in an assigned 
direction, it is necessary for the translator to impose an array of strategies to overcome 
their resistance and channel them to the designed direction. Therefore, the second stage 
of translation ~ interessement is followed. According to etymology, the word, interesse 
means in-between. Hence, to interesse is to build up linkages. In order to consolidate the 
bonding between actors, it is important for the translator to cut the possible linkage 
between the enlisted actors and other competing alliance (Callon 1986b). 
A ties B together by employing various means to cut the possible linkages 
between C, D and E (see Fig. 3.3). Hence, in the process of interessement the 
identity of B and link between A are strengthened. The link disconnects B with 
9 According to Callon (1986a: 26), it is "a passageway through which all the other entities that make up its 
world must pass". In the case of St. Brieuc Bay, he suggests that different actors (the scallops, the 
fishermen and the scientific colleagues) come together because they recognize that this is the only way 
(supporting the three researchers' notion) they can get what they want. 
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the potential association of C, D and E. Finally, "B is a ‘result，of the association 
which links it to A" (Callon 1986b: 208). 
Therefore, it clearly shows that interessement is a "group of actions by which an entity 
([in the St. Brieuc Bay case] here the three researchers) attempts to impose and stabilize 
the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization" (Callon 1986b: 
207-8). 
j X D 
<^ 
/ \ 六 ~ ^ ® 
CD ^ ^ X D 
Key: ^ ^ Strategies used by A to cut off possible links with B 
Fig. 3.3 The Second Phase ofTranslation: Interessement 
(Source: Callon 1986b:208) 
By reviewing the previous two phases of translation, it is found that the 
translator has channelized the actors to a designed direction which can benefit them. 
However, there is still a possibility that the actors will escape by taking a detour. 
Therefore, the translator attempts to consolidate the linkage among actors by cutting 
possible challenging alliances in the stage of interessement. In order to enforce the 
mutual definition of actors, further strategies are needed. 
In a linguistic sense, to enrol is "to cause to become a member o f ? � I n 
other words, the translator wants the enlisted actors to further stay in this alliance and 
, 
'° See Oxford Advanced Learner 's Dictionary of Current English with Chinese Translation 1996 Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press. 
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play the assigned roles defined before. Parkin (1994: 207) suggests that enrolment 
succeeds in creating "an implicit or explicit alliance between the powerful key actor and 
other chosen members of the actor network which is constantly challenged by other actors 
and changing circumstances". Therefore, enrolment is the process of defining and 
coordinating the role of actors. In the case of St. Brieuc Bay, Callon (1986b: 211) 
comments that enrolment is “the group of multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and 
tricks that accompany the interessements and enable them to succeed". Meanwhile, there 
are four possible channels to enrol the actors. They are "physical violence (against the 
predators), seduction, transaction and consent without discussion" (Callon 1986b: 214). 
Hence, a successful enrolment can stabilize and channel under the planning of the 
enroling actor. It will involve "redefining the roles of the actors and entities as they come 
into alignment, such that they come to gain new identities or attributes within the 
network. It is the intermediaries, referred to above, which act to bind actors together, 
cementing the links" (Murdoch 1995: 747). 
The last phase of translation is mobilization. To mobilize is to "collect 
together for service or use"." It implies that by the time translation comes to this phase, 
the roles and identities of actors have already been stabilized and eventually cause them 
to take actions. Callon (1986b: 216) suggests the term "mobilization" to stress on the 
displacement'^ of objects: "to mobilize, as the word indicates, is to render entities mobile 
11 See Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English with Chinese Translation 1996 Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press. 
12 For the definition of displacement, in the case of electric vehicle in France, Callon (1986a: 27) suggests 
that "some links is necessary to make entities accept certain spokesmen and certain points of jiassage. 
Otherwise, the action at a distance involved in enrolling Renault, CGE and the fuel cell into the EDF's 
projects will remain mysterious". Furthermore, a stable translation will not attain without attachment to 
displacement (social and physical) (Latour 1985; Law 1985, cited in Callon 1986b). 
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which were not so beforehand". Following the success of enrollment, it is inevitable that 
enrolling actors will be the sole spokespersons, i.e. they are authorized to "express[es] 
their [the other ac tors ' - TKF] desires, their secret thoughts, their interests, their 
mechanisms of operation" (Callon 1986a: 25). It can be considered as the result of "the 
progressive mobilization of actors who render the following propositions credible and 
indisputable by forming alliances and acting as a unit of force" (Callon 1986b: 216). 
To summarize, translation is "to speak for others but its own language" 
(Callon 1986a: 25-6). If the translation is successful, the initiate actor will control other 
actors and they will remain "faithful to their alliances", and "only voices speaking in 
unison will be heard" (Callon 1986b: 223). 
Law (1992: 380，387) argues that actor-network approach "is all about 
power... concerned with the mechanics of power� , ]] In this way, one expects that the 
actor-network approach brings the following implications on the concept of power: 
• Generally speaking, power is regarded as a kind of thing which can be possessed by 
someone.i4 Therefore, power has long been considered as causes of events rather 
consequences.i5 However, under the actor-network approach, most of the structural 
properties are considered as "a set of effects arising from a whole complex of network 
relations" rather than "the causes of events" (Murdoch 1995: 747). Therefore, power 
should be regarded as a relational concept which is produced by a stabilized social 
13 Indeed, Murdoch (1995: 753) also comments that the actor-network approach delineates "sets of power 
relations". 
14 Bames (1988: 57, cited in Law 1991: 167) defines power as "the added capacity for action...", foucault 
(1982: 217，cited in Law 1991: 167) also treats power as "an enable phenomenon". 
15 Latour (1986) exposes that it is under the influence of diffiision model. For detail description of diffusion 
model, see Latour (1986). 
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network as an effect (Law 1991). Moreover, it is "exercised rather than possessed" 
(Foucault 1979: 27, cited in Law 1991: 169). 
• As power should be considered as an effect instead of a cause of action, the 
possession of power is not dependent on how much one is endowed with. On the 
contrary, it is reliant on the number of people who come into association (Latour 
1986). In this way, those who are powerful are those "able to enrol, convince, and 
enlist others into networks on terms which allow the initial actors to 'represent' the 
others" (Murdoch 1995: 748). Therefore, the analysis of power can also be seen as 
"the study of associations" (Murdoch & Mardsen 1995: 372). 
• If power is considered as the effect of collective action, how do heterogeneous actors 
become associated together? Latour (1986) suggests that this question can only be 
answered from the practical point of view. In the association of people, "power is 
now transferred to the many resources used to strengthen the bonds" (Latour 1986: 
276). In this way, the real difference between the powerful and the wretched lies in 
the difference in "the methods and materials that they deploy to generate themselves" 
(Law 1992: 390). Therefore, in order to study the notion of power, it is necessary to 
scrutinize empirically how resources tie heterogeneous actors together. 
3.3.3 The Role of Space 
Recollect Law's quotation that translation is contingent, local and variable. 
This puts space in a prominent position in the translation process. In order to do justice 
/ 
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to this recognition, it might be better to dwell on how the mainstream geography literature 
understands the role of space.'^ 
By reviewing theories in sociology, economics, and other disciplines in 
social sciences, it is found that social processes are universally applicable. Therefore, 
spatial differences are usually treated as "little more than deviations from the norm" 
(Duncan & Goodwin 1988: 48). "This is why, in the context of empirical research, these 
disciplines often (although usually implicitly) wrongly identify 'society, or ‘economy, 
with the nation-state -- as in 'British society' or ‘the British economy' (Duncan & 
Goodwin 1988: 47). Duncan (1989a: 131) labels this kind of response as “spatial 
amnesia". Sayer (1985) argues that social processes cannot be taken place in void. He 
distinguishes researches into two major categories: abstract and concrete researches. 
Abstract research is "concerned with structures (sets of internally or necessarily related 
objects or practices) and with the causal powers and liabilities necessarily possessed by 
objects in virtue of their nature" (Sayer 1985: 53-4). These structural properties are 
abstracting from reality which have neglected all contingent and contextual effects 
(Duncan 1989a). However, it is found that abstract theories are needed to operate in the 
real world. Hence, the task of concrete research is “to determine the actual effects of the 
causal powers" (Sayer 1985: 53-4). 
Duncan and Goodwin (1988: 56) suggests that "abstraction can be useftil enough 
for theoretical analysis, which is after all a vital part of any research". However, it 
does not mean that the abstract theories "can actually exist in an abstract way, and 
hence without spatial relations". 
t 
16 For an application of the mainstream geographic discussion of the role of space on Chinese urbanization, 
see Tang(1993). 
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In order to demonstrate the abstract theories on concrete instance, it is imperative to 
consider the role of space. 
Despite rising concem on the role of space in the recent decade, it does not 
represent that an appropriate understanding on the role of space has been found. Rather, 
another extreme of spatial account develops ~ consideration of space as an independent 
entity which affects social behaviour. This notion of "spatial fetishism" is clearly 
illustrated in ideas like ‘the urban way of life’ or 'ecological area, where "it is the 
spatially defined and created conditions of certain area which produce social behaviour" 
(Duncan 1989a: 132). 
Setl -~~_^ Set2^— -~-^_^ 
广 A B C � — r A Q C � 
V _ ^ Q R ^ V ^ ^ P B R ^ 
Fig. 3.4 The Independence of Spatial Relation from Types of Objects 
(Source: Sayer 1985: 52) 
Instead of accepting the notion of "absolute space", it is suggested that a 
relativist position on space be used." In other words, it means that "space can only exist 
as a relation between objects (such as planets, cities or people), which do have substance" 
(Duncan & Goodwin 1988: 54). Sayer (1985: 52) also argues that "although space can 
only exist in and through objects, it is independent of the particular types of objects 
present". The notion of relative space is illustrated in Fig. 3.4. 
‘ The spatial relations of B to A and C, and Q to P and R are exactly equivalent (as 
shown in Set 1): swapping B with Q would not change this spatial relation of 
'between-ness' (as shown in Set 2), though depending on what kind of things the 
口 For the notion of absolute space, see Duncan (1989a). 
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letters represent, the moves might trigger off or block certain causal mechanisms 
possessed by those objects" (Sayer 1985: 52). 
Fig. 3.4, it suggests that space not only exists as relation among objects, but also implies 
that such relation does not possess any kind of causal power to affect social processes. 
According to the realist approach, objects are "understood to possess causal powers and 
liabilities to do or suffer certain things by virtue of their structure and composition, but 
whether these powers or liabilities are activated depends on contingently related 
conditions" (Sayer 1985: 50). Thus, by adopting space as a relative concept, it can only 
be ‘‘a contingent effect" (Duncan 1989a: 133). In this way, how space makes a difference 
“will contingently depend on how it interacts with other powers and other objects" 
(Duncan 1989a: 133). However, what is the difference between causal powers and 
contingent effects? In the realist account, the former one refers to the powers "derive 
from the basic properties of objects and substances (and remember space is not an object 
or substance) to affect change in the very nature of themselves or other objects" (Duncan 
1989a: 133). But the latter one "does not have the power to cause change in this 
fundamental energizing way". They are just forming "contextual conditions which can 
affect how, or if, causal powers act" (Duncan 1989a: 133). Meanwhile, it is worth to note 
that although spatial relation is produced by objects or substances, it is needless to say 
such relation can be reduced as constituent of objects or substances ( Duncan 1989a, 
1989b; Duncan & Goodwin 1988; Sayer 1985). In short, under the relativist perspective, 
space is conceived as a kind of "secondary effect" whereas the major forces "still reside 
in substance objects (unlike absolute views of space where space is a primary, energising 
t 
object)’’ (Duncan 1989a: 132). In addition, it affects social processes contingently upon 
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the interaction of objects. Therefore, it can be concluded that space affects how social 
processes operate rather than as causes of social processes. It can be clearly illustrated in 
the following example. 
In area X，for instance, the general processes of deindustrialization and gender 
role definition might interact in a specific way, different from the way they might 
interact -- if at all ~ in areas A and B. In one area paid employment might be 
'feminized', in another, women workers might be laid off, in a third, female 
employment opportunities might increase in one sector as they decrease in 
another, and so on (Duncan & Goodwin 1988: 56). 
Moreover, space can also be regarded as a kind of locally derived causal 
mechanism. Duncan and Goodwin (1988: 57) argues that the uneven societal 
development "is not just a matter of forms and outcomes (for example, certain industries 
locate in certain areas) but also of social mechanism themselves". In this way, causal 
mechanisms are not necessary universal but also can have their own history and 
geography, i.e. they can be locally derived (Duncan 1989a, 1989b; Duncan & Goodwin 
1988). However, is there any difference between concepts of causal local mechanisms 
and absolute space? It is discovered that the former one shows "what the social 
mechanisms actually are, which are spatially bounded, and how they might work". In 
contrast, the latter one proposes that "spatial differentiation created variations in social 
behaviour". Therefore, such locally derived social mechanisms are also called "spatial 
boundary effects" (Duncan 1989a: 135). 
Furthermore, space can also affect the social mechanism as "locality 
effect，，. Accordingly, locality effect is "a bundle of complementary and locally derived 
processes and outcomes produce some sort of local social system" (Duncan & Goodwin 
# 
1988: 61). It implies that it is a kind of spatial effect which have combined both spatial 
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contingent and spatial boundary effects. For example, "a distinctive local political 
culture" can be regarded as the effect produced by the combination of "locally specific 
class relations" and "other locally specific processes and outcomes (say local labour 
movement hegemony over the local state)�’ (Duncan & Goodwin 1988: 60). However, 
the criterion for the occurrence of locality effects is highly demanding. Therefore, it is 
rarely found in practice. -
Besides, it should also be mentioned that spatial differences are produced 
by social mechanism. By tracing back to traditional social and economic theories such as 
Marxist and neoclassical theories, the former suggests that "uneven development is 
central to the very processes of capitalist production and reproduction" whereas the latter 
sees uneven development “as an end result or even an unfortunate by-product of socio-
economic processes...". According to the realist philosophy, spatial variation is derived 
in the "virtue of the nature of causal powers" (Duncan 1989a: 135). This is called 
"uneven development effect" (Duncan 1989a: 139). Such a kind of effect is also 
"affected by spatial contingency and spatial boundary effects (level one and two)” 
(Duncan 1989a: 136). 
The linkage between this discussion of space and the actor-network theory 
is offered by Murdoch and Marsden (1995)，who specify the micro-processes of 
association among different localities. They conceptualize localities as networks of 
relations constituted by various actors and resources in different scales. It is to see how 
different localities associate together to protect their common interests, and finally, affect 
change in national politics (i.e. locality effect). The term "actor-spaces" is used to' draw 
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the attention to the "indissoluble linkages between the material, phenomenological and 
social components of situations that are mobilized during the building of association" 
(Murdoch & Marsden 1995: 372). 
To summarize, space does matter in the operation of social processes (but 
it is not an independent variable -- it is produced by social mechanism). Four types of 
spatial effect have been identified. They are spatial contingent effects, spatial boundary 
effects, locality effect, and uneven development effects. Spatial contingent effects are 
"affecting contingently how change occurs" whereas spatial boundary effect "came 
changes to happen" (Duncan & Goodwin 1988: 57). These two spatial effects are well 
illustrated in Fig. 3.5 and 3.6.'^ Locality effects are "a whole gamut of spatial 
contingencies, local causal processes and locally specific effects" which produce “a 
spatially specified structural system" (Duncan & Goodwin 1988: 60). Finally, uneven 
development effects suggest that spatial variation is created by social mechanisms. 
3.4 Implications for the Study of IRP Implementation in China 
The above sections have critically elaborated the actor-network approach 
and the role of space. It is time to draw some implications of this discussion for the study 
of IRP implementation in China: 
18 In Britain, Sheffield has built much more council housing than other localities. This local outcome can 
be partly explained as the result of spatial contingencies - "where, for example, more council housing was 
built because there was already more substandard housing already existed there" (Duncan 1989b: 234) (see 
Fig. 3.5). Moreover, this can also be regarded as the consequence of particular social relations there. Refer 
to Fig. 3.6, it is discovered that there is a "class conscious and organized local political movement 
dominating the major local organ of state power -- local government - and consciously used this power to 
build council housing which they saw as important to their political project. For the same reason, direct 
labour was often used to do the building. In other words, the casual social mechanism were locally specific. 
Variation was not just of the contingent effects of spatial patterns on some invariant and universal (or at 
least national) mechanism" (Duncan l989b: 234-5). 
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Fig. 3.5 Contingent Local Variation: The Case of Council Housing 
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effects council house building 
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Fig. 3.6 Causal Local Variation: The Case of Council Housing 
‘ (Source: Duncan 1989b: 235) 
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1. The implementation of IRP can be seen as a translation process -- the 
interplay of heterogeneous actors. In China, the resettlement project cannot be left to 
individual families. Therefore, the IRP must be under the State regulation. For this 
reason, the State is inevitably the dominant actor (the translator) in IRP implementation. 
The State cannot be considered as authoritarian or omnipotent in China nowadaysJ^ 
Instead, the State is conceptualized as consisting of a set of heterogeneous actors. While 
the central government may consist of actors of diverse, if not conflicting, interests (such 
as Ministry of Water Conservancy, Ministry of Electric Power and Ministry of Finance), 
there will also be other actors including provincial, city, county, town (township), village 
governments (each of which consists of many actors), peasants, as well as other 
organizations. Rather than seeing these as discrete institutions or entities, they can be 
treated as many individual networks. 
2. Actors should not be restricted to social agents only, but include materials 
such as farmlands, capital investments, and local geography as well. Moreover, the 
materials are mobilized (by the State) to link the actors together on one hand, and on the 
other, parts of an environment which both constrain and enable the IRP implementation. 
In addition, the mobilization and availability of these materials vary spatially. As the 
implementation of IRP is specified by the spatial constitution of materials, actors 
involved can also be regarded as "actor-spaces" (Murdoch & Marsden 1995). 
3. In the State regulated IRP implementation, actors still have the freedom to 
quit from the network. With the decentralization of both fiscal and decision-making 
» 
authority under reform, each level of government can now enjoy more autonomy than 
19 See section 3.2 of this chapter. 
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before. It is possible that the local governments in TGR are only paying lip-service to the 
IRP implementation, especially when those upper level decisions are vague and 
inconsistent (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992). Or, IRP may finally be distorted to serve the 
interests of local governments rather than that of the central. Or, even worse, the IRP 
may be used by the local authorities to squeeze the local population.^® Although the 
relocated residents cannot choose whether to resettle or not, they can still have their own 
attitude in this issue. In other words, they can choose to cooperate with the State or not. 
Scott (1989) has called this the "everyday forms of resistance"?' 
4. If IRP implementation is conceptualized as translation process, it becomes 
necessary to see how sets of strategies and various kinds of resources are being used to 
link heterogeneous actors together. Based on the empirical investigation of Callon 
(1986b)� there are four phases in translation. Indeed, different phase means that different 
strategies are used and different resources are mobilized. Moreover, the strategies used 
and resources mobilized are not pre-given. Rather, they are contingently related to the 
empirical setting o f IRP implementation -- the Zigui County. 
5. The role of space also poses significant effects on IRP implementation. 
The existing spatial differentiation among eastem and westem regions of China is caused 
20 Naughton dubs this phenomenon as "implementation bias" {shangyou zhengce, xiayou diuce) (Lampton 
1987: 13). Lieberthal & Lampton (1992: 6) also comments that central-local relation in China nowadays is 
delineated as "work with" rather than "dictate to". 
Everyday forms ofresistance is regarded as a kind of non-cooperative or non-supportive attitude towards 
the state policy, such as, "the underreporting of land, misreporting of cropping patterns and yields, making 
exaggerated claims about thefts and spoilage of grain, illegal procurements, hoarding of grain for local 
welfare ftinds, and so on" during the GLF (Scott 1989: 16). It is a channel for the subordinate groups to 
express their dissatisfaction towards the state policy. Scott (1989) argues that this practice is common in 
socialistic countries. It is because, on one hand, the State directly controls every aspect of the society, and 
therefore, easily clash with the people. On the other hand, the prohibition of any kinds of open opposition 
forces the people to express their dissatisfaction in such practice. 
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by the underlying logic of the Chinese political economy. In the reform era, the 
development of coastal (eastem) region has greatly surpassed that of westem (inland) 
region. This new pattem of regional uneven development is caused by the new regional 
policy adopted in late 1970s. In the past, China adopted "redistributive policies", which 
aimed at creating spatially balanced development. However, instead of stressing on 
equity, the Chinese State has now implemented a new regional policy which emphasizes 
the development of coastal region in the reform era. Therefore, resources, investments, 
and preferential policies are granted to coastal provinces. This uneven regional 
development has significantly affected the IRP implementation in terms of spatial 
contingent and spatial boundary effects. 
6. Since IRP is a national policy to be implemented in local areas, it is 
necessary to specify IRP in a local context -- the Zigui County. Zigui County is a 
distinctive area. It is located in the western region of China, its economic development is 
far behind those of the coastal developed regions. Besides, it has its own history, 
geography as well as distinctive way of interaction among local actors. All these 
characteristics are the spatial contingent context which affect the IRP implementation: the 
way that IRP implementation actually works as well as the amounts and varieties of 
resources can be mobilized. Meanwhile, there are also locally generated specific forces 
which affect the IRP implementation. The TGP has been shelved for several decades, 
therefore, the whole TGR has suffered from backwardness for several decades. As a 
result, the whole TGR is hungry for large scale development. In addition, the coastal 
I 
regions have received tremendous investments and preferential policies from the &iate in 
6 7 
the reform era. It further makes the whole TGR as relatively deprived and accentuated 
this 'hunger'. This is one of the locally derived specific forces. Besides, the TGP is also 
another locally derived specific force. The TGP implies the coming of large scale 
development and investments from the State. These development impetuses, indeed, 
affect the IRP implementation. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented a conceptual framework to unravel the 
implementation of IRP. Since China has undergone drastic changes in the reform era, it 
implies that the previous framework on policy implementation is no longer applicable. 
Therefore, it is imperative to update our understanding. The fragmented bureaucratic 
structure and the appearance of diversified society have altered the policy implementation 
process in China: the cooperation of local actors is very crucial. Hence, it is suggested to 
use the actor-network approach to scrutinize the IRP implementation process. The actor-
network approach does not only provide us with a better understanding of IRP 
implementation but also draw on attention to the power of the State. Under the sociology 
of translation, social structural properties are treated not as causes of events but as 
network effects. Therefore, the power of the State is better seen as an effect produced by 
the association of different actors. As IRP is a nation-wide policy which is implemented 
in a local setting, it is necessary to consider the spatial dimension in this study. However, 
how does space affect IRP implementation? It all depends on how the process 
* 
contingently interacts with the spatial context, i.e. Zigui County, and the influence o f the 
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specific local forces (the local development hunger and the TGP). Hence, the next 





A DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTING 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to provide the background information for the IRP 
implementation in Zigui County. It will be divided into four main parts. Firstly, there 
will be an overview of the TGP to provide an appropriate context for understanding the 
IRP. Secondly, it will delineate the historical development of the TGR. The 
controversial TGP has been delayed for more than 40 years. No wonder that residents in 
the region are longing for large scale development. Therefore, it is significant to 
understand this context as it will affect the implementation of IRP in the TGR. Thirdly, it 
will introduce the basic characteristics of Zigui County. Since Zigui County is a 
distinctive region with its own characteristics, one would expect a different pattem in the 
implementation of IRP. Hence, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of Zigui 
County so as to know how does this spatial contingent context affect the implementation 
of this region-wide policy. The final major section puts forward in a summarized form in 




4.2 Overview on the TGP 
The TGP is one of the largest multi-purpose hydro-projects in the world. 
It will be carried out in the middle stream of Changjiang at Sandouping, in one of the 
beautiful gorges of the river -- the Xiling Gorge -- which is 40 km upstream from the 
Gezhouba Dam (the first mammoth dam standing in the mainstream ofChangjiang). The 
TGP involves a giant dam across the river, flood discharge channels, hydro-electric power 
station, as well as navigation passages. The height of the dam reaches 185 metres and the 
maximum water-retaining level is 175 metres. The hydro-electric power station will be 
"installed with 26 generating sets, with a total generating capacity of 17.68 million 
kilowatts, supplying 84 billion kwh a year" (Yao 1989a: 16). This project will be 
constructed under three phases which will last for 18 years. It is estimated that the first 
group ofgenerators will start to generate electricity in the 12th year (Yao 1989a). 
The TGP is a cross-century strategic project which includes huge amount 
ofcapital investment, technological inputs as well as large scale population resettlement. 
Putting this nation-wide project in a local region inevitably involves the distribution of 
costs and benefits between the centre and the local. Table 4.1 lists the potential impacts 
and benefits of the TGP. 
Among the major potential impacts of this project are strategic 
vulnerability, huge population resettlement, loss of cultural landmarks, erosion and 
reservoir siltation as well as financial difficulties. First, in term of national security, a 
huge dam constructed across Changjiang may "weaken China's bargaining position in 
future disputes, either domestic or international" (Feamside 1988: 618). As the 
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downstream of Changjiang is densely populated, once the mammoth dam breaks down, 
disastrous consequences will be resulted. Second, the huge number of relocated 
population imposes two large burdens to the TGP. On one hand, large sum of fund is 
needed to resettle the relocatees and support their future living. On the other hand, 
resettlement also exerts severe pressure on the already saturated environmental capacity 
(Xu et al. 1993). Third, the beautiful scenic spots such as the three gorges (Qutang Gorge 
and Wu Gorge will be sunk in this project whereas Xiling Gorge has been inundated in 
the Gezhouba project) and other historical relics will be sunk after the completion of 
TGP. For most of the Chinese, the sinking of these special scenic and cultural landmarks 
is more than the loss of tourist attraction. Rather, "along with the Panda and the Great 
Wall, they are known to Chinese schoolchildren and the general public as a symbol of 
China" (Fearnside 1988: 620). Fourth, sedimentation has been regarded as one of the 
major concerns in this project. The Changjiang basin has been investigated as "the site of 
particularly rapid deforestation and increase in erosion in recent years" (Smil 1983: 228, 
cited in Feamside 1988: 622). It is feared that severe erosion upstream of the Changjiang 
basin may eventually speed up the sedimentation of the reservoir, thus, reduce the power 
generating capacity of the project.' Fifth, it is found that budgets of past dam projects, 
like Danjiangkou and Gezhouba, were always overran (Feamside 1988). As the scale of 
the TGP is much larger, it adds many difficulties to the estimate of the total cost of the 
project. Hence, it increases the worry of cost overrun. 
I 
t 
1 Referring to the previous experience in Sanmen Gorges Dam on the Huanghe, it is discovered that "75% 
of its 1,000 MW generating capacity" was lost owing to sedimentation (Deudney 1981: 61’ cited in 
Feamside 1988: 622). 
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However, this project is mainly justified by the potential benefits of flood 
control, electricity generation, and navigation. First of all, it is estimated that this giant 
dam can effectively protect the downstream of Changjiang from floods as severe as those 
of 1870.2 Therefore, the possibility of property and life losses from flooding is greatly 
reduced. Second, electricity generation is considered as the principal benefit of this 
project. It is estimated that this project will generate "an annual output capacity of 84.7 
billion kwh of electricity" (Lu, Youmei 1996: 9). As a result, it helps to enhance the 
living standards in China.^ Meanwhile, there are two more advantages when developing 
the TGP as a large power generation centre. On one side, it lessens the need to transport 
coal from North China to the national industrial centres in Central and East China. 
Because the TGP would supply sufficient electricity to these national industrial centres, 
the transportation of large amounts of coal from North China would not be necessary. On 
the other side, it helps to improve the national air quality by reducing the emissions of 
carbon dioxide (over 100 million tons), sulphur dioxide (2 million tons), carbon 
monoxide (10,000 tons), as well as nitrogenoxides (370,000 tons) as 50 million tons of 
coal would be saved annually (Lu, Youmei 1996). Third, the rise of water level behind 
the dam will deepen and widen the river channel from Yichang City to Chongqing City. 
Therefore, it helps to enlarge the transportation capacity of Changjiang from 10 million 
tons to 50 million tons and ships of 10,000 tons can navigate to Chonqing throughout the 
2 The flooding o f l 8 7 0 is regarded as a kind of'mega-flooding' that occurs once every thousand years. 
3 According to the World Bank, the Chinese living standards are greatly limited by "low capita energy 
availability" (World Bank 1985, cited in Feamside: 625). Summing up, there are three ways that help to 
improve this condition. First, add more power generation; second, drop down the population, T^iid third, 
enhance the energy use efficiency. By constructing the TGP, China may "want to boost electricity 
production capacity by 13,000 MW instead of or in addition to saving this much by reducing population and 




Strategic vulnerability Major concem 
Population resettlement Major concern 
Cultural landmarks Significant intangible value to many Chinese 
Archaeological sites Of value to scholars: need study 
Natural habitats Already heavily disturbed: relatively small area to be 
flooded 
Fauna Some threats to species requiring shallow water 
downstream of dam; fish migrations are already 
blocked by an existing dam 40 km downstream of 
Three Gorges site 
Yangzi Lake hydrology Higher water level in low water period; no threat of 
desiccation 
Erosion and reservoir siltation Will impede navigation on short term and reduce 
storage volume on longer term 
Yangzi dikes Will increase maintenance required 
Agricultural and fisheries production Some potential impacts need study; some concerns 
have been overstated 
Coastal erosion ‘ several factors reduce risk, but needs study 
Earthquake hazard Needs study: consequences of exceeding the dam's 
tolerance would be disastrous 
Public health Probably not severe, but needs study 
Climate change Not a real problem 
Cross-China Water Transfer Many impacts if this scheme is implemented 
China's development budget . Severe drain, especially if cost overruns follow the 
example of other dams 
BENEFITS 
Flood control Majorjustification: alternatives include reforestation 
Electricity Much needed, but could be produced more cheaply 
and quickly from smaller dams. Energy conservation 
and population control more cost effective ways of 
increasing per capita power supply 
Irrigation A relatively minorjustification for the dam for 
Yangzi valley. Cross- China Water Transfer plan to 
use Three Gorges water in Yellow River Valley has 
severe potential impacts 
Navigation Large ships could reach Chongqing, but siItation may 
soon impede navigation 
Reservoir fisheries Increase in fish production upstream of dam 
Table 4.1 Potential Impacts and Benefits o fTGP (Source: Fearnside 1988: 619) i 
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year. Concomitantly, the transportation cost will be lower than before. Thus, it helps to 
boost the economic development of southwest China (Yao 1992a, Huus 1994). 
It is difficult to decide the construction of TGP by weighing the potential 
benefits against the impacts. Therefore, the project still remains a controversial issue 
today (although the NPC has made a decision to proceed in 1992). Indeed, controversy 
over this project has a long history. The idea of building such a huge dam was first 
suggested by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the early 20th century. In the 1930s, the feasibility study 
of the TGP was first conducted under the cooperation between the Kuomintang 
government and the United States. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949，there 
continued to be strong voices for the construction o fTGD. The TGP was first brought up 
within the CCP leadership after the 1954 flood which inundated 2.5 million mu (313,490 
hectares) of farmland, affected 19 million people and caused the Beijing-Guangzhou 
railway to be blocked for a hundred days (Lampton 1987b). Recognizing the importance 
to protect the middle and lower stream of Changjiang, Premier Zhou Enlai, at the First 
Session of the First National People's Congress fNPC) in September 1954, made a 
proposal for "comprehensive Yangtze River [Changjiang -- TKF] Basin planning" 
(Lampton 1987b: 176). Therefore, the CBPO was set up to study the feasibility of the 
TGP (Lieberthal & Okensberg 1988). In order to fulfill Mao's dream of ‘high gorges and 
great lake’ (gaoxia chu pingwu) (Liu & Li 1992: 55), feasibility studies of TGP have 
been carried since. But not much activity took place during the 1960s and 1970s due to 
economic and political upheavals (Lampton 1987b). 
I 
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Most comprehensive study of the project undertaken in 1986. A research 
group composed of 412 experts and scholars examined 14 crucial aspects of the TGP 
within two years and eight months and published the feasibility study report in 1989. It 
concluded that the TGP is technically feasible, economically reasonable and should be 
built the earlier the better. However, many other experts were still query the idea. The 
Chinese government first responded by deciding not to start the project in the near future. 
But later, at the Fifth Plenum of the Seventh NPC in 1992, the TGP was put back on the 
agenda again. It was approved, with 1,767 votes for and 177 votes against. An 
unprecedented number of deputies abstained or did not vote (Li, Rongxia 1992). The 
dispute over this issue is still exiting today (see Dai & Xue 1996). 
To summarize, the TGP is a state-regulated project put in a local region. 
Therefore, it will encompass the costs and benefits distribution between the central and 
local governments. Besides, the debate on both its potential benefits and impacts has 
made it a major controversial issue in China. 
4.3 Historical Background of Three Gorges Region (TGR) 
The TGR refers to the region which will be inundated after the completion 
of the TGP. It includes 19 cities or counties across Hubei and Sichuan Provinces (see 
Fig. 4.1),4 covering a total area of 54.2 thousand square kilometres with a population of 
15.49 million people in 1992 (Chen 1996a: 11). A majority of the counties in the region 
4 The 19 inundated counties or cities are Yichang, Zigui, Xingshan, Badong, in Hubei Provihce, and, 
Wushan, Wuxi, Fengjie, Yunyang, Kaixian, Wanxian County (includes Wanxian City), Zhongxian, Shizhu, 
Fengdu, Wulong, Fuling City, Changshou, Jiangbei, Baxian, as well as Chongqing City (only part of it) in 














































































































































































































































































































































































































are designated as ‘poor county�{pinkuwcian) which reflects the low level of economic 
development of the TGR. In 1992, the total Gross National Product (GNP) of the region 
was only 14.81 billion yuan and GNP per capita was 1,070 yuan (see Table 4.2). For the 
same year, the GNP per capita was equal to the national figure for the mid-1980s, and 
Shanghai City for the mid-1960s (Chen 1996a: 11). The income per capita was 941.5 
yuan, which was lower than the figure for the whole country, and for Sichuan, Hubei and 
Jiangsu Provinces. As illustrated in Fig. 4.2, primary production accounts for 40% of 
GNP in 1992 while secondary and tertiary production account for 35% and 25%, 
respectively. When compared with the figure for the country and other selected 
provinces, the GNP share of primary production in TGR is much higher but those of 
secondary and tertiary production is much lower. In addition, the total value of village 
industry was only 29.34% of the total value of village society in 1992. The total value of 
town and township enterprises per capita was just 636.69 yuan in 1992 (see Table 4.3). 
They are much lower than that of the national average and other provinces. It indicates 
that the development pace of rural industrialization in TGR is very slow and the degree of 
rural industrialization is rather low. 
In sum, the economic foundation of the TGR is on agriculture. The region 
is still at the primitive stage of industrialization. The main income of the tertiary sector is 
derived from the massive export of manual labour. The economic structure of this region 
is similar to that of the country in the late 1970s. The development level o f T G R is 15 to 
20 years behind the whole country, and 20 to 30 years behind the rich provinces (Chen 
1996a: 12). , 
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Fig. 4.2 Comparsion on GNP Composition'between T G R and Other Regions, 1992 





Region & GNP Income Value of Value of Value of 
Provinces per capita per capita primary secondary tertiary 
sector sector sector 
per capita per capita per capita 
TGR 1,017.0 941.5 654.2 979.3 193 
Sichuan 1,353.6 1,155.0 680.6 1,690.4 358 
Hubei 1,798.6 1,475.5 789.7 2,491.5 460 
Jiangsu 2,845.0 2,448.0 975.0 6,762.3 663 
National 2,032.6 1,685.1 771.4 3,147.3 • 572 
Average 
* The unit is yuan 
** My translation. 
Table 4.2 Main Indicators ofNational Economy: Comparison between TGR 
and Other Regions, 1992 (Source: Chen 1996a: 11) 
Region & Share of total value of Total value of town 
Province rural industry in total value & township enterprises per 
of village society (%) capita {yuan) 
TGR 29.34 636.69 
Sichuan 35.49 1,136.68 
Hubei 34.58 975.40 
Jiangsu 70.05 4,112.96 
National 50.09 1,534.10 
Average 
*The original table is in Chinese. English translation is mine, 
Table 4.3 Comparison on Rural Industry and Enterprises between TGR 
and Other Regions, 1992 (Source: Chen 1996a: 12) 
i 
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In the eyes of the local leadership, poverty of the TGR is closely related to 
the delay of the TGP over 40 years. The impacts of the postponement can be discussed 
from two aspects. First, the postponement of the project delays the state investment in 
the TGR, thus ‘freezes’ the economic development of that region at the level of 1950s. 
Most of the cities and counties along the river will be submerged with the construction of 
the TGD. Due to the uncertainty of the exact construction date and the water retention 
level, in order to avoid ‘double investment' and guarantee sufficient resources for the 
project, the State greatly reduced the investments in the TGR since 1950s. It is evident in 
the dialogue of the Head of Wanxian Prefecture, Mr. Chen Guangguo: 
since the Three Gorges Project was first proposed in the 1950s, it has been 
examined and re-examined with no decision made until now [1992]. The 
situation has adversely affected development in Wanxian Prefecture. With an 
unstable investment environment, there is little chance of getting investment from 
either the state or the province... (Li, Ping 1992a: 30).5 
In the period between 1980 and 1984，there is only 70 million yuan of state investment in 
the whole Wanxian Prefecture {Diqu) (Cheng & Jin 1992). When compared with the 
state investment in the coastal region in the same period of time, the TGR is "forgotten 
economically" (Li, Ping 1992a: 30). Under a planned economic system, the state 
procurement of resource and investment fund is critical for the development of local 
economy. Aggravated by the weak economic foundation of the TGR, most of the 
infrastructures and public facilities in the TGR have therefore remained as they were in 
the 1950s. 
t 
5 From the statistical figures of 1990, it is found that the GNP of Wanxian Prefecture was only 4.3 billion 
yuan which was one of the 18 lowest earning region in China (Li, Ping 1992a). 
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Second, local investments were also greatly discouraged in the past few 
decades. The Vice-county Head of Zigui County, Miss Yang Dejiu, said: 
the main cause of Zigui's poor development is the uncertainty of the TGP. Since 
we are not rich enough, therefore, we dare not make plans for urban construction 
(Liu & Li 1992: 57，my translation). 
In Zigui County, there has no big hotel, entertainment centre, bus terminal and even a 
public toilet! It is not because they did not want to build but the TGP hinders their 
planning very much (Field Observation, 1995). For example, the Zigui local government 
has originally planned to enlarge the existing bus terminal in 1989 but suddenly received 
the news that the TGP would commence soon. Therefore, the plan had to be aborted (Liu 
& Li 1992: 57).6 ��� same situation was also found in Fengdu County and Fuling City. 
In Fengdu County, 
the local government has raised enough capital for the construction of Jingzhutan 
hydroelectric power station and the Fengdu sugar and paper making factory. But 
considering that they will be inundated when the TGP is completed (although 
building of both of the above projects have started), the local government 
cancelled them immediately (Cheng & Jin 1992: 48, my translation). 
Whereas in Fuling City, 
for the sake of urban expansion to absorb the increasing population, the local 
government decided to build the Wujiang Bridge in 1978. After raising 5 million 
yuan (2 million yum was raised locally and 3 million yuan was allocated from 
Sichuan Province), it started the project. However, half-way through the project, 
the local government was asked to give up (at that time, it had spent 1.8 million 
on this project). It is because the government departments concerned told the 
local government that the construction of the TGD will raise the water level to 
200 metres, a level above the bridge. (Cheng & Jin 1992: 48，my translation). 
I 
g ^~I * 
The existing bus terminal ofZigui faces the following problems: first, it cannot accommodate any bus for 
as long as it wishes to remain. Second, the ticket office has only several square metres. Third, the 
passengers have to queue up to buy their tickets in an open area without cover (Liu & Li 1992: 57). 
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As mentioned above, according to local cadres, the TGR is a 'forgotten 
comer，{yiwang de jiaoluo) -- region that has been neglected by the State for several 
decades (Lu 1992: 4). The delay of the TGP postpones the economic development o f the 
TGR for more than 40 years. Coupled with the TGR's local constraints, such as 
unfavourable geographical location, poor transportation facilities, low education level of 
the local people, etc., there is a strong local demand for better economic development and 
improved living standard. Most of the local officials and residents of TGR believe that 
the construction of the TGP will help improve the local backwardness and add 
development impetus to the region. Therefore, they strongly support the construction of 
TGP and look forward to an early start of the project. A peasant in Badong, Mr. Su 
Zhikang said: 
[w]e're willing to have the Three Gorges Project built”., because it will benefit 
the area. If the project goes ahead, the state will invest more funds here and the 
water, electricity and transport services will be more convenient. Moreover, if a 
large project is built here, there will be more people in the cities. So' our 
vegetables and fruits will have a larger market and our income will increase. In 
addition, we can make money in the tourist industry (Li, Ping 1992a: 30). 
He further supplements that: 
I want the state to decide the matter at the earliest possible time. People in the 
flood zone think about it every day of every month and, ifapproval is not given, it 
will affect us adversely (Li, Ping 1992a: 30) / 
The local officials also agree that the TGP will greatly benefit the whole TGR. The Head 
ofWanxian Prefecture, Mr. Chen Guangguo, said: 
w]e think that construction of the Three Gorges Project will not only be 
extremely efficient in terms of flood prevention, electricity generation and 
, improvement in navigation, but also bring opportunities for our prefecture's 
economic development... the large project's tremendous economic power will 
7 The most urgent problem that Mr. Su faced is whether to build his new house in a higher location or river 
side since his choice is depending on the construction of the TGP (Li, Ping 1992a). 
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give great impetus to the area's development... If the Three Gorges Project is not 
built, Wanxian Prefecture will never become the focus of investment in Sichuan 
Province and the area will never catch up with the national development level (Li, 
Ping 1992a: 30). 
In addition, he expects that Wanxian Prefecture will get about 10 billion yuan as the 
resettlement funds in the future. He said that "[w]e can restructure our prefecture's 
economy with the money" (Li, Ping 1992a: 30). Although the actual benefits of TGP to 
the prefecture may not be the same as anticipated, it reveals that "the prefecture will rid 
itself of its poor and backward condition with the help of this great project" (Li, Ping 
1992a: 30). This strong local demand for the project is further enhanced in the reform 
period of 1980s. Under the open policy and economic reform, most of the coastal region 
has been better o f fbu t the TGR still remains as poor as before. As a result, it will further 
o 
make the local people ofTGR feel relatively deprived (Fig. 4.3). 
In sum, in the view of the local cadres, the low level of economic 
development in the TGR is shaped by the delay in constructing the TGP for several 
decades. Therefore, there is a strong local demand for large scale investment in the 
region. The coming of the TGP is definitely a valuable opportunity as it implies that 
large amount of investment funds, technological inputs, as well as infrastructures will be 
poured into the TGR by the State. 
g 
In 1950, the average agricultural and industrial production value of the TGR was 117 yuan per person. It 
is higher than the national average of 106.2 yuan (110% of the national average). However, the percentage 
is decreasing gradually from 80% of 1950s, 50% of 1960s and only one-third of national average in 1980s 
(Cheng & Jin 1992). In 1985, the average agricultural and industrial production value of TGR was only 
increased to 477 yuan per person and the national average was raised up to 1,276 yuan per person. The 
TGR shares only 34.3 percent of the national average (Jiang, Di 1992). 
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Nation-wide The delay ofTGP 
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by the State Council 
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IRP implementation The TGP construction 
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Fig. 4.3 How the Local Development Hunger in TGR and the Construction 
ofTGP affect the IRP Implementation 
4.4 Basic Characteristics of Zigui County 
Zigui County is the homeland of the famous patriotic poet, Qu Yuan. It is 
a mountainous county in the Xiling Gorge, located at the western part of Hubei province. 
It is 85 kilometres from Yichang City and 722 kilometres from Wuhan City (the capital of 
Hubei Province) (see Fig. 4.4). The area of Zigui County is 2,267.72 square kilometres. 
Ofthis, 13.2% is farmland, 4.4% is water surface area, 64.7% forest, and the rest, 17.7%, 
rocky hills (Hubeisheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 1984: 549). No wonder that 
Zigui is referred to "eight hills, half water, one and half field" {hashan banshui 
i 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Zigui County had 419.7 thousands residents of whom 90% were classified as agricultural 
population (Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1995). The county administers 8 towns 
{chen) and 8 townships {xiang) (see Fig. 4.4).9 Originally, Zigui County was under the 
leadership of Yichang District {diqu). In 1993，following the regional administrative 
reform of city-leading-counties {shiguawcian), the Yichang District was replaced by 
Yichang City. 
As in other counties in the TGR, Zigui is also regarded as a ‘poor county�. 
It has long received financial assistance from the provincial government. From 1953 to 
1985, it received 148.86 million yuan from Hubei province, or an average of4.51 million 
y ^ per year (Hubeisheng Ziguixian Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 1991). In 1994, 
the GNP of the county was 649 million yuan and GNP per capita was 1,555 yuan, just 
half of the Hubei provincial figure. However, when compared with the two nearby 
counties -- Yichang'® and Wuchang counties," the GNP per capita ofZigui is only halfof 
the figures for these two counties (see Table 4.4). Therefore, the economic development 
of Zigui County is not only far below the provincial standard, but also falls behind the 
standard o f the TGR (although there are some poorer counties in the TGR). 
9 The 8 towns are Guizhou (county seat of Zigui), Xiangxi, Shachenxi, Guojiaba, Xintan, Maoping, 
Yanglinqiao, and Lianghekou. The 8 townships are Quyuan, Shuitianba, Zhouping, Xietan, Wenhua! 
Meijiahe，Mopan, and Zhilan (Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1993) (see Fig. 4.4). ， 
10 Yichang County is east ofZigui . As in Zigui, 80% o f t h e land is hilly, 15% is suitable for agricultural 
activities. It will also one of the inundated counties in Hubei Province. The site o f T G D , Sandouping, is in 
this county (Hubeisheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 1984). ， 
“ W u c h a n g County is south of Wuhan. Unlike Zigui and Yichang, it is not a county in, the TGR. 
Therefore, it does not need to implement resettlement work. As the majority of the land of Wuchang is 
below 200 metres, it has 800 thousands mu of farmland. Therefore, the economic development of this 
county is much better than other counties within Hubei Province (Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1989). 
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Year Zigui Yichang Wuchang Average of 
County County County Hubei Province 
1989 590 1,277 1,760 1,182.41 
1990 532 1,287 1,651 1,248.09 
1991 665 1,381 1,835 1,305.39 
1992 802 1,586 2,269 1,827.00 
1993 976 1,766 3,153 2,339.00 
1994 1,555 4,688 5,028 3,341.00 
* The unit is yuan ‘ 
Table 4.4 GNP per capita: Zigui, Yichang, Wuchang Counties and 
the Average ofHubei Province, 1989- 94 
(Source: Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1990- 95) 
County Total Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Value of Sector Sector Sector 
G W Value Value Value 
Zigui 649 203 181 265 
Yichang 2,849 688 1,762 399 
Wuchang 3,047 1,147 1,066 807 
* The unit is million yuan 
** All the items are under my translation 
Table 4.5 Comparison on the Total Value of GNP and its Composition between Zigui, 
Yichang, and Wuchang Counties, 1994 
(Source: Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1995) 
As in the whole ofTGR, the long period ofbackwardness ofZigui County 
is also closely related to the postponement of the TGP. Owing to insufficient investment, 
the degree of industrialization in Zigui County is fairly low. There is no large national 
enterprise {guoying ziye) in the county. Thus, the economic foundation of the county is 
t 
mainly relied on agriculture. It can be seen that the total agricultural value is much higher 
88 
than the total industrial value in 1994 (See Table 4.6). By looking at the economic 
structure of Zigui County, the proportion of primary production in GNP composition 
(31.28%) is higher than that of secondary production (27.89%) in 1994. However, it is 
shown that the proportion of tertiary production (40.83%) is much higher than that of 
primary and secondary in 1994 (see Fig. 4.5). The boost development of tertiary 
production can be attributed to the implementation of TGP's preparation works and 
resettlement project in Zigui or nearby counties like Yichang County. It is evident in the 
proportion of construction and transportation sectors in the total value of non-agricultural 
activities in 1994. They account for about 35% in the non-agricultural sector (see Table 
4.6). 
Zigui County has long been famous for the production of a special orange 
species, ‘Qicheng'. It is called the 'homeland of orange’ {Qicheng zhi xiang) which is 
one of the hundred special agricultural products counties in China. Therefore, the 
plantation of orange is the most common agricultural practice as well as the main income 
source of the residents in Zigui. Besides, tea and tobacco are also found in Zigui. In this 
way, the agricultural development of Zigui County is growing from the stage of 
subsistence farming to commercial farming. About 25% of the agricultural production 
now belongs to commercial farming. However, when compared with Yichang County 
(80% has been commercialized), Zigui County is just in the infant stage of commercial 
farming (Personal communication with the Head of Zigui Agricultural Bureau, Mei 
Yongshang, 28/8/1995). By looking at the degree of rural industrialization, Zigui is still 
I 
at a fairly low level. In 1994, the proportional of rural industry in the total value of non-
i 
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agricultural activities was only 46.74%. Compared with the figure of Yichang and 
Wuchang Counties in 1994，Zigui County is much lower (see Table 4.6). The low degree 
of rural industrialization is also reflected in the net income of peasants. The net income 
of Zigui County has long been lower than Yichang, Wuchang, as well as the provincial 
average. The net income of each peasant in Zigui was only 627 yuan in 1994. It was just 
half of the provincial average and Yichang County, and only 40% of Wuchang County 
(see Table 4.7). As a result, it concludes that the low income of Zigui rural population is 
mainly due to the low degree of rural industrialization. 
� . - > • 
Fig.4.5 Comparison on GNP Composition between Zigui, 
Yichang, and Wuchang Counties, 1994 
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County Total Total Total Non-agricultural Activities Value 
Agricultural Industrial 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Value Value 
Zigui 394 274 172 78 49 7 62 368 
(46.74) (21.20) (13.32) (1.90) (16.85) 
Yichang 99 1,996 1,099 288 258 221 0 1,866 
(58.90) (15.43) (13.83) (11.84) (0.00) 
Wuchang 1,556 4,352 2,358 19 208 117 171 2,873 
(82.07) (0.66) (7.24) (4.07) (5.95) 
* Key: 1 Rural Industry 
2 Construction 
3 Transportation 
4 Commercial Activities (Wholesaling, Retailing, Trading, and Catering Activities) 
5 Others (Such as Labour Exporting) 
** The unit is million yuan 
*** All items are under my translation 
**** ( ) represents percentage 
Table 4.6 Comparison on some Basic Economic Indicators between Zigui, Yichang, and 
Wuchang Counties, 1994 (Source: Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1995) 
County / Year 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
& Province 
Zigui wi~~404~~m~~5^~~m~~m~~m~~4^~~6zT 
Yichang 435 468 501 639 627 649 699 850 1,208 
Wuchang 596 634 661 719 810 748 805 1,107 1,603 
Average of 445 461 498 572 671 627 678 783 1,170 
Hubei Province 
* The unit is yuan 
Table 4.7 Comparison on the Net Peasant Income per capita between Zigui, Yichang, 
Wuchang, County and the Average ofHubei Province, 1986- 94 
(Source: Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1987- 95) 
/ 
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4.5 Implications of the Setting for an Actor-network Analysis: A 
Preliminary Statement 
One can derive some implications from the above description of the 
setting: 
• The TGP involves heterogeneous actors. Since the TGP is a multi-purpose project 
which includes great deal of benefits and losses, it inevitably involves various 
bureaucratic and regional interests (Lampton 1987b; Lieberthal & Oksenberg 1988; 
Ma 1990). Amongst, it is the State that pushes the construction of this project and 
sees through its implementation. According to the actor-network theory, the State 
plays the role of the translator in TGP resettlement. 
• The actors include not only organizations or human beings but also a variety of 
materials. In the TGP, electricity will be generated, farmlands inundated, people 
relocated and investment fund allocated. These non-human materials must receive 
equal attention as the human actors. 
• The TGR is considered as a rather weak actor-space. The TGR is a relatively 
backward region when compared with other parts of China. It implies that the amount 
of mobilizable resource in the region is limited. In order to improve the 
backwardness of the region, a large sum of investment is required. As the TGP is 
supposed to do that, there is a favourable condition for translation. 
• IRP is regarded as the Obligatory Passage Point (OPP) in the process of 
problematization. The postponement of the TGP has cultivated a great local 
development hunger in TGR. This hunger has made the local people to believe that 
i 
only the construction of the TGP will help to improve the local economy as well as 
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their daily life.^^ In this way, the TGP is synonymous with development and 
improvement (for the local people). In order to construct the TGP, resettlement is 
necessary. Resettlement is implemented through the IRP and it needs the cooperation 
of the local people in TGR. Therefore, to improve local economy is to build the TGP; 
to build this project is to implement IRP; to implement IRP is to cooperate with the 
State. In this way, the local people will follow this detour so as to support the 
implementation ofIRP.^^ 
• As the IRP is a nation-wide policy to be implemented in a number of distinctive 
locales in TGR, it is impossible to get the same implementation process and outcome 
everywhere. Therefore, the distinctiveness of Zigui County is the spatial contingent 
conditions which will affect the IRP implementation. It will affect the implementation 
ofIRP at least in three ways (see Fig. 4.7). 
• First, more resources and investment in Zigui are available for state mobilization. 
Zigui County is the pilot resettlement county. In order to illustrate a successful 
example for later resettlement projects in TGR, more investment and resources will 
expectedly be poured into the resettlement project of Zigui. Therefore, the actor-
space of Zigui will be larger. 
12 The Head of Zigui Resettlement Bureau, Mr. Zhou Min, said the TGP has provided both political and 
economic benefits to the county. For political benefit, it has raised the reputation of the county. In term of 
economic benefits, the TGP has poured large sum of capital and impetus for county's development. First, 
the new county-seat town has been enlarged from 0.7 km square to 4 km square. Second, the industrial 
enterprises have received technical improvements. Third, the communication networks have been improved 
(for e.g. new telephone line, pagers' and mobilize phones' network has been connected). Fourth, several 
highways have been built, like Zixing highway (Zigui to Xingshan). Fifth, it has attracted a, portion of 
technical experts to work in the county (Interview in 4/8/1996). 
13 In the recent investigation by Lu, Qi (1996)，it is found that the attitude of the local people towards 
relocation is rather positive. It is because they expect resettlement will bring benefits to them. 
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• Second, the poverty of Zigui County is significantly affecting the IRP 
implementation. Like other areas in the TGR, Zigui County has a poor economy. 
Therefore, the demand for the construction of TGP is also very strong. To implement 
the project, it is necessary to implement the IRP first. In the previous pilot relocation 
of Zigui, it has illustrated that the IRP can help to enhance the living standard of the 
relocatees. As a result, it is expected that the local people will more likely accept the 
IRP and cooperate with the local authority. 
• Third, the relatively remote location and the long period of economic dependency on 
the State are also expected to be favourable local resources to be mobilized by the 
State to implement the IRP in Zigui. The mountainous relief of Zigui has made the 
county relatively isolated from the outside world. It implies that the local authority 
can easily control the information flow and ensure the effectiveness of policy 
� propagation. As a result, the IRP is expected to be implemented smoothly in Zigui. 
Nation-wide 
policy formulated 
by the State Council 
Zigui County 
,, The first county to 
Integrated Resettlement resettle ~ more resources 
Policy (IRP) and capital inputs 
< Contingent spatial < Weak local economic 
,, effects foundation 
IRP implementation 
in a locale of TGR Rather remote location --
inconvenient transportation 
I 
Fig. 4.6 How Zigui County affects the IRP Implementation , 
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4.6 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the basic features of the TGP, the TGR, as 
well as the Zigui County. It is aimed to provide a general background to understand the 
IRP implementation. The TGP is a mega-project that involves different interests. 
Therefore, it lays down the foundation that heterogeneous actors are enlisted in the TGP 
resettlement. As resettlement cannot be left to individual families, it is inevitable that the 
State is a dominant actor in IRP implementation. The TGP has delayed the development 
of the TGR for several decades. There is a strong local demand for economic 
development. However, to develop local economy is to build the TGP. To build the 
TGP, it is necessary to resettle local people. In this way, it is expected that there is a 
strong local support for TGP resettlement project. Finally, to specify the process of IRP 
implementation in Zigui, it is necessary to consider the effects of local peculiarities. 
Zigui is a distinctive area of China with its own socio-economic characteristics and 
resettlement experiences. These specific features serve as spatial contingency to affect 





INTEGRATED POPULATION RESETTLEMENT: AN 
ACTOR-NETWORK APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to unravel the process of the IRP 
implementation in TGR. An actor-network approach is used as a framework to delineate 
such a process. A case will also be used to give an in-depth illustration of the sequence 
of the process. The following discussion is divided into three parts. Firstly, it lays down 
the foundation for the operation of actor-network approach in Zigui resettlement project. 
This part is further sub-divided into three separate sub-sections. It will outline the 
resettlement system of Zigui County and its enlisted actors. As the actors are defined in 
this resettlement system by the linkage of resources, hence, the intermediaries of 
resources among actors, i.e. resource allocation and mobilization, will also be introduced. 
It is, moreover, necessary to display the social universe which, is shaped by the State as a 
background to the case study of Tongshuwan Village. Such an universe provides a 
favourable atmosphere for the IRP implementation as well as the TGP construction. The 
second part of this chapter will focus on IRP implementation in Tongshuwan Village. It 
will illustrate how the State enrols the enlisted actor-spaces together and implements the 
IRP in the village successfully. The discussion will be structured around the four phases 
•of translation, problematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilization. In the final 
{ 
part, findings will be summarized to conclude the whole chapter. 
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5.2 Setting the Scene: The Actor-world 
Actor-world is defined as: 
the context which determines the actors, gives them different roles or identities, 
scenarios, establishes relations between them as well as defines their histories, 
limitations and the contemporary social atmosphere (Callon 1986a). 
5.2,1 Major Actors involved in Zigui Resettlement Project 
Among the actors in Zigui resettlement project, it cannot be denied that the 
State is the dominant actor, i.e. the translator. Through the establishment of resettlement 
system and the promulgation of the relocation ordinance, the State has defined list of 
actors. On the 29th of June, 1993，the sixth regular meeting of the State Council passed 
the Ordinance on Changjiang TGP Construction and Population Relocation {Changjiang 
Sawcia Gongcheng Jianshe Yimin Tiaoli) (Beijing Review 12/7/1993). Under this 
ordinance, the Zigui resettlement system is established. The TGP Construction 
Committee (TGPCC) is the major decision-making body of the TGP which is under the 
direct leadership {danlie bianzhi) of the State Council. Three separate branches are set up 
to be in-charge of different aspects of the TGP (Fig. 5.1). The TGPCC Office is the 
decision-making board of the project. The TGP Resettlement and Development Bureau 
(TGPRDB) is responsible for the TGR resettlement, whereas the TGP Development 
Corporation deals with financial affairs of the project. That is to say, the TGPRDB, in the 
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Fig. 5.1 A Hierarchical Representation of Actors in IRP (Source: Fieldwork 1995) 
According to the population relocation ordinance, the management o fTGP 
resettlement is "administered by concerned provinces acting under the unified leadership 
of the central government, with counties bearing the responsibility for actual relocation 
I 
activities" {zhongyang tongyiguanli fashenfuzhi xianweijichu) (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 14). 
* 
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Therefore, under the TGPRDB, provincial resettlement offices are set up in Sichuan and 
Hubei Provinces. Zigui County is under the administration of Hubei province. With the 
change to the city-leading-counties system {shiguanxian zhidao) in 1993, it is directly 
under the leadership of Yichang City. Hence, under the resettlement offices at provincial 
and city level, Zigui County Resettlement Bureau is the local base to implement the IRP. 
Below the county resettlement bureau, they are the towns' and townships' resettlement 
stations. In Tongshuwan Village, the village resettlement work is under the auspices of 
the Village Party Secretary. Since Tongshuwan Village is under the administration of 
Guojiaba Town, the village resettlement work is jointly under the supervision of the 
Guojiaba Town Resettlement Station. For the town resettlement station, it is not only 
under the leadership of county resettlement bureau but also under the leadership of local 
town government. In this way, the resettlement offices of Hubei Province and Yichang 
City, Zigui County Resettlement Bureau, Guojiaba Town Resettlement Station, Guojiaba 
Town Government, as well as Tongshuwan Village Party Secretary are actors defined by 
the State to implement IRP in local areas. However, the most important actors in the 
TGP resettlement should be Tongshuwan villagers. It is because, for the sake of the TGP, 
they had to resettle and re-adjust their daily life. Among the actors in Zigui resettlement 
system, they are regarded as the cost-bearer. Thus, eventually, the relocated population of 
Tongshuwan Village is involved in Zigui resettlement system (see Fig. 5.1). Besides, 
with respect to the relocated population, it can be classified into 4 different categories 
(see Fig. 5.2). Firstly, as there are both cities, towns and villages inundated in the TGR, 
the relocated population is divided into urban and rural population. Secondly, due to the 
t 
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limited environmental capacity of the TGR, only part of the population can be relocated 
locally.i Therefore, a part of the population needed to be relocated 'outside' {waiqian). 
The resettlement of Tongshuwan Village involves rural population in which case the 
whole village is relocated locally? 
Relocated locally Relocated in other 
regions {Waiqian) 
Urban population Guojiaba Town Guojiaba Town* 
Rural population Tongshuwan Village 
*see footnote 1 
Fig. 5.2 Different Types of Relocated People in the TGP Resettlement 
(Source: Fieldwork 1996) 
The enlisted actors are, indeed, micro-networks with various properties. 
When the TGPRDB wants to recruit the actors into Zigui resettlement system, it is 
necessary for the TGPRDB to simplify the actors' properties in order to suit its interests. 
For example, it is definitely the local governments in Zigui County which should possess 
multiple functions. However, the TGPRBD attempts to recruit them in Zigui resettlement 
system by reducing them to the resettlement function only (see Fig. 5.3). 
‘ In the interview of the Head of Guojiaba Town, Mr. Li, he noted that it is impossible to relocate all the 
town's inundated population locally. There are 45 percent of them needed to be relocated outside the town. 
’ He said that, in the mean time, the most difficult problem for him is to decide who should be relocated 
outside (Interview, 5/8/1996). , 
2 The rural relocated population "refers to people whose registered residence is in the countryside, and who, 
as a result of the construction of the project, have lost their means of production such as farmland and 
orchards, and thus need to be resettled" (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 15). 
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Besides those actors directly involved in Zigui resettlement system (i.e. the 
residents, local governments and the resettlement bureaux of Zigui County), the State also 
enlisted other regions in the Zigui resettlement system. There are three channels that the 
other regions are involved in Zigui resettlement system. 
TGPCC ( Zigui relocated A 
\ ^^>v^ residents J 
广 • actor-world N ^ ^ - ^ - ' ^ ^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  \ 1 / \ / 
/ \ Hubei Province Yichang City 
/ V j T / 1 
/ Local governments . 
^/^^^i!^^^\^ ^^^^~ y ^ ^ 
/ Resettlement \ Zigui County / Tongshuwan Village 
1 Bureaux • j 广 ' ‘ \ Guojiaba 广 \ \ ^ ^ 
V ^ ^ • 入 Town \ 
r ^ ^ j \ 
/ Guojiaba / \ 
Zigui Town 
County T \ 
/ \ 
Key: _ ^ Simplification 
Fig. 5.3 The Anatomy of the Actor-world in Zigui Resettlement Project 
’ First, the regions outside Zigui County, as well as the TGR, are acted as 
i 
the relocatees' accepting regions. Since the environmental capacity of Zigui County is 
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limited, it is necessary to relocate some residents to other regions (Xu et al. 1993)? The 
Head of Zigui Resettlement Bureau, Mr. Zhou Min, admits in an interview that "limited 
environmental capacity to absorb the rural relocatees is one of the problems in Zigui 
resettlement". He continues to say that 
we try our best to resettle the people locally but still encourage people moving to 
their relatives and friends in other regions. In case, they must be relocated in 
other regions, they are ensured to relocate voluntarily to maintain stability in the 
course of relocation. In the last two months, our county had relocated 1,000 to 
2,000 residents to Yichang and Dangyang City. There were also people relocated 
to their friends and relatives in Hunan, Sichuan and, as far as, Henan and 
Shandong Province (Transcription from interview, 4/8/1996). 
Second, the other regions play the role of supporters to Zigui resettlement 
project. According to the population relocation ordinance promulgated in 1993, it 
highlights the principles of "state assistance with preferential policies, support provided 
by various regions and self-reliance" (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 13). Therefore, besides local 
government and resettlement bureau, the relocated people can also have resettlement 
assistance from other regions. The preferential treatment terms of the resettlement 
regulation clearly stated that "related central and provincial government departments will 
give priority to the reservoir area in arranging construction projects and allocating funds" 
(Wu, Naitao 1994b: 13). Besides, subsidies, scientific and technological assistance are 
given to the TGR by corresponding provinces, enterprises and government departments 
{duikou zhiyuan). From 1993 onwards, there has been "nearly 60 central government 
departments and 20-odd provinces and cities which have established supportive ties with 
3 According to Xu et al. (1993), there are 294.9 thousand mu of land in TGR can be planned foragricultural 
development which shares only 1.1 percent of the uncultivated mountainous slopes of the 19 inundated 
cities and counties. In Zigui, there are only 7,000 mu of land ready for future rural resettlement, shares only 
0.2 percent of the total inundated area of the county. 
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377 corresponding units in various counties, cities and prefectures in the reservoir area. 
Some 100 projects have been completed and 130 million yuan in assistance funds have 
been allocated.^ In addition, some 388 people have undergone intensive training and 
1,560 laborers from the reservoir area have found employment.... Between now [1993] to 
the year 2000，the state will provide a special annual loan for the technical renovation of 
enterprises which will be moved out from the reservoir area" (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 14). In 
Zigui, until 1995, 141 projects had been completed, receiving assistance funds of 93.14 
million yuan. Besides, there are 19 cities or counties that have established relations with 
Zigui County government and 273 enterprises that have linkages with the enterprises of 
Zigui. They both agreed that the relationship of corresponding assistance will last for 17 
years. Nevertheless, the Jiangsu Province government assigned that the 12 counties of 
Yangzhou, Nantong, Chenzhou and Changzhou Cities to provide assistance to 12 
corresponding towns and townships of Zigui County. Meanwhile, it also gave 13 
automobiles to the county government (Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1995: 229-
30). For Hubei province, the transportation department of Jingmen City assisted the 
transportation department of Zigui County in the transportation development of Maoping 
Town (Yichang Nianjian Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 1993). Also, Huazhong Agricultural 
University in Hubei Province also provides assistance to Zigui County in terms of 
subsides, scientific and technological assistance and education to peasants (Personal 
contact with Mr. Cai Chongfa, 4/8/1996).^ 
» 
4 Amongst, there are 3.6 million ymn for the dam area. , 
5 Since 1991, Huazhong Agricultural University has sent many experts to villages ofZigui to help peasants 
to improve the skill of planting orange tree. Moreover, short-term training classes were also held to 
introduce new farming techniques to the peasants. Besides, in 1996, the staff of the university has also 
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Third, some regions, like provinces at downstream Changjiang, are 'free-
riders' in the TGP since they do not have to bear any cost of the project but they can 
enjoy its benefits. Hence, in order to ensure their benefits from the TGP, they strongly 
support the TGP resettlement. The construction of the TGP will definitely provide the 
benefits of electricity supply, navigation and flood control. However, these benefits are 
not restricted to the TGR but shared along the whole of the Changjiang. This is evident 
from the interview with Mr. Wang, Keying, Deputy-governor ofHunan Province. 
Constructing a reservoir in the Three Gorges on the Yangtze River [Changjiang ~ 
TKF] is the key to solving the problem of flood control in Dongting Lake. Only 
construction of a large reservoir will prolong the service life of the lake.... 
Building a reservoir at Three Gorges will directly benefit Hunan and so we are in 
favour of the immediate construction of the project (Li, Ping 1992a: 28). 
Although the above three groups of actor are linked with the Zigui 
resettlement project in different ways, it should be noticed that they are less significant in 
the Zigui resettlement system (when compared with actors directly involved in the 
resettlement project). Hence, only those actors directly in the Zigui resettlement system 
will be discussed in the following section. 
5.2.2 Mechanism of Non-human Actors: State Allocation and Mobilization 
In applying the actor-network approach to the Zigui resettlement project, it 
is necessary to uncover how the State links the enlisted actors together through 
mobilizing various kinds of resource. This section is about the way the State manipulates 
various resources to achieve its own purpose. 
I 
t 
donated a sum of money to Zigui County for the purpose of building Xiwang primary school (Personal 
Contact with Mr. Cai Chongfa, 4/8/1996). 
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Resources are intermediaries that tie actors together. They are also actors 
as well. However, how are resources linked together? The State manipulates resources 
to attract the enlisted actors in two ways, first, allocation of resources to local regions and 
second, mobilization of resources in local regions (see Fig. 5.4). 
In TGP resettlement, resources allocated to local regions are mainly in the 
form of relocation fund and infrastructure development. According to the TGP relocation 
ordinance, the relocation funds are allocated for the compensation of immobile assets 
loss, like houses and means of production, of the relocated people, restoration of the 
inundated infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, reconstruction of the inundated cities, 
towns and factories, and lastly the local resources development, such as the plantation of 
orchards (Beijing Review 12/12/1994; Chen, Yaobang 1994). For the relocation fund, 
they are allocated to each administrative level, ranging from province to village. Under 
the management system of "concerned provinces acting under the unified leadership of 
the central government, with counties bearing the responsibility for actual relocation 
activities", the State Council decided to allocate 40 billion yuan of relocation fund to the 
two resettlement provinces - Hubei and Sichuan.^ The provincial governments are 
totally in-charge of the whole sum of money {haogan shiyong). Amongst, Hubei 
province shared 5.35 biWionyuan (Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1995). 
I 
t 
6 The proposed relocation fund of TGP, based on the feasibility study report in 1986, is 18.5 billion yuan 
(calculated in 1990 prices) (Yao 1992b). 
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Fig. 5.4 Resource Allocation and Mobilization from the State to the local 
in the TGP Resettlement (Source: Fieldwork 1996) 
In fact, the distribution of the relocation ftinds is rather uneven. Most of 
them are concentrated at the upper administrative hierarchy, i.e. at provincial, city and 
county level. In the 1994 Hubei Province relocation investment budget, the village 
relocation fund shares only 9.20 percent of the total investment and the towns and 
township shares 11.56 percent. The two together then accounts for only about 20 percent 
o f the Hubei Province's total. However, when compared with the relocation investment 
in city, the figure reaches 43.94 (see Table 5.1). Therefore, it indicates that the relocation 
fund in the town (township) and village level are much less than that in the county and 
I 
city level. Zigui is no exception. As evident from an interview with Mr. Zhou Min, the 
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Head of Zigui Resettlement Bureau, Zigui has received 2 billion yuan relocation ftmd but 
the construction of the new county seat {Xinchengguan) in Jiandaogu (Scissors valley) 
will consume ha l fo f the relocation fund, i.e. 1 hiWionyuan (Personal note, 31/8/1996). In 
Tongshuwan Village, there is a rife phenomenon that the villagers can only receive 70 to 
80 percent of the scheduled relocation ftind {daowei). The Village Party Secretary 
explains: 
in our village, it is an usual phenomenon that villagers can only get 70 percent of 
their total relocation fund. It is because in our village's resettlement ordinance, 
villagers are required first to break down their old houses before they get the 
whole sum of the relocation funds. However, in this moment, due to the lack of 
capital for village infrastructure development, the Village Committee borrows 30 
percent of the villagers' relocation fund (Interview, 7/8/1996). 
Item Investment* Percentage 
{million yuan) 
Rural Relocation 24.94 9.20 
City Relocation 119.09 43.94 
Town (Township) Relocation 31.34 11.56 
Factory Relocation 69.01 25.46 
TGR Transportation Restoration 10.59 3.91 
Compensation of Power Station 1.70 0.63 
Planning & Technological Innovation 6.60 2.44 
Administration and Management Fee 7.73 2.85 
Total 271.00 100 
* Completed Investment 
Table 5.1 Hubei Province Relocation Investment Budget, 1994 
(Source: Hubei Nianjian Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 1995) 
The concentration of allocated resources at the city and county level can be 
explained by two reasons. First, under the socialist planned economy, the urban sectors 
f • • 
are usually privileged in terms of materials supply. Therefore, it is logical that cities and 
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counties have received more relocation funds than towns, townships and villages. 
Second, there are three counties in Hubei Province -- Zigui, Badong and Xingshan -- that 
needs to relocate their county seats before the damming of Changjiang in 1997. Hence, 
they take up the majority of the relocation fund within their own county. 
Besides, the infrastructure development projects are also concentrated on 
the city and county level only. In the early phase of the TGP, over 60 construction 
projects are undertaken in the dam area. The total investment of these projects costs 3 
billion yuan and "two-third of them are key construction projects mandated by the [S]tate 
government" (Beijing Review 26/9/1994: 5). In order to assist the TGP, Hubei Province 
has started an array of infrastructural projects but majority of them are at city level. 
For examples, the building ofXilingxia Bridge across Changjiang in the dam area; 
the Yichang-wanglong highway which links the major cities along Changjiang in 
Hubei Province; 15 kilometres telecommunication lines are constructed for the 
communication between Yichang City and the dam areas (Hubei Nianjian 
Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 1993). 
According to the Head of Guojiaba Town government, Mr. Li, except those ‘sunk， 
infrastructures which will be restored by the State, there will not be any extra • 
infrastructure developments in Guojiaba except those investment made by the town 
government itself (Interview, 5/8/1996). The situation is the same in Tongshuwan 
village. All the investment in the construction of new roads, bridges and schools are 
n 
locally raised or supported by international organizations. 
Due to the shortage of state resources allocation in town, township and 
village level, it is necessary to mobilize resources in local areas in order to effectively tie 
t , 
7 The construction of new primary school in Tongshuwan Village costs 850 thousands yuan, amongst, the 
Canadian government has donated 120 thousands yuan for this project (Interview with Village Party 
Secretary ofTongshuwan Village, 7/8/1996). 
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the actors together. Therefore, in Tongshuwan Village resettlement, the focus is to see 
how the State has mobilized various kinds of resource in the village in order to translate 
the local actors. Unlike the resources allocated directly from the State, the resources 
mobilized in local regions is not strictly confined to materials only. On the contrary, 
there are various kinds of resource which can be mobilized in the local areas, for 
example, historical facts, technological innovations, natural scenery and village customs, 
etc. The availability of resource mobilization is spatially contingent. To specify the 
spatial contingent conditions in which the actors are situated, the term, actor-spaces, is 
applied to operate in the Tongshuwan Village resettlement.^ Resources that can be 
mobilized in Tongshuwan Village include the mountainous location of the village, local 
demand for living improvement, land resources as well as the locally raised capital in 
village, etc. They are all mobilized by the Village Party Secretary who re-interprets and 
transforms them as state resources to attract the villagers in IRP implementation. As the 
processes of resource mobilization and translation in Tongshuwan Village should be 
investigated empirically, it will be left for discussion in the latter part ofthis chapter. 
5 . 2 � 3 Social Atmosphere^ 
In order to ensure the enlisted actors are being translated successfully, the 
first step is to produce a favourable environment for them to participate. It is aimed at 
giving confidence to the actor-spaces. In addition, it also provides a message to them that 
once theyjoin in the association, their interests or goals will be fulfilled. In other words, 
t 
« 
8 Therefore, I used the term, actor-space, instead of actor in the following discussion. 
9 "Social universe", "social climate" and "social atmosphere" are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
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the social climate shaped by the State has a demonstrative effect. It is hoped that this will 
initially stabilize the role of actor-spaces. 
To draw on analogy, in the case of electric vehicle, "the EDF (Electricite 
de France) presented a plan for the VEL [the electric vehicle] that only determined the 
precise characteristics of the vehicle it wished to promote, but also the social universe in 
which the vehicle would function. First, the EDF defines a certain history..." (Callon 
1986a: 21). The State also shapes the historical development of the TGR. As stated in 
chapter 4, the delay o fTGP has shaped the poverty ofTGR. Therefore, the local demand 
for economic development is very strong. With reference to this local demand, the State 
creates a favourable social climate for the actor-spaces to join into the resettlement 
network. The formation of the favourable social atmosphere can be divided into four 
stages. 
The first stage is the IRP pilot study. The IRP pilot study started in 1985. 
It was aimed to lay down foundation and provide field experiences for future large scale 
relocation work. It involved "the resettlement of both rural and urban residents, the 
relocation of cities and towns, providing new facilities for factories and personnel 
training" (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 12). In the past 8 years, the State had allocated over 460 
miWionyuan for "the development of 4,867 hectares oforange groves, tea plantations and 
mulberry fields, 28 industrial enterprises have been established to employ relocatees, and 
four factories have been relocated. Some 58 advance projects for the relocation of cities 
and towns have been completed, and a large number of personnel have attended applied 
> 
technical training courses" (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 12-3). The pilot study l^ys down 
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foundation for future comprehensive relocation work and illustrates the fact that IRP can 
help the local residents to improve their living standard. Besides, the main purpose of the 
pilot study is to give out evidences that: through the implementation of IRP, the 
TGPRDB is able to relocate million of people successfully. As resettlement is considered 
as one of the obstacles in the construction of TGP, the success of pilot study is a strong 
argument for the State to strike for the early construction of the TGP. The residents of 
Taiping ofYichang County, the first town in Hubei Province to be inundated, "succeeded 
in setting a national record for yielding 8,000 yuan per mu annually from the tea which 
has now gained a niche in the world market" (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 16). Whereas in the 
Leijiaping Village, Dongrangkou Township ofBadong County, a peasant called Li Siguo 
with four dependents, originally worked on a half hectare of contract farmland. 
After he moved to the trial community, he worked on 0.4 hectare of farmland 
planted with oranges, together with an interplanting of com, wheat, peas and 
water melons. In 1989，his family harvested close to 3,000 kg of grain and made 
an income of 12,450 yuan, an increase of 239 percent over 1986 when he had not 
yet moved (Li, Ping 1992b: 27). 
It is obvious that the pilot study has a demonstrative effect -- many relocated people find 
that the IRP is profitable and are eager to move to the trial communities. 
In short, the State creates a social universe that: first, the State has taken "a 
prudent and responsible attitude towards the resettlement problem" (Li, Ping 1992b: 27). 
In other words, the State is worth trusting in settling the TGP resettlement. Second, it has 
established the image that IRP is workable and profitable to the relocated residents. 
Therefore, if the relocated people want to improve their living standard, they should 
» 
cooperate with the State and follow the IRP. 
/ 
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The second stage denotes the several months before the proposal of TGP 
sent to the NPC. The State had organized three field trips to TGR so as to help the 
political leaders and the public to know more about the TGP. The aim of these trips was 
to gain the support of the NPC delegates, government officials, scholars and technical 
experts. 
There were three trips in the period between October, 1991 and February, 
1992. Each of them was arranged for different groups and organizations. First, among 
the midst of October and the midst of December in 1991，the State had arranged the 
delegates of NPC to visit the upper and middle streams of Changjiang as well as the 
location o f the TGD, Sandouping. Second, during the midst ofJanuary in 1992, the State 
News and Propaganda Department organized another visit to TGR. There were 42 news 
units in Beijing invited in this trip. Through the holding ofseminars and the field visit to 
cities and towns along the river, many problems in the mind of the reporters had been 
solved. Meanwhile, it also increased the confidence of these reporters in the propaganda 
work of the TGP. Third, in February, 1992, the State Council organized various 
government departments together with scholars and experts offamous universities to visit 
to the TGR, Jingjiang and Dongting regions (Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1993). 
After the three field trips, those representatives concluded that: 
we discovered that after the decades of study of the TGP, various data and 
information o f the project is reliable and the project is technically possible. Since 
many problems o f the project have been resolved and the merits o f the project are 
more than defects, the TGP should be built. Therefore, we suggest the NPC 
should pass the resolution on TGP as early as possible (Hubei Nianjian Bianji 
, Weiyuanhui 1993: 245-6, my translation). 
i 
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The three visits to the TGR have two impacts to the residents in TGR. 
First, it has given the message to the local people that the TGP is highly concerned by the 
State. Second, such intense visits to the TGR within several months imply that the 
possibility for the construction of the TGP is quite high. After the period of visit, it has 
aroused the ‘Three Gorges Fever’ {Sanxiare) in TGR. In the Yuan Xiao Festival (the 
fifteenth day of the Lunar New Year) of 1992, residents of the Zhongbao (Middle Castle) 
Island of Yichang County organized an activity called 'Welcome the TGP and Celebrate 
the Yuan Xiao Festival' {Ying Sawcia Gongcheng Qing Yuawciao Jiajie) spontaneously 
(Liu & Li 1992: 56). That night has attracted about 20 thousand people to the island and 
it started the ‘Three Gorges Fever，. Since Zhongbao Island will be removed when the 
TGP starts, many people, included tourists, factory managers and merchants from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, etc., came to the island in the summer of 1992. Some of them were 
interested in sight-seeing, but the majority of them came to discuss development projects 
with the local government and enterprises (Liu & Li 1992). Although the NPC still has 
not passed the resolution on the TGP, it indicates that the public is very eager to build the 
TGP. This kind of ‘surpass’ {chaoqian) attitude reflects the local residents' desire to get 
rich. Therefore, the ‘Three Gorges Fever' can be regarded as an opinion poll of the TGR 
relocatees. 
The third stage is the formulation of relocation ordinance in 1993. The 
relocation ordinance specifies "clear rules on resettlement, management of submerged 
areas, as well as preferential policies" (Beijing Review 12/7/1993: 7). By mean of setting 
I 
preferential terms in the ordinance, it creates a social atmosphere that the State has 
/ 
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promised to develop the TGR and improve the local people's living standard. In terms of 
local economic development, the document notes written that "a fixed amount of earnings 
from electricity generated by the Three Gorges Power Station will be drawn as a fimd for 
construction in the reservoir area" (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 13). Also, the State has 
established the TGR as an Open Economic Zone. The cities of Yichang, Fuling and 
Wanxian are designated as open cities. They will have "similar preferential policies 
granted to open coastal economic zones and riparian cities" (Beijing Review 26/9/1994: 
5). According to the TGR economic development planning schedule, the State is planned 
to invest 44 billion yuan, in constructing 326 projects in the TGR (Hubei Nianjian Bianji 
Weiyuanhui 1994). On the issue of raising local living standard, it has been promised 
that "counties and cities in the reservoir area with access to abundant hydroelectric 
resources will be listed as primary electrified rural counties". In addition, "the state will 
offer special concern and support to areas accepting relocatees in terms of granting 
special loans, technical renovation projects and scientific and technological development" 
(Wu, Naitao 1994b: 14). 
For the fourth stage, it is the phase that the State allocates more fund and 
resources to the TGR. For examples, in order to prepare for the early phase of the TGP, 
the State has invested 0.7 billion yuan to build the section of the Yiwang highway from 
Jiangling to Yichang (Hubei Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 1993). Also, the construction 
work of the three new county seats of Zigui, Xingshan and Badong has been started. In 
Zigui County, 23 projects have been started to construct and 53.54 million yuan has been 
I 
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invested.iG Amongst, the County cement factory is expected to complete within 1994. 
Also, 13 other projects including the County power station, printing factory, etc.... have 
finished planning and are scheduled to be built in the near future (Yichang Nianjian 
Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 1995). Through investment in the TGR to develop the 
infrastructures, it creates a favourable social atmosphere that the State will keep its 
promise and the State is worth trusting. Thus, local support for the TGP and IRP 
implementation will be easily acquired. 
Through the establishment of the favourable social universe in the context 
of TGR, it lays down the foundation for the process of translation in Tongshuwan 
Village. The social universe has demonstrated to the local residents that the TGP and IRP 
can help them to 'escape, from poverty {tuopin) and develop their economy. 
5.3 Process of Translation: The IRP Implementation in Tongshuwan 
Village 
In order to unravel clearly the underlying mechanism of the IRP 
implementation, the process of translation is applied. The strategies of translation are 
very much dependent on empirical investigation. The following discussion draws on the 
case of St. Brieuc Bay in France (Callon l986b) as the model of description and 
information from my personal investigation in Tongshuwan village. The process of 
translation is divided into four phases: problematization, interessement, enrolment and 
mobilization. Each of the phases, indeed, overlaps in practical situation (Callon 1986b). 
/ 
'° The investment involved bank loans, 27.5 million yuan, ftinds raised by enterprises, 23.34 million yuan 
and others, 2.7 million>^waw (Yichang Nianjian Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 1995). 
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Before delineating the implementation process of IRP in the village, it is imperative to 
introduce the background information ofTongshuwan village. 
Tongshuwan Village is one of the villages in Guojiaba Town of Zigui 
County. It is located at the riverside of Tongzhuang River, just opposite to the town seat 
of Guojiaba Town (see Fig. 4.4). There were 1,437 people (in 402 households) lived in 
the village, in 1995. 1,100 of whom (or 287 households) would have to be relocated. In 
1995，it had resettled 739 people (187 households). 732 o f t h e m (185 households) were 
relocated locally and 7 (2 households) relocated outside the village {waiqian). There 
were 901 mu farmland and 755 orange grove in 1995, 766 of which will be sunk in 1997 
(amongst, 308 mu are rice field). In 1995, 900 mu of land had been exploited for the 
relocated population. In addition, 4.57 million yuan had been invested to build new 
houses. A total of 15,650 square metres of new houses has been built. The majority of 
the population in the village are peasants." Therefore, the village economy chiefly relies 
on agricultural activities. In 1995, over 80% of the total village income came from 
agricultural activities. Amongst, orange production was the main source of income. The 
total orange production increased from 360 thousands kilogram in 1994 to 510 thousands 
kilogram in 1995. Income earned from orange production grew from 748 thousands yuan 
to 4.58 million yuan during the same period. Over 80% of the village household income 
in 1995 was above 500 yuan. Meanwhile, 125 households (505 people) or 35% of the 
total, in the village were 'thousand yuan household' {qianyuanhu) in 1995. Their 
incomes were higher (the average net income of the villagers, which was 888 yuan) (see 
t 
” I n 1995，there are 819 labor force in the village and 770 of them are engaged in agricultural activities. 
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Fig. 5.5). In short, it can be concluded that the living standard of Tongshuwan Village is 
a little bit higher than the surrounding villages. 
Fig. 5.5 The Income Distribution of Tongshuwan Village, 1995 
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5.3.1 Problematization: The Establishment of IRP as Obligatory Passage Point (OPP) 
Latour (1987) points out that the first and easiest way to translate actors is 
to purvey their explicit interests. Therefore, the first moment of translation is 
problematization. It is a process which delineates the key important actor, i.e. the 
TGPRDB, and defines the other actor-spaces' paths to achieve their goals based on its 
designed node of network, i.e. ‘the Obligatory Passage Point’ (OPP). The purpose of this 
process is to succeed hegemony among actor-spaces, thus, finally they are enrolled and 
mobilized (Parkin 1994). The question of ‘can IRP be implemented successfully?' is 
enough to link the enlisted actor-spaces together and establish their identities and 
relations (see Fig. 5.6). The actor-spaces involved in the IRP implementation of 
I 
Tongshuwan Village are channelized to the OPP. The OPP is a path provided by the 
i 
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State that the actor-spaces can get what they want when they pass through it. However, 
for what reasons do the actor-spaces tum to the OPP? In the IRP implementation of 
Tongshuwan Village, the actor-spaces involved are the TGPRDB, the Guojiaba Town 
government and the Zigui resettlement bureau, the villagers and Villagers' Committee 
(VC) {Cunmin Weiyuanhui) of Tongshuwan village (see Fig. 5.7). When the actor-spaces 
are willing to follow the OPP, it implies that the usual way of them to achieve their goals 
is blocked (Latour 1987). Therefore, in order to fulfill their goals, the actor-spaces are “to 
consent to detour" (Callon 1986a: 26). It is important to let the actor-spaces know that 
they will be benefited in this detour. Although the actor-spaces recognize that they can 
benefit from the network, they still have the freedom to reject as they will calculate the 
cost of alliances (Callon 1986a). 
Fig. 5.7 illustrates the goals of the actor-spaces. First, the main goal of the 
TGPRX)B is to complete the construction of TGP. To complete the project is to handle 
1 2 
the relocation problem successfully. To handle the relocation problem successfully is to 
implement IRP. Therefore, the IRP implementation is the OPP for the TGPRDB to 
achieve its goals. In addition, special and separate governmental departments are set up to 
handle the resettlement project, or the resettlement bureau. In Tongshuwan Village, the 
VC is in charge of the IRP implementation. Their goals are to complete their own 
‘12 Premier Li Peng has said that "the success of the Three Gorges Project lies in relocating the population" 
(Wu, Naitao 1994b: 11). The term, 'successful' may be under different interpretations by different persons. 
According to Li, Boning (1992), a successful relocation project should involve three criteria. First, to 
ensure the living standard of the relocated people will not be lower than before. Second, to avoid social 
disturbances caused during relocation. Third, to prosper economic development of the entire TGR. 
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Fig. 5.6 The Process of Problematization: The Setting up ofIRP as OPP 
� in the Case of Tongshuwan Village (Source: Fieldwork 1996) 
The whole TGR still remains as a relatively poor region in 1990s. 
Therefore, the local demand for development in that region is very strong. The goals of 
the local government and residents in Tongshuwan are to develop local development and 
improve living standard. It is evident from all the interviewed peasants of Tongshuwan 
Village when asking their impression towards the TGP. They can easily point out two to 
three advantages of the project, like electricity supply, flood controlling and 
transportation improvement, etc. Meanwhile, some of their answers significantly reflect 
’ their concerns on local development. For examples, a young farmer in division eight, Mr. 
t 
Zhao, has said: 
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I support the TGP because it can improve my living conditions, build new road to 
our village and also give us convenience on water transportation in the future 
(Interview, in 7/8/1996).'^ 
By mobilizing the historical resources in the TGR, the TGPRDB shapes the goals of the 
1 
residents and government of Tongshuwan Village. Therefore, in order to improve living 
standard and local economic development, it is necessary to build the TGP. To build the 
TGP is to resettle the villagers successfully. To resettle the villagers successfully is to 
implement IRP in the village. Accordingly, the Tongshuwan villagers are linked by the 
TGPRDB. 
In order to explain the reasons why the actor-spaces detour to the OPP, it 
should pay attention to the obstacle problems of the actor-spaces (see Fig. 5.7). First, for 
the Guojiaba Town resettlement bureau, it is necessary to detour to the OPP since it has 
to tackle the resettlement problems in Guojiaba Town (including Tongshuwan Village). 
Second, the Tongshuwan villagers want to improve their living standard but cannot 
achieve it by themselves. Therefore, they are willing to detour to the OPP. Third, for the 
local government of Tongshuwan Village, the VC, the local economic development is 
hindered by the lack of capital investment. Hence, the VC has to cooperate with the State 
and detour to the OPP. 
13 Originally, Tongshuwan Village is located at the mid-level of a mountain. Since the water level of the 
river will rise to 175 metres in the future, it will become a river-sided village. Hence, water transport will 
be more convenient (Field observation, 8/1996). 
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Fig. 5.7 The Goals and Paths of Actor-spaces in the Case ofTongshuwan Village 
(Source: Fieldwork 1996) 
It is necessary to pause and remark on Fig. 5.7. This is a simplified figure 
to represent the process how the actor-spaces are enrolled into alliance. Each actor-space 
has its own main goal but hindered by the obstacle problem. However, the actor-space 
may not just have a single goal in reality. For examples, the State wants not only to 
complete the TGP but also to "ensure the prosperity of the entire region and improve the 
living standards of local residents" (by the IRP implementation) (Wu, Naitao 1994b: 12). 
For the sake of convenience in discussion, the figure only selected the main goal of the 
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actor-spaces. It does not mean that the actor-spaces have just a single goal. Meanwhile, 
the purpose of the figure is to help the reader to understand that: if the actor-spaces want 
to attain their goals Q)roduced by IRP and TGP), they must cooperate in the IRP 
implementation ofTongshuwan Village. 
5.3.2 Interessement: Keep the Local Residents on Track 
In the phase of problematization, the identities and relations between 
actor-spaces are tentatively established. Therefore, it is still possible for the actor-spaces 
to reject the detour to the assigned direction. In order to stabilize the roles of the actor-
spaces, it is necessary to impose an array of strategies. Interessement is a group of actions 
taken by the State to cut the linkage between the involved actor-spaces and other 
competing alliance (Callon 1986b). In this section, it will display series of strategies 
which are used to channelize the local residents to cooperate with the State in the IRP 
implementation of Tongshuwan Village. 
Latour (1987) suggests that to enrol the actor-spaces and stabilize their 
behaviour, it is necessary to limit the knowledge of the actor-spaces. It is because the 
more the actor-spaces know, the easier it will paralyze the enrolment (Latour 1987). 
Thus, the first strategy exercised in Tongshuwan Village is information control. 
From the investigation of the IRP implementation in Tongshuwan Village, 
it is discovered that the State is the only channel that distributes information to the 
relocated residents. This is evident from the result of asking the peasants about their 
information source on resettlement issues such as the exact date of relocation, the amount 
i 
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of compensation and the future arrangement, etc. Most of the interviewed residents got 
the information from the Village Representative Assembly (VRA) {Cunmin Daibiao 
Huiyi),�4 broadcasting and Village Party Secretary.'^ Meanwhile, some of the residents 
said that they received the message of relocation from television broadcasting and 
newspaper (Interviews, 1996)]6 It is clear that all the information channels of the 
villagers are under official control. In addition, through mobilizing the local favourable 
resources, the State can further control the village information flow. There are three 
kinds of local favourable resources. First, there was no road in the village before the 
winter of 1993 (Interview with Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996). Second, there is no 
telephone line in the village till now. The only telecommunication channel of the village 
is the broadcast line. Its main function is to announce official news and policies. Third, 
the education level of the villagers is not high. Most of them only graduated from 
primary school. Meanwhile, they can hardly read newspaper (as newspaper can be 
bought at post office only) (Field observation and interview, 8/8/1996). It implies that 
there is not any fast convenient and private channel for the villagers to acquire external 
message. Together with the relatively remoteness of the village, it helps the State to 
further control the local information flow (see Fig. 5.8). With this advantage, the State 
can easily manipulate the social atmosphere in the village in order to gain the support of 
the local residents in the IRP implementation. From the investigation result of the 
14 The ftinction o f V R A can be found in chapter 3. In Tongshuwan Village, the VRA is held twice a year. 
'Thus, it becomes a major information source for the villagers to know the official policy (Interview with 
Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996). , 
15 In the interview with the Village Party Secretary, Mr.Zhou, he said that he always needed to come to the 
peasants' houses to explain the resettlement affairs (Interview, 7/8/1996). 
16 In China, television broadcast and newspaper are strictly under state control. 
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impression of the IRP, it is found that all of the residents did not know the exact content 
of this policy. However, the majority of them could say that it is a policy which can 
benefit their living. It is reflected that although the residents have not been truly 
benefited from the IRP," under the promotion of official message, they increase their 
confidence of IRP implementation in the village (Interviews with Tongshuwan villagers 
1996). As a consequence, under the monopoly of the official message, the village 
residents were easily enrolled. 
By nature, the strategy of information control is a defensive one. It just 
limits the flow of information to the village. Therefore, the State has to implement some 
offensive strategies (see Fig. 5.8). The objective of these offensive strategies is to affect 
the attitude of the relocated people, thus to seek their cooperation in the IRP 
implementation of the village. First, they are the strategies of policy propagation and 
mass education (Interview with Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996). However, before the 
discussion of the strategies, it is necessary to introduce the structure of the village 
government. 
In Tongshuwan Village, it is the VC that is responsible for the local 
relocation project. The VC consists of 5 cadres who are all elected by the villagers. The 
head of the VC is usually the village leader {cunzhang). Theoretically speaking, the VC 
is the highest authority in the village. However, in Tongshuwan Village, the highest 
authority lies in the head of Village Party Secretary. This can be explained by 2 reasons. 
’ 17 It may be argued that some of the residents have been relocated for one to two years, they should be 
benefited from the IRP. However, it should be notice that in that period of time, they are in,debt (for the 
sake ofbuilding new house) and with income approximately the same as before (some are even lower than 
before as their orange groves have not reach the mature stage). Therefore, in that period, some of the 
residents are actually suffered (Field observation 1996). 
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First, it is a common view in China that the political status of party is higher than that of 
government. Thus, it is easy to explain why the local government is always under the 
leadership of the local party secretary. Second, Mr. Zhou Liyi has stayed on the post of 
Village Party Secretary ofTongshuwan Village for more than 20 years. In the village, he 
has a high prestige in the heart of the local residents.'^ Thus, the Village Party Secretary 
is totally in charge of the IRP implementation in Tongshuwan Village. 
There are 3 measures that the Village Party Secretary has taken to 
propagate the IRP and the TGP. First, the content of the IRP is painted into 28 large 
slogan on the walls of the houses. Second, the broadcast meeting is held once a week to 
introduce the content of IRP and the benefits of the TGP. Third, the village cadres are 
organized to visit the pilot site which aims at raising their morale. For examples, the 
village has organized tour to visit Wenhua Township which is a relocatees' accepting area 
(Interview with Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996). 
Meanwhile, the Village Party Secretary has exercised two methods to 
educate the public. First, in the course of IRP implementation, those households who 
complete their relocation task before the scheduled date will receive open appraisal in 
VRA. In contrast, those households who leave behind the schedule have to receive public 
criticism and subject to penal ty . Second, in order to educate those stubborn minded 
18 From my observation, the Village Party Secretary has a good reputation in the village. It can scrutinize 
from four evidences. First, every villager can tell you who is he and where he lives. Second, when you ask 
them about their impression towards him, their answers are unanimous that "he is a capable man". Third, 
everyone welcomes him and greets to him when he visits to the villagers. Fourth, he has not any bad habits 
like smoking, drinking wine and gambling (Field observation 1996). 
19 For example, it is written in the local resettlement ordinance that a male work force (age between 18-60) 
must exploit 0.2 mu of land per year whereas a female work force (age between 18-55) must axploit 0.16 
腕 o f land per year. Those who fail to complete the task will subject to penalty of 925 yuan per mu o f land. 
However, state cadres, students and teachers in the village do not need to comply (Tongshuwan Village 
resettlement plan 10/12/1994: 3，my translation). 
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relocatees, special learning classes are held. The above measures help the IRP 
implementation in the village, as the Village Party Secretary said: 
our propagation and education work have great impacts towards the IRP 
implementation. There are over 97% of the relocatees felt confident to the IRP 
implementation in our village (Interview, 7/8/1996). 
The State has succeeded in implementing the propagation and education 
measures by mobilizing local resources, i.e. the loyalty of the Village Party Secretary to 
the State (see Fig. 5.8). In the reform era, it can no longer be assumed that the village 
cadres remain loyal to implement state policy (especially in case of conflicts between 
village and the State, the village cadres are usually caught in an embarrassing position).^® 
However, it is investigated that the Village Party Secretary of Tongshuwan is adhered to 
the state policy in the village resettlement project. Thus, it is a favourable local resource 
for the State to mobilize and seek the cooperation of the local residents. 
Besides, there are also 3 other offensive strategies to affect the attitude of 
the relocated people (see Fig. 5.8). First, a pilot study is carried out in the village under 
which Tongshuwan Village is divided into eight divisions and six of them are needed to 
relocate. Division seven is the pilot study of the village (Personal contact with Village 
Party Secretary, 29/8/1995). The effect of pilot study affects the attitude of the relocated 
people in the village. Since the relocated people of other divisions saw the living 
conditions of the pilot one have been improved (old wooden houses are rebuilt to two to 
three storeys houses and the amount of arable lands have increased), it has reduced the 
worries of the relocatees towards the IRP implementation in the village. It is clearly 
I 
i 
2e The role of village cadre can refer back to Chapter 3. 
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illustrated in the relocation work of division one. During my f!eld work, division one is 
Still not yet relocated. One of the residents, Mr. Zhou, who will be relocated in next year 
said: 
I have visited some of the pilot households in our village. To us, the pilot has 
demonstrative effect. I think the pilot is good and I want to leam their 
experiences.... So I have planned to spend 20 thousands yuan to buy a tractor to 
move my belongings (Interview, 8/8/1996). 
It reflects that the village pilot study has established good examples to the villagers and 
made the people optimistic towards the IRP implementation in the village. 
Second, the model of the village cadres also helps to affect the attitude of 
the relocated people. In order to lead the public to cooperate in the IRP implementation, 
the Village Party Secretary insisted that the village cadres should first set up good 
example for the relocated people. There are 10 cadres and 15 members of CCP in the 
village. Secretary Zhou said that they all complete their relocation task before deadline?' 
Besides, he also quoted one of the examples. One of the village cadres called Xie 
Kegong supports the relocation work so strongly that he acts as a leader to scarify his 
backyard for the construction of road. Mr. Kong, a resident of division eight was very 
impressed when he heard the news of Mr. Xie. Also, he said that he was touched by the 
deeds of Secretary Zhou and the other village cadres that they worked night and day, even 
in the time of raining. Hence, in the eyes of some relocatees, the cadres' model at least 
has exerted influences on their attitude towards the IRP implementation in the village. 
Third, the visits of state, provincial and county leaders to the village have 
,positive effect on the attitude of the relocated people. Secretary Zhou said: 
t 
21 For the details of relocation task, see footnote 20. 
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the leaders ofprovince, county and related governmental departments come to our 
village every year. It has a positive effect that it can help us to solve the 
relocation problems, like relocation planning and capital investment problems, 
immediately (Interview, 7/8/1996，my translation). 
Meanwhile, he supplemented and said "each visit does increase the confidence of the 
public" (Interview, 7/8/1996). It is also evident when asking the effect of leaders' visit to 
the village that all of them agreed the State is highly concerned with the relocation project 
of Tongshuwan Village. Therefore, it helps the residents to be more confident about the 
village resettlement work. 
The adoption of the offensive strategies really helps to affect the attitude 
of the local residents. For examples, when asking the question "whether they expect 
assistance from the State in case of difficulties?", some of the interviewed peasants said 
that they expected the State to provide capital and material support in case of difficulties 
(Interviews, 1996).^^ On the contrary, one of the peasants said "the amount of money 
given to us is based on policy, so I don't expect anymore". Whereas another resident said 
"I am in difficulty, same as the State! Therefore, I don't expect" (Interview, one of the 
villagers in Division two, 9/8/1996). These two cases indicate that the above measures do 
effect changes on peasants' minds. 
22 For example, when taUcing with Mr. Wang, one of the villagers in division one, he stated that the 
government should help them by redistributing the farmland again. His ftiture is all dependent on the 
government's decision on land redistribution (Interview, 8/8/1996). On the other hand, Mr. Xu (division 
three) and Mr. Huang (division five) both agreed that the government should help them to solving the 
problem of drought in the village (Interviews, 8/8/1996 and 9/8/1996 respectively). 
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5,3.3 Enrolment: To Make the Local Residents Cooperated 
In the first stage of translation, the State has offered a detour for the actor-
spaces so that they (includes the State itself) can all be benefited. At that stage, all of 
them are tied by a single question ("can IRP be implemented successfully?") but nobody 
(even the State) can give a definite answer. In order to "transform a question into a series 
of statements which are more certain" (Callon 1986b: 211), the State has to use some 
strategies and mobilize local favourable resources. Therefore, in the stage of 
interessement, the State attempts to consolidate the link between the local residents and 
the government of Tongshuwan Village. Although the State has significantly shaped the 
attitude of the local residents, it does not mean that they will be cooperated in the village 
IRP implementation. Thus, it deploys the third stage of translation - enrolment” 
Enrolment is a series of multilateral negotiation between the State and the 
actor-spaces, aiming at making the latter to stand on the same line with the former. When 
applying the process of enrolment in the case of Tongshuwan, it is possible to say that the 
majority of the enlisted actor-spaces can be enrolled by "consent without discussion". 
The Guojiaba Resettlement Station as well as the Town government and County 
resettlement bureau are established to be in-charge of the resettlement work. Thus, they 
are definitely enrolled by the State in such a way. For the VC ofTongshuwan, although it 
is granted with autonomous status, the village is under the strong leadership of the 
Village Party Secretary. As mentioned before, the Village Party Secretary is closely 
linked with the State policy, thus the VC of Tongshuwan Village is also enrolled in the 
i 
23 The stage of enrolment can only come if the stage of interessement is successful (Callon 1986b). 
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way of "consent without discussion". Finally, there is only the local residents of the 
village left to be discussed. To enrol the local residents is meant to have series of 
negotiation (see Fig. 5.8). 
To seek the cooperation of the relocated people in involuntary 
resettlement, one cannot use the method of "physical violence". This is the root cause of 
the previous failures in the history of Chinese population resettlement (Mou & Cai 1996; 
Shui 1996). Therefore, to avoid past mistake, it is important to seek the support of the 
local residents ofTongshuwan Village by means of negotiation, transaction and seduction 
(see Fig. 5.8). They can be discussed in 4 aspects. 
First, the Tongshuwan Village negotiates with the County resettlement 
bureau to strive for local relocation. Originally, Tongshuwan Village is planned to 
relocate ‘outside，in 1991. However, under the effort of the Village Party Secretary and 
the local residents, they strive for relocating themselves locally in 1992 (Interview with 
Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996). In this local movement, it clearly shows that how the 
Village Party Secretary mobilizes local resources and links the local residents together to 
negotiate with the County resettlement bureau. The Village Party Secretary has skillfully 
manipulated three kinds of resources to achieve his goal. First, the Village Party 
Secretary makes use of the State document as a powerful weapon to negotiate with the 
County resettlement bureau. The preliminary resettlement document (a draft later 
promulgated as ordinance in 1993) published by the State stated that "village relocation 
should be based on agriculture, local resettlement and resources exploitation" {sanweizhu 
1 
"yinongweizhu houkaoweizhu jiaokaifaweizhu). Therefore, it becomes a powerful 
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Strategies used Resources mobilized locally 
Stage: Interessement 
1. Information Control State: the only channel to distribute information 
(Defensive measure) Lack of contact with the outside world, e.g. without 
telephone line. 
2. Affect the Attitude of State: only distribute positive message to peasants 
Peasants: Village Party Secretary: loyal to State policy 
(Offensive measures) Peasants: low education level • 
a/ Policy Propagation & Peasants: tend to be obedient 
Mass Education 
b/ Effect ofVillage Pilot 
c/ Village Cadres' Model 
d/ State Leaders' Visits 
Stage: Enrolment 
1. Strive for local 1,000 mu of land resources 
relocation successful Locally raised funds 
(Series ofNegotiation) Peasants: love homeland habit 
Local opinion: relocating locally 
2. Let the relocated people Local resettlement plan 
participate in the course of VRAs: the residents can raise their opinions 
formulating the local Hard working ofVillage Party Secretary: to explain 
resettlement regulation and clarify problems to the public 
3. Provide public facilities, Locally raised capital 
e.g. road and new primary The 20% compensation funds 
school. Long period of poverty 
(Series of Transaction) 
4. Future plan to improve Lack of public facilities, e.g. telephone lines 
the living conditions of Basic economic condition is quite good 
local residents Local residents strongly demand for living 
(Series of Seduction) improvement 
Fig. 5.8 Interessement and Enrolment: Lists of Strategies used and 
. Resources Mobilized in Tongshuwan Village (Source: Fieldwork 1996) 
/ 
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argument behind the strive for local relocation (Tongshuwan Village resettlement plan 
10/12/1994: 1). Second, the Village Party Secretary has mobilized local resources to 
strive for local relocation. ^^  In 1992, the Village Party Secretary negotiated with the 
local residents and gained their support. It was agreed that they would raise money 
locally to invite the Planning Institute of Wuhan (Wuhan Guihuayuan) to survey the land 
resources of the village. It was discovered that the village has 1,000 mu of land ready for 
exploitation. This is another strong argument for the village to strive for local relocation. 
Third, the Village Party Secretary utilizes the local residents' opinion to strive for local 
relocation. In preparing for local relocation, the Village Party Secretary and the VC has 
sent 'opinion cards' {yixiangke) to consult the opinions of the local residents. There are 
278 households decided to relocate locally and 3 households decided to relocate 'outside' 
(Interview with Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996). As a result, the County resettlement 
bureau approved the Tongshuwan Village to relocate locally instead of 'outside' in 1992. 
In this case, it is suggested both the state resources (the document) and the locally 
mobilized resources (the potential land resources, the locally raised capital and the local 
opinions) are used and transformed into powerful argument to strive for local relocation 
(see Fig. 5.9). 
In order to seek the support of the relocated people, their interests should 
be respected and protected. In the case of striving for local relocation, it reflects that local 
relocation can fulfill the interests of the majority of villagers. It is evident in the result of 
the peasants' interviews. All the interviewed residents unanimously agreed to relocate 
I 
/ 
24 In this case, the potential land resources, locally raised capital and local public opinion are three 
important local resources mobilized by the Village Party Secretary. 
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locally (Interviews, 1996). One of the local residents said "my homeland is better than 
any other golden and silver land" {jingwo yinwo buyu ziji kouwo). Another peasant said 
"loving homeland is the habit of peasant" (yilian gutu) (Interview, 8-9/8/1996). During 
my field work, it is discovered that ‘outward�relocation causes problems to local official. 
According to the Head of Guojiaba Town government, Mr. Li., admitted that relocating 
people away from homeland is a very difficult task. He said "the most difficult problem 
encounter in the ‘outward’ relocation is to decide who should relocate 'outside'?"?^ 
Meanwhile, when talking about how to recover the living conditions of the relocatees 
{yimin jingshenmianmao), he responds: 
for those whose relocated locally, they haven't any problem as they have new 
houses, increased farmlands and public facilities. However, for those moving 
‘outs ide�� they need at least three to five years to recover their original living 
conditions. 
One can scrutinize the difficulty of relocating people 'outside' not only from the dialogue 
with local official but also from people's complaints. During my visits to the town 
resettlement station, I can see that many people come there and complain. When I asked 
where do they came from? It is found that they are the residents whose relocated 
'outside'. No wonder Mr. Li said it is a difficult task as he did not only deal with the 
local relocatees but also those who have been moved outside. In short, success in striving 
local relocation is a first critical step to gain the support of the local residents in IRP 
implementation. 
Second, the Village Party Secretary negotiates the local resettlement plan 
with the local residents (see Fig. 5.8). The course of formulating the local resettlement 
I 
25 Refer back to footnote 1. 
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plan can be divided into three stages. The first stage is the preparation stage. After the 
village decided to relocate locally, the Village Party Secretary formulated the preliminary 
resettlement plan to cope with the local situation. The slogan of "land exploitation, road 
construction and house building" {tian lu fang) was formed. It is established as the 
sequence of relocation. Therefore, the relocated people should first finish land 
exploitation work, then their new houses can only be built till the construction of road 
(the section in front of their houses) completed (Interview with Village Party Secretary, 
7/8/1996). After the drafting this initial plan, the pilot was carried out in 1994. There are 
23 households with 91 residents in division seven listed as village pilot. The pilot study 
ended in the same year (Personal contact with Village Party Secretary, 29/9/1995). For 
the second stage, it is a period of consultation. After the end of the pilot study, the VC 
invited the Survey Bureau of Wuhan (Wuhan Cehuiqu) to assist in resettlement planning. 
Under the two months' field survey, it has made a model of the village. Before the 
formulation of the local resettlement regulation, the local residents were consulted in the 
VRA. Originally, the VRA was held twice a year. In 1994，several additional assemblies 
were held to discuss the relocation regulation. After the consultation of the public in the 
VRA, under the support of majority residents, the village resettlement regulation was sent 
to the Town government for approval (Interview with Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996). 
The third stage is the implementation period. In order to let all the residents to 
understand the content of the village resettlement regulation, the Village Party Secretary 
has printed 350 copies of the regulation and delivered to every household in the village. 
I 
Secretary Zhou expects that it can ensure each of the relocated people knows Jheir own 
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rights and duties in the course of relocation, hi the initial period of the regulation 
implementation, some of the residents still have many queries. Therefore, secretary Zhou 
has to visit their houses to explain and clarify the regulation to them personally. He said 
“I have to go to each group and household to talk with them face to face at least twice a 
month" (Interview with Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996). 
In the formulation of the village resettlement regulation, the local residents 
can have a chance to participate in it. Although the degree of participation may not be as 
high as the westem democratic countries, it is still important to seek the support of local 
residents in the IRP implementation in the village (see similar findings in Enakshi 1992: 
21). Besides, it is also found that if the residents know more about the regulation, it helps 
to implement the policy more effectively. It is evident in the peasants' interviews that 
most of them can tell their rights and duties written in the regulation. For examples, over 
90% of them can tell their amount of compensation fee, their maximum house 
construction size, their new farm size and the village resettlement plan, etc. 
Third, the Village Party Secretary has skillfully manipulated the local 
resources to provide public facilities to the local residents (see Fig. 5.8). It is evident in 
the construction of road and primary school of the village. The first benefit to the 
villagers in the resettlement project is the construction of road. Based on the preliminary 
resettlement plan, the slogan "road, house and orange grove" {lu fang yuan) promises the 
villagers that their living conditions will be improved in the future. The road was started 
to build in 1994 and planned to be finished in the early 1997. The capital for the road 
construction was raised locally with each of the residents contributed 100 yuqn. In the 
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investigation, although they have to hand in 100 yuan, they strongly support this project. 
One of the peasants in division eight, Mr. Kong, said “it is a road of affluence'' {xingfulu) 
(Interview, 7/8/1996, my emphasis). Another resident admitted that he has heard some 
voices against this project. However, he supplemented that 
the majority of residents are supporting this project. It is because it has made 
transportation more convenient than before. Why don't we support it? 
Moreover, it is discovered that the 100 yuan were deducted from their resettlement funds. 
However, some peasants even did not know that they have contributed 100 yuan. 
Secretary Zhou said "generally speaking, the living standard of our village residents is a 
little bit higher than the surrounding areas". My investigation reviews that the average 
income of the interviewed households in 1995 is around 10,000 yuan and one of them 
reaches 30,000 yuan?^ By mobilizing the local affluence, the Village Party Secretary 
decided to build the road on behalf of the resettlement project. In other words, the 
Village Party Secretary transforms local resources (the locally raised capital and the road) 
to achieve the goal of the State, i.e. to help to implement the IRP in the village. In the 
mind of the residents, the construction of road is a kind of benefit from the village 
resettlement project. It is evident from one of a peasant's dialogue who is preparing to 
relocate in next year: 
I think that the IRP is a policy that benefits to us as the road built has increased 
our convenience and my new house will be larger than before". 
Besides the road, the Village Party Secretary has mobilized local affluence to build a new 
primary school, which is planned to cost 850 thousands yuan. The Canadian government 
I 
has donated 120 thousands yuan for this project, 70 thousands yuan was raised locally, 
26 For the basic economic condition ofTongshuwan village, refer to the beginning ofsection 5.3.1 • 
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another 70 thousands yuan came from the relocation funds, and the State Education 
Department has given a subsidy of 275 thousands yuan (Interview with Village Party 
n 
Secretary, 7/8/1996). However, it is still short of315 thousands>^waw. Secretary Zhou 
said "I have tentatively held the compensation funds of the villagers to fill this gap.^^ 
Also, I can save up the money spent on other projects like the road construction". Will 
there be difficulty on road construction? He continued: 
the money on road construction can be saved by mobilizing local residents to do 
instead of employing workers (Interview, 7/8/1996). 
Once again, the Village Party Secretary transforms local resources (the local manual 
labour, the 20% compensation and the locally raised capital) to provide public facilities to 
the villagers for the resettlement project. Therefore, it has established an impression (in 
the mind of the villagers) that the IRP implementation in the village can benefit the 
villagers' living. It is evident from one of the villagers' saying: 
I don't know details about the IRP but I know that it is a good policy since it has 
given us new house, double income,^^ new road and school (Interview with Mr. 
Kong, one of the villagers in division eight, 7/8/1996). 
Fourth, the last way to enrol the local residents is through seduction. 
Since the relocated people started to recognize that the IRP is a policy beneficial to them, 
in order to maintain the cooperation of villagers with the State, it has to further promise 
27 The State Education Department gives subsidies o f 2 5 0 yuan to each of the villagers. There are 1,100 
villagers and therefore, the total amount is 275 thousands yuan. 
28 According to the village resettlement ordinance, the compensation fund is divided into three stages to 
distribute. First, 40% is given after the foundation of the house has been established. Second, another 40% 
is distributed when the new house has been buiIt. Third, the last 20% is provided only i f the old house has 
‘broken down. In this case, the Village Party Secretary has held on the last 20% of the compensation ftmd 
(Tongshuwan Village resettlement plan 10/12/1994: 1-2, my translation). , 
29 Since the water level has not yet raised, therefore, the original farmland of the peasants can still be 
farmed. In addition to the new exploited orange grove, the relocated people can have a double income 
(Interview with Mr. Li, Head ofGuojiaba Town, 5/8/1996). 
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improvement of living standard to the villagers (see Fig. 5.8). It is found that although 
the living of the villagers have been improved, they still demand more improvement. 
One of the villagers in division two, Mr. Zhou, said "the State should implement more 
projects in our village to provide more jobs for us". Whereas another peasant said “I 
think the best assistance for me is to redistribute the farmland. If the village don't 
redistribute farmland, I think my future living will not have any improvement" 
(Interview, 8/8/1996). Thus, it reflects that there are still some problems the villagers 
wanted to solve in the village. They hope to make use of this chance (in the course of 
undertaking the resettlement project) to acquire more improvements. By recognizing the 
further goals of the villagers, the Village Party Secretary has arranged an array of future 
plans for the village development. It can be divided into 3 aspects. First, it is planned to 
improve the agricultural conditions of the village. In order to solve the problem of water 
deficiencies in dry season, the village has formed a special team to study the problem of 
water sources in September, 1996. The village is planned to build two large water 
pumping stations. Meanwhile, different sizes of water pool will also be constructed. 
Under planning, every household builds a small pool; every group builds a medium pool 
and the village builds a large pool. Furthermore, in order to solve the problem of soil 
erosion, it is planned to build 7,000 metres water dikes. Lastly, hoping to raise the quality 
of farm products of the village, the VC cooperate with Huazhong Normal University to 
establish the "TGR Ecological Agriculture Demonstration Site" {Sawciakuqu 
Shengtainongye Shifanqu) in the village (Interview with Village Party Secretary, 
» 
7/8/1996). Second, the village also planned to further improve and expand ks public 
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facilities. Since the village still has no telephone line connected, the village plans to 
remedy this situation in 1998. In addition, 80% of the villagers have television sets, but 
they are always under intervention. Thus, the village will also plan to install cable 
television for the residents in the future. Besides, in order to improve the road condition 
under raining, it is planned that the roads will be re-surfaced.^® Third, the Village Party 
Secretary planned to redistribute the farmland after the completion of the village 
resettlement project. Since, the existing land distribution pattern has not been changed 
for 30 years, it is necessary to redistribute the land evenly. It is in the mind of the Village 
Party Secretary that each peasant will have one mu of land in average (Interview, 
7/8/1996). 
By formulating a series of plans, the Village Party Secretary has continued 
to gain the cooperation of the public in IRP implementation in the village. Although 
there might not be sufficient findings for these projects, the most important thing is to 
maintain the cooperation oflocal residents with the State through the seduction offurther 
improvement in living standard. Therefore, it helps to implement the IRP in the 
Tongshuwan Village. 
In short, by mean of enrolment, the local residents are further locked in the 
track which has been designed in the process of problematization. The success in 
enrolment paves the way for the next phase -- the process ofmobilization. 
» 
i 
30 There is limited capital for the construction of this road, thus, it is a mud road that causes trouble for 
transportation when raining (Interview and field observation, 1996). 
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5.3.4 Mobilization: The Success ofTranslation 
The last phase of translation is mobilization. With translation, the roles 
and identities of the actor-spaces have been stabilized and they are linked together to 
render the single question into an indisputable status. Finally, they are acted together "as 
a unit of force" (Callon 1986b: 216). Thus, if the former processes of interessement and 
enrolment are successful, mobilization will follow suit. 
In the IRP implementation of Tongshuwan Village, it is found that the 
translation of the State is successful. Therefore, the local residents are mobilized to 
cooperate with the State and follow the local resettlement regulation to complete their 
relocation task. It is investigated that there are over 80% of the relocated people resettled 
at the end of 1996.31 It is planned the relocation project of the village will be completed 
at the end of 1997. When the result of the village relocation project was asked, Secretary 
Zhou responded that there are 4 kinds of improvements after the resettlement. First, there 
have been 700 mu of land exploited and 400 mu of them (orange grove) can be harvested 
in 1996. It has provided a total income of 200 thousands yuan for the peasants in 1996. 
Second, the peasants not only can harvest their new exploited farmlands but also have 
earnings from their old farmlands. It is found that some of the peasants even planted on 
the land of their previous houses (since the houses have been broken down, therefore, the 
empty space is also left for farming). Third, the living conditions of the local residents 
have generally been improved. He said "their wooden houses become red brick ones and 
the total residential space has been enlarged from 34 thousands square metres in the past, > 
t 
31 There are 228 households have been relocated at the end of 1996 with a total number of 995 local 
residents (The total number of relocated household is 278) (Interview with Village Party Secretary, 
7/8/1996). ‘ 
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to now, 54 thousands square metres" {youtudaoyang, youxiaodaoda). Fourth, the security 
of the village has also been improved. He said “ in the last year during the period of 
orange harvest, we need to send somebody to guard our farm. However, we don't need to 
do so in this year. I think it is because the living conditions of people have been 
improved" (Interview with Village Party Secretary in 7/8/1996, my translation). 
Generally speaking, the relocated people are satisfied with the living after 
relocation. However, there are still some problems the relocatees have to face. For 
example, one of the relocatees in division five, Mr. Huang, said that his living condition 
is approximately the same as before. 
It is even worst that during my house construction, I have borrowed money from 
friends and relatives. Therefore, in this one or two years, I need to repay the debt 
(Interview, 9/8/1996). 
It is definite that many relocatees have to face the same problem. Secretary Zhou said 
that the average compensation fee for the relocated household is 17.8 thousands yuan but 
the average cost of building house is 35 thousands yuan. Hence, the relocated people 
have to raise money by themselves to fill this gap. Because of a relatively poor 
foundation, there are 5% of the relocatees having big difficulties in house construction 
(Interview with Village Party Secretary, 7/8/1996).32 
Since it is anticipated that the village will complete the relocation project 
in 1997 and the Village Party Secretary has successfully sought the cooperation of the 
32 According to the village resettlement ordinance, the amount of compensation fee is based on<he size and 
the materials of their previous house (Tongshuwan Village resettlement plan 10/12/1994: 2-3). The poor 
foundation households are those whose previous houses are small and made of low quality materials such as 
mud and wood (Personal contact with Mr. Cai Chongfa, 6/8/1996). 
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local residents in IRP implementation, the translation of the State in Tongshuwan Village 
can be considered as a success. 
5.4 Summary 
The chapter has illustrated the process of IRP implementation by means of 
the actor-network theory. In the context of Zigui resettlement project, TGPRDB acts as 
the translator to link up heterogeneous actor-spaces. The Zigui Resettlement Bureau and 
local government, Guojiaba Town Resettlement Station and local government, as well as 
Tongshuwan Villagers and Party Secretary, all are the enlisted actors. The roles and 
relations of these actors are defined in the population resettlement ordinance and 
resettlement system. However, the major linkage among them is by means of resource 
circulation. Two main ways of resource circulation are identified - resource allocation 
and mobilization. The State's resource allocation is mainly at the city and provincial 
level, therefore, resource mobilization is very important for the implementation of 
translation at the county level or below. The availability of resources mobilized and 
strategies of translation are spatially contingent. Therefore, actors involved in Zigui 
resettlement project are re-interpreted as actor-spaces. A case, Tongshuwan Village, is 
selected to illustrate how resources are mobilized and strategies are employed to translate 
heterogeneous actor-spaces. Four phases of translation illustrates the implementation of 
IRP in Tongshuwan Village. In the first stage, problematization, the TGPRDB attempts 
to guide the actor-spaces into assigned direction. For actor-spaces involved in Zigui 
resettlement, development of local economy is to construct the TGP. To coristruct the 
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TGP is to implement resettlement successfully. To implement resettlement successfully 
is to implement IRP. In this way, to develop local economy is inevitably linked with IRP 
implementation. In order to mobilize localized resources and strategies, the TGPRDB 
translates the Village Party Secretary as agent in Tongshuwan village resettlement. In the 
second stage, interessement, the roles of actor-spaces are stabilized by employing both 
defensive and offensive strategies. For the former, the Village Party Secretary maintains 
limited information flow into village so as to stabilize the role of local actor-spaces. For 
the latter, the Village Party Secretary affects the attitude of local actor-spaces by policy 
propagation, village pilot, village cadres' model as well as state leaders' visits. In the 
third stage, enrolment, actors-spaces are further enlisted to play their assigned roles. This 
is achieved by series of negotiations, transaction and seduction. In this stage, different 
kinds of local resources are mobilized such as land resources, locally raised funds, local 
opinions, local resettlement plan, long period of poverty, as well as habits of peasants, 
etc. In the final stage, mobilization, local actor-spaces are mobilized to resettle and 
cooperate with the State. Having gone through these stages, IRP implementation in 




SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Summary of the Findings 
This research has unravelled the IRP implementation in Zigui County. 
The conventional decision-making models, the rationality model and the power model, 
conceive of the implementation of a national policy as an administrative order imposed 
from the top of the Chinese political hierarchy (Lieberthal & Okensberg 1988). However, 
the Chinese society has changed rapidly in post-Mao era. As interests of the central and 
local have become increasingly diverted, the outcome of a national policy implementation 
is very much dependent on the interpretation and loyalty of the local leaders, ln this way, 
local leaders are important ingredient in affecting policy implementation in a locale. This 
fragmented bureaucratic structure, therefore, produces a new political culture in China ~ 
bargaining behaviour. This new political culture implies that local cooperation is a 
prerequisite to the smooth implementation of national policies. Therefore, policy 
implementation in China nowadays is not something imposed from above but generated 
by the association of a set of heterogeneous actors. In order to have a better 
conceptualization of the interplay of heterogeneous actors, the actor-network approach 
was employed. 
’ Under the actor-network analysis, IRP implementation is seen as the 
t 
sociology of translation. In other words, to implement IRP is "to enrol, convince and 
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enlist others into network on terms which allow the initial actors to 'represent' the others" 
(Murdoch 1995: 748). This process has been investigated empirically in Tongshuwan 
Village. The TGPRDB acts as the translator. The translated actors include Zigui 
Resettlement Bureau and local government, Guojiaba Town Resettlement Station and 
local government, as well as Tongshuwan Villagers and Party Secretary. The roles and 
relations of these translated actors are defmed through resource mobilization. Besides, 
they are also tied together by various kinds of strategies. However, resources mobilized 
and strategies oftranslation are spatially contingent. In this way, the translated actors in 
Zigui resettlement project are also regarded as actor-spaces. There are four phases of 
translation -- problematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilization. For the first 
phase, the TGPRDB has made an initial plan to channelize the enlisted actor-spaces to an 
assigned direction. The logic of translation seems like this: to develop local economy is 
to construct the TGP; to construct the TGP is to implement resettlement successfully; and 
to implement resettlement successfully is to implement IRP. Therefore, it has been 
achieved that the prerequisite for developing local economy is the implementation of 
IRP. To mobilize local resources and strategies effectively, the TGPRDB translates the 
Village Party Secretary as agent in Tongshuwan village resettlement. For the second 
phase，the Village Party Secretary has employed two main strategies to lock the actor-
spaces in their own roles. First, he has limited information flow into village. Second, he 
has implemented various measures to affect the attitude of local actor-spaces such as 
policy propagation, mass education, village pilot and village cadres' model. For the third 
phase，the Village Party Secretary has made the actor-spaces to cooperate by.a series of 
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negotiation, transaction and seduction. Besides, various kinds of local resources have 
been mobilized, such as land resources, locally raised funds, local opinions, local 
resettlement plan, long period of poverty, as well as habits ofpeasants, etc., to further link 
up the actor-spaces. For the last phase, it is found that local actor-spaces has started to 
cooperate with the State and resettle under the guidance of IRP. By applying this 
approach, the IRP implementation is investigated empirically on the extent to which the 
State controls over a locale. Therefore, a new rationale of the Chinese State's 
governmentality has been found. On the one hand, it paves the way for making 
recommendations for future TGP resettlement, and on the other hand, it gives reflections 
on current policy implementation practice in China. 
Meanwhile, this research has also examined the role of space in affecting 
the IRP implementation. As mentioned above, localized resources and strategies have 
determined the size ofactor-spaces as well as the success oftranslation. However, they 
are spatially contingent. Hence, the characteristics ofZigui County have been regarded as 
having the role of uncovering the localized effects and their impacts on IRP 
implementation. In other words, Zigui County has dwelt on the context in which the IRP 
implemented. Besides, local specific forces have also affected the IRP implementation. 
Due to the postponement o f T G P for several decades, the TGR has been molded as one of 
the poorest regions in China. Needless to say, there is a strong development hunger in 
TGR. The coming of TGP in 1990s has definitely brought capital and development 
impetus to the TGR. The TGP intertwines with the local development hunger in TGR, 
thus, creating a favourable condition for IRP implementation. . 
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6.2 Research Limitations 
Doing research is a process of learning. Recognizing limitations is very 
important. On the one hand, it helps the researcher to have self-improvement in the 
future and, on the other hand, it allows readers standing at a better position to evaluate 
and understand the whole research. In the process of doing this research, it has 
discovered that the major obstacle is the political atmosphere in China. The tense 
political atmosphere in China has rendered the attitude of the local cadres, irrespective of 
the different roles they are involved in the TGP, cautious towards any investigation of 
TGP. This is even more so towards foreign investigators, because they do not want the 
leakage of any unfavourable message about the TGP to the outside world. 
This is understandable since the TGP is still an extremely controversial 
issue. Although the TGP was approved by the NPC in 1992, opponents of the TGP have 
not given up their battle for banning the construction one way or other. In the eyes of 
some domestic scholars, the approval of the TGP was a reckless and arbitrary political 
decision.' They criticize that this project is a "pet project" of some Chinese leaders 
(Huus 1994, Sullivan 1995” In the decision making process o f the project, as most of the 
experts were "technically illiterate and politically subservient supports of pro-dam party 
leaders", opposing voices have not been received sufficient attention (Sullivan 1995: 
1 Wu, Guoguang (1994, cited in Dai 1994) has noted that “[in] China, nothing is free ofpolit ics. Although 
it should be a scientific issue, the Three Gorges Project has, unfortunately, been dragged into the political 
arena". 
2 A Chinese historian in Beijing comments that the project is "Li Peng's pet project... lt is traditional for 
• emperors to build monuments to themselves" (Huus 1994: 70). Whereas Dai (1996, cited in Dai & Xue 
1996: 1) also criticizes that "the project can be approved under a contentious situation, all theother factors 
being less important that: 'Deng Xiaoping agreed’ has always been the most critical factor in the critical 
moment" (my translation). She also calls this project the "pet project o f t h e red emperor" (Sullivan 1995-
268). 
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267). Besides, the approval of the TGP has also aroused criticism abroad. Sullivan 
(1995) points out that the Chinese authority has totally underestimated the environmental 
impacts of the project. Due to this reason, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank 
have refused to provide any financial support for the project (Huus 1994，Sullivan 1995).] 
To counteract the above criticism, the Chinese authority has tied the project with Chinese 
nationalism/ As a result, the project supporters are "identified with the power and glory 
of the Chinese nation" whereas the opponents are classified as "tools of foreign interests" 
(Sullivan 1995:269). 
It is in this context that one should view the importance of information 
about population resettlement. If there is any chaos in the process of resettlement, it will 
not only affect the construction of the TGP but also the stability o f the TGR as well as the 
whole of China.5 Moreover, the CCP is in the period of leadership transition, the most 
important task ahead is to maintain stability in China) Such a large project, which has 
been identified with national pride, will leave the Chinese government with no alternative 
but keeping a close on it. If problems arose from the TGP, the responsible local cadres 
will definitely receive criticism from above and demotion. Indeed, it did happen once in 
Zigui. In the summer of 1995, two Norwegian students came and video-tapped the 
3 "Environmental groups in the United States have attacked the project as one o f t h e World Bank's "Fatal 
Five" - five large development schemes that have been criticized as indicative of low priority for 
environmental concerns in the Bank's lending decisions" (Feamside 1988: 615). 
4 The Premier, Li Peng has boasted that the TGP "will show the rest o f t h e world that the Chinese people 
have high aspirations and the capabilities to successftilly build the world's largest water conservancy and 
hydroelectric power project" (Sullivan 1995: 269). 
, 5 In an internal-security report ofWanxian county, it states that "dissatisfaction ofresettlers combined with 
the instigation by troublemakers will undoubtedly cause chaotic incidents such as sit-ins, demonstrations, 
“ petitions and even criminal acts, including beating, smashing, looting, ransacking and kidnappine" (Huus 
1994: 72). 
6 The major position in the CCP will be rearranged in the fifteenth committee o f the CCP in late 1997. 
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resettlement. However, they displayed it openly abroad without the consent of the local 
authority. It, once again, stirred up criticism from overseas criticism. The local cadres, 
caught in a very embarrassed situation, had suffered a harsh criticism from the central 
authority (Personal communication, 29/8/1995). Since then, the Zigui local government's 
attitude towards TGP investigations has been very careful, especially those undertaking 
by foreigners7 
As a result, it has posed some problems for my research. First, the 
response to my request for some basic socioeconomic data about Zigui was postponed 
from the winter of 1995 to the summer of 1996. Thus, it has hindered my preparation for 
field work. Second, I have to hand in my investigation proposal to the Head o f the county 
for scrutiny, back and forth several times, before starting my field work. I was asked to 
delete sensitive questions that they do not want you to ask in the interview. In this way, it 
has constrained my interview content. Third, during my field work in Tongshuwan 
village, to ensure that my investigation will not cause any trouble to the local authority, 
the Village Party Secretary arranged a local cadre to accompany me in interviews. On the 
one hand, it made the peasant's dialogue restrictive and conservative. They seemed to 
avoid answering in details that they thought sensitive. On the other hand, the sampling 
7 The cautious attitude of the local cadres on the TGP can be reflected, first, in the preparation of my field 
work. Professor Zhang Guangyuan of Huazhong Agricultural University, who has undertaken research in 
Zigui for several years, advises me that "resettlement investigation in this period is a very sensitive issue, lt 
,does not allow you to conduct the investigation freely and anywhere you like. Also, it is necessary for you 
to state your intention clearly and in details so as to gain the confidence of the local cadret" (Personal 
communication, 1/8/1996). Second, in the beginning of my field work, the Village Party Secretary 
repeatedly reminds me that "your investigation must base on fact and must write on what you have seen in 
the village; otherwise I may be in trouble" {shishiquishi) (Personal communication, 7/8/1996). 
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technique of identifying interviewees was not random: Instead it depended on the 
relations with the local cadre.^ This sampling method may not be the ideal. 
In order to overcome the above restrictions, informal discussion with the 
peasants were also undertaken during my field work. It helped to re-confirm my 
interview results. When comparing the content of informal discussion with those of 
interviews, it was found that the difference between them is marginal. Therefore, it 
reflects that my worry about the limitations of my interviews is less reaL^ Besides, I have 
relied on field observation to test the validity of the interview result. I have stayed in that 
village for two weeks and I lived in a peasant's house. Therefore, there are many 
opportunities for me to go around and talk with them in "spare time". 
In sum, the results of my interviews are reliable. Of course, I could have 
carried out more extensive and intensive interviews, had there been no restriction. Then 
my research findings could be more persuasive. 
6.3 Implications of the Study 
The implications ofthis study can be discussed in terms ofboth theoretical 
advancement and policy recommendations. 
8 Under my observation, most of the interviewees were the friends of the local cadre, or at least have good 
relations with h e r . � have once asked her a question that "are you seldom go to group one (since I observed 
that it was difficult for her to find interviewees in group one) � ” "I have fewer friends there so I seldom eo 
‘there," she replied (Personal contact, 8/8/1996). ’ 
9 It may be true that in the traditional mind of Chinese peasant, they are more likely to mention the good 
points of their village to the outsiders. The converse is equally true: if they are dissatisfied with the 
government arrangement, the foreign investigator is a very good channel to express their criticism towards 
the government. 
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6.3.1 Theoretical A dvancement 
It is a truism to say that this research has enriched the studies on TGP. 
Existing studies have focused on either the practical dimension of the project or whether 
or not it is a rational decision. Discussion has always been focused on the economic 
aspects. In unveiling how population has been resettled, this research has opened up a 
domain of study on TGP. In the end, we will know more about the project. 
It has made a small advancement on the way to study policy 
implementation in China. In the existing literature, the majority conceive policy outcome 
as either dominated by the upper hierarchy of the State or affected by the local. This 
research has exposed the problems of these perspectives as outdated and unrealistic. 
They may not be an appropriate framework to understand policy implementation in China 
nowadays. Instead of following the previous accounts, the present study has adopted the 
actor-network approach. The actor-network approach draws the attention to the dynamics 
between actors in a policy implementation process. Since the local governments have 
become more autonomous in the reform era, the implementation of national policy in 
local areas, indeed, needs the local cooperation increasingly. Not much attempt has been 
done to relate all the actors of the whole dynamic process within a theoretical framework. 
Therefore, this research is a plausible launching point to employ a micro-perspective to 
unravel policy implementation process in China. 
Furthermore, this research has argued emphatically the importance of the 
spatial dimension, which has seldomly been touched on by the existing literature. The 
actor-network approach has abstracted the IRP implementation as the i;iterplay of 
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different actors. However, to investigate the empirical reality in Zigui County, it is 
impossible to operate abstract theory in practice without considering the role of space. 
Therefore, this research has provided us a comprehensive picture on the IRP 
implementation in Zigui County and offered a clear illustration on how the abstract theory 
is operated in a concrete context. It should be clearly now that space should be put back 
to the study on policy implementation in China and be conceptualized appropriately. 
6.3.2 Policy Recommendation 
The above chapters have shown that the policy implementation in post-
reform China is much different from what we have usually conceived. Therefore, the 
present research findings may have important practical implications. 
First, the case study revealed that the IRP implementation from the central 
State to the village needs the cooperation of different local actors. This has a strong 
implication for administrative reform. The Chinese bureaucratic structure has become 
increasingly fragmented. However, the path of fragmentation has been operated without 
a fruitful guidance. While it is necessary to have the cooperation of local actors, it is 
found that the central-local relations have not been clearly defined yet ." Therefore, it is 
suggested that the central- local relations needed to be institutionalized in the form of 
administrative reform so as to guarantee the smooth implementation ofnational policy in 
local areas. 
…In existing Chinese political system, local states are considered as the agent o f the central state. Owing to 
the economic reform in the past decade, the local states have gained certain kinds ofeconomic autonomy. 
However, till now, there is still lacking a formal and institutionalized relation among the central and local 
s t a t e s ( W u & Z h e n g l 9 9 5 ) . 
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Second, it is also discovered that in order to gain the support of local 
people, the policy should consider the local interests at least. In the case of Tongshuwan 
Village, the success in policy implementation in the village can be attributed to the State's 
skillful manipulation of local resources and strategies. However, one should not forget 
that the policy itself is the major consideration of the relocated people. If the IRP harms 
the interests of the villagers, hardly can it gain the local support. Likewise, the 
mobilization of local resources and localized translation strategies have significantly 
reduced the cultural barriers that posed on the IRP implementation.^^ Unlike the family 
planning policy, the IRP is commonly accepted by the village community. Hence, it was 
successfully implemented. This comparison reveals that national policies should take 
into consideration local interests at least to a certain extent if they were to be 
implemented successfully. 
Third, the IRP may be the basis to formulate other policies. It is a 
relocation policy which helps to develop local economy rather than provides relief works 
only. A such, it is possible to apply the model of IRP to the domain of Chinese 'poverty 
assisting policy’ {fupin zhengce). It has been estimated that 65 million people are still 
regarded as 'poverty population' {pinkun renkou), which need government assistance, in 
1996. In order to improve the poverty of these people, it is imperative to change the 
present relief policy to IRP. Thus, the new direction of 'poverty assisting policy�should 
“ G u o (1996) exposes that the main barrier of implementing family planning policy in rural community is 
the village culture. It involves the farmers worship familism, small peasant economy lifestyle as well as the 
clansman consciousness (the core spirit of male peasant). It is suggested that in order to reduce the local 
resistance to national policy, it is necessary to consider the cultural practices ofruraI society. 
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be to exploit local resources so as to provide long term stable livelihood rather than 
provide short lived assistance. 
6.4 Directions for Future Research 
This research has made a modest contribution to the actual implementation 
process of IRP in Zigui County. As the TGR will continually carry out resettlement 
project till 2009, one can expect that the Zigui experience may not be the only one. There 
may be different experiences in other relocated counties in TGR. Therefore, it is 
imperative to further investigate the IRP implementation process in other relocated 
counties or in other future mega-project of China. These attempts will further enrich the 
understanding on the whole TGP resettlement project. 
This research represents the first attempt to illustrate the policy 
implementation process by the actor-network approach. Owing to limited time and data, 
only Zigui County has been chosen for investigation. The findings of this research can be 
further enriched by operating this approach on other regions as well as other policy 
domains. It is worthwhile applying this approach to other regions such as the coastal 
prosperous region. In doing so, it will help us to capture the variations in different 
operating contexts with unique locality effect. One can also make comparisons between 
coastal regions and inland regions so as to get a full picture on the regional political 
development of China. Likewise, it is also imperative to operate this approach in other 
policy domains such as poverty relief. In this way, we would be in a much better position 
to scrutinize the different implementation patterns of various policy domains . ‘ 
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